Co-operative or investor owned: how does the structure of the electric wind energy firm influence the effects of wind energy development on community development? by Taylor, Keith
 
 
 
 
 
       CO-OPERATIVE OR INVESTOR OWNED: HOW DOES THE STRUCTURE OF 
THE ELECTRIC WIND ENERGY FIRM INFLUENCE THE EFFECTS OF WIND 
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT? 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
KEITH ANDREW TAYLOR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSERTATION 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Human and Community Development  
in the Graduate College of the  
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2013 
 
 
 
 
Urbana, Illinois 
 
 
Doctoral Committee: 
 
Professor, Chair & Director of Research Gale Summerfield 
Assistant Professor Stephen Gasteyer, Co-Chair 
Professor William Sullivan 
Professor Patrick Mooney 
 
 
 
! ii!
Abstract 
 
Wind energy has consistently grown at a rapid pace over the last decade, doubling 
in total installed wind energy capacity roughly every two and a half years.  Community 
and economic development externalities of wind energy development are presumed to 
contribute to community wellbeing through market-based mechanisms.  The scholarship 
on the interactions between wind energy firms and their host communities has yet to 
critically analyze these presumptions despite the extraordinary importance of energy 
governance and development in current affairs.  The status quo continues to be advanced 
in public policy with little assessment of the community outcomes, nor of the 
consequence of privileging a given institutional model (the investor-owned utility) over 
robust alternatives (electric co-operatives).  By ignoring the effects of organizational 
structure of wind energy firms, government energy policymakers may be missing an 
opportunity to enhance potential community development outcomes. 
Dominant theories of development –from the Wilsonian bureaucratic 
administrative approach to Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons- claim that development is 
optimized when external, elite, centralized actors govern.  But recent work by Elinor 
Ostrom and the Bloomington School finds that in many instances community 
development is optimized when resources users from the local community govern 
themselves. 
What are the implications of applying Bloomington School policy to the wind 
energy sector?  In order to address this, two questions are posed for analysis: How does 
wind energy development interact with community development?  And what roles does 
the institutional model play in these interactions?   
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Comparative case studies were performed of two ownership models of wind 
energy firms and their host communities: Ward County, North Dakota’s co-operative-
owned PrairieWinds wind farm, and McLean County, Illinois’s investor-owned Twin 
Groves wind farm.  The Bloomington School’s Institutional Analysis and Development 
Framework informed the methodological approach to understand how wind energy 
development and operations interact with local level community development, how the 
ownership model influences the actions of the utility, and how the systems of endogenous 
and exogenous governance influence the overall interaction.  Fieldwork, interviews, and 
archival analyses were used to gather the data necessary to inform these questions.  
Findings indicate that the ownership model of the wind energy firm matters, 
namely that the co-operative firm exhibits a number of features conferring enhanced 
community development outcomes.  In contrast to these findings, current wind energy 
development policy privileges absentee, private ownership and stewardship of wind 
energy resources.  Public policy must allow for institutional diversity in order to 
guarantee optimal community development outcomes.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 The classical research on coal and oil boomtowns in rural American communities 
during the 70’s and 80’s highlights the chaotic possibilities of absentee-owned energy 
development on host communities.  Today, rural communities are again at the center of 
another mass expansion of energy development (since the 2000’s), this time in the guise 
of wind turbines.  The new energy boom is ushering in another transformative era for 
rural American communities rich in these resources.  But this time, the outcomes may be 
different for those communities hosting this new infrastructure. 
      Wind energy “boomtowns” will look different from the coal and oil boomtowns 
of old.  Wind, unlike coal and oil, is said to be an inexhaustible source of energy, 
meaning that once a wind farm is built, the infrastructure will remain rooted for a 
prolonged period of time, thereby providing host communities with a level of stable long-
term planning capacity not found in other communities host to exhaustible energy 
sources.  Additionally, firms and investors involved in wind energy development are 
differentiating themselves from so-called dirty energy producers, linking wind energy to 
social and environmental causes, promising a greater collective benefit.  Finally, 
renewables such as wind (and solar) are advocated by the current Obama Administration 
as central to U.S. energy policy’s targeted goals of grid modernization and enhanced 
energy security (both in terms of energy independence and reliable energy sourcing), 
meaning there will be more –not less- wind turbines being erected across the rural 
countryside. 
      What do we know of the development claims of wind energy firms?  Are they 
valid?  And do the public policy pathways maximize community gains from this new 
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energy boom, or are alternatives obscured? 
      It is important to understand the trends in wind energy development, and 
contextualize why the wind energy development phenomenon may influence the day-to-
day lives of those people living within the communities.  Importantly, it is also important 
to understand the actors involved in wind energy development, and how their underlying 
motivations shape community development outcomes.  This chapter will give a broad 
overview of the wind energy industry, followed up by questions essential toward 
understanding the community outcomes, the role of the ownership model of the firm, and 
the government and market policy pathways that play a direct role.  The chapter then 
concludes with an outline of the dissertation itself. 
The Growth in Wind Energy 
      The focus here is wind energy development. Wind energy development is the 
growth leader amongst renewables.  On the outset of this study, carried out in 2011, wind 
energy was expected to grow at a projected annual rate of 39 percent over the next five 
years (“World Wind Energy Association,” 2010); this represents an expected doubling of 
total installed wind energy capacity every two and a half years (Madison, 2010).  Actual 
global wind energy has been a bit slower than the estimate; it grew at 20.3 percent in 
2011, and approximately 16 percent in 2012 ("World Wind Energy Association," 2012).  
Wind energy development, like large-scale economic development, is presumed to 
contribute to community wellbeing through market-based growth (McKibben, 2007; 
Miraftab, 2004b, p. 91; Pellow & Brulle, 2005).  These suppositions are rarely measured 
against the reality of their claims, nor do the suppositions account for the perspectives of 
individuals who have firsthand exposure to wind energy development in their 
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community.  By ignoring the effects of organizational structure of wind energy firms, 
government energy policymakers may be missing an opportunity to enhance potential 
community development outcomes. 
      The scholarship on wind energy development processes has largely been relegated 
to economic modeling with little attention paid to the social and community outcomes 
(Kildegaard & Myers-Kuykindall, 2006; Loomis & Carter, 2011).  Data available mainly 
come from environmental, industry, or oppositional interests. That means community 
members have a narrow scope of data with which to inform wind energy development 
decisions.  Additionally, little scholarly attention has been dedicated to energy 
governance “despite the extraordinary importance of energy in current” affairs (Aitken, 
2010; Florini & Sovacool, 2009, p. 5240).  The dissertation adds to the energy and policy 
development and institutional literatures through an institutional analysis of the 
community development outcomes arising from wind energy development. 
       The central hypothesis of this dissertation proposal is that the ownership structure 
of the wind energy firm will result in differing community development outcomes; 
specifically a community-based ownership model of the wind energy firm differs in 
community development influence from ownership by the absentee investor-owned 
utility (IOU1).  Of particular interest are the community governance implications of the 
rapid deployment of wind energy in rural communities.  Preliminary research 
(Brockhouse, 2008) on community ownership models of wind energy has demonstrated 
an enhanced local economic multiplier effect and increased economic capacity when 
weighted against IOU development outcomes (Kildegaard & Myers-Kuykindall, 2006): 
An increasing body of empirical research indicates that corporate and community !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1     IOU is an industry standard acronym used when referencing investor-owned models of energy utilities.  
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wind development structures are not equal in terms of their local economic 
impacts, not limited to the owners themselves.  In particular, mounting evidence 
points to the idea that community wind has greater economic impacts on local 
economies during the operational phase of the project, due to local spending 
multiplier effects associated with the higher income streams (p. 1). 
 
One electric utility model has received little attention in the scholarly literature: the co-
operative model.  Co-operative-owned businesses have, in general, been linked to 
enhanced development outcomes, particularly in regions with robust co-operative 
economic sectors (Deller, Hoyt, Hueth, & Sundaram-Stukel, 2009; Fazzi, 2011; Putnam, 
Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993; Restakis, 2010).  However, almost all of the rapidly 
expanding wind energy industry is investor-owned, with only two utility-scale co-
operative wind farms existing in the entire USA as of 2013.2  Neither model of wind 
energy ownership (co-operative or IOU) has been critically analyzed for its community 
development effects.  The intent of this dissertation is to fill that gap and increase 
understanding of the implications of this rapid rate of growth on the wind energy host 
communities.   
      The author carried out case studies of two organizationally-different wind energy 
firms and their host communities: Ward County, North Dakota’s PrairieWinds wind 
farm, co-operatively-owned and operated by the Basin Electric Power Co-operative, and 
McLean County, Illinois’s Twin Groves wind farm, operated by the investor-owned 
Horizon Wind.  The two cases were chosen in part for a number of attributes based on 
data culled from the outset of the research in 2010.  Illinois was of interest because the 
state was nationally ranked 16th in total wind energy resources, but 6th in actual installed 
wind energy generation capacity ("American Wind Energy Association," 2012a).  North !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2     This dissertation is focused on only utility-scale wind farms.  Community-owned wind farms are typically 20 megawatts (MW) 
and below.  Kildegaard and Myers-Kuykindall (2006) classified wind farms with a capacity of 50 MW and above as corporate-scale.  
For the purposes of this paper, a wind farm meeting that criteria is more accurately labeled a utility-scale wind farm. 
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Dakota on the other hand was ranked number one nationally in terms of total wind energy 
resources, but 10th in actual installed wind energy generation capacity ("American Wind 
Energy Association," 2012a).  Despite North Dakota’s status as 10th in actual installed 
capacity, the state is host to one of the nation’s two co-operatively owned, utility-scale 
wind farms, adding a further element of interest. 
      The North Dakota case of Ward County is particularly of interest because of its 
status as host to the first co-operative-owned wind farm.  The community of McLean 
County, Illinois, in contrast, hosts an investor-owned wind farm in a state with only IOU 
wind farms.  While the firms both operate with the same federal laws and regulations, the 
case of Illinois’ McLean County serves as a comparison, used to assess how the social 
norms, markets and local laws vary and influence the outcomes of wind energy 
development.   
      This study takes an institutional approach to understanding how wind energy 
development and operations interact with local level community development, how the 
ownership model influences the actions of the utility, and how the systems of endogenous 
and exogenous governance influence the overall interaction (Ostrom, 2005).  The 
Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD), crafted from the foundational 
work of the Bloomington School political economists (Aligica & Boettke, 2009) will be 
utilized to better contextualize the interplay amongst these community-based social 
systems through analysis of the multilayered interactions between communities, wind 
energy organizations, governance institutions, and individual actors (p. 13). 
      The IAD framework is in part a diagnostic developed through decades of 
empirical analyses of over a thousand case studies (Poteete, Janssen, & Ostrom, 2010) in 
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an effort to understand the impact of countervailing forces on a specific case or action 
situation.  IAD is a rigorously tested framework incorporating three broad levels of 
analysis (operational level, collective-choice level, and constitutional-choice level 
(Aligica & Boettke, 2009, p. 85-86)), harnessing the power of the iterative analytical 
method inherent to the case study methodology.  The IAD as a diagnostic can be used to 
deconstruct and reconstruct numerous variables to enhance our knowledge of institutional 
design, socially ordered relationships, and how rules-in-use and human behavior applying 
those rules impact outcomes in a specific case (p. 13).   
      The central research question -“how does wind energy development influence 
community development?”- requires an in-depth analysis of a number of socially ordered 
relationships.  The action situation of interest in this study is the interaction between a 
wind energy utility and the host community.  The institution to be assessed is the wind 
energy firm.  Further impacting the local processes and the institution being analyzed are 
other connected, adjacent social processes (the market, government regulation, public 
support, and other prevailing trends and policies) (McGinnis, 2011a).  The actors are then 
incorporated in the analyses.   
      Three tiers of questions arise out of the central research question.  The three 
questions follow in numbered order of importance to this research project3: 
How Does the Ownership Model of the Wind Energy Firm Affect Community  
Development (Operational Level)? 
 
     IOUs are typically owned by a broad number of investors, typically from outside of 
the local host community. Utilities had sited their operations in host communities out of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3     The central focus of this research is the community and wind firm interaction, not a complete assessment of government and 
market actors.  For the purposes of this research, Chapter Six will present a short, concise analysis of the layers of governance as 
opposed to a total treatment of federal and state governance. 
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financial –not social- motivation, with little concern for the wellbeing of local residents 
(Adamson, 2008; Freudenburg, 1984, 2008).  The absentee ownership model of IOUs has 
been one of the focal points of criticism in the energy boomtown literature.   
      Proponents of community owned and governed energy generators, such as claim 
the shift toward direct, community ownership should result in more desirable social 
outcomes ("Mission," n.d.; "Windustry," n.d.b).4  Advocates of locally rooted firms point 
to the evidence of community-owned enterprise offering greater benefits to their local 
host communities than do investor-owned firms (Kildegaard & Myers-Kuykindall, 2006; 
Tolbert, Irwin, Lyson, & Nucci, 2002).  Yet the lion’s share of wind energy development 
is being undertaken by transnational IOUs due in part to the privileging of the IOU model 
through policy mechanisms, meaning policy may be promoting the least community-
optimized type of wind energy firm (Finzel & Kildegaard, 2013). 
      Co-operative business models have received relatively favorable acclaim in 
various literatures as a form of social enterprise (Gonzales, 2010; Hazen, 2010; Ki-moon, 
2009) for their community-building attributes and democratic governance structure5 
(Brennan, 2009).  Despite testimonials and scholarship of the beneficial community 
character of co-operatives (Malone, 2010), a critical analysis of co-operatives, 
particularly electric co-operatives, has yet to be performed methodically across sectors 
and across ownership models.  Compounding the problem is that little attention has been 
paid to the patterned processes of co-operative business development (Zeuli & Radel, 
2005). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4     The community-ownership model of wind energy is found predominantly in states such as Maine, Minnesota, and Oregon, though 
the co-operative-ownership model is rarely applied. 
5     In fact the United Nation’s website for the 2012 the Year of Co-operatives begins with a quote by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
stating "Cooperatives are a reminder to the international community that it is possible to pursue both economic viability and social 
responsibility" (Ki-moon, 2009), which no doubt helps to reinforce the relatively favorable perspective of co-operatives.  
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      Electric co-operatives comprise a significant share of the electric utility.  The 
USDA ("USDA Rural Development," n.d.) claims the U.S. electrical energy sector is 
comprised of 3,150 utilities nationally.  According to the National Co-operative Business 
Association ("NRECA International," n.d., p. 32) 220 out of the 3,150 are electric IOUs, 
and 905 are electric co-operatives.  Co-operatives own and operate almost half of all 
electrical distribution lines, delivering 10 percent of the nation’s electricity to 37 million 
people in 47 states, with a total workforce of 70,000; the co-operative electric power 
sector is no niche player.   
      Unlike electric IOUs, federal statutes leave many of the regulatory responsibilities 
up to the co-operative’s membership under the presumption that the incentives for self-
monitoring are evident due to the ownership model and democratic governance 
mechanisms (though the national government does defer regulatory authority to the states 
should they wish to regulate electric co-operatives).  However, noteworthy anecdotal 
evidence portends to bigger systemic concerns related to the economic and social 
integrity of the co-operative electric sector and its ability to self-govern (Cooper, 2008).  
There are journalistic accounts of co-operative boards receiving excessive compensation, 
management gaming the by-laws to limit democratic participation in the co-operative, 
and other actions contrary to the co-operative principles.  Understanding the social 
dilemmas facing electric co-operatives could not only benefit the communities hosting 
them, but also inform stakeholders and enhance policy seeking to optimize community 
orientation of electric co-operatives.     
      This study will begin filling the literature gap on wind energy and electric co-
operatives by comparing the community interactive aspects of investor and co-operative 
! 9!
owned wind through a critical comparison of the two cases.  The study is designed not to 
presume that one ownership model has greater value than the other, but will address 
questions such as the following: How does the ownership structure of the firm influence 
the community outcomes?  Does the firm’s ownership structure impact the capacity of 
individuals to act collectively to meet their common ends (Ostrom, 2005), and if so, how?  
How does the firm work with the local elites and marginalized populations? 
      The questions posed at the collective choice and operational levels of analysis 
attempt to aid understanding of community interaction and engagement through the 
perspective of the firms: how does the utility’s ownership engage the community that is 
hosting the wind energy generation assets and why? How do the internal institutional 
logics influence the level of community development (a question of interaction)?  How 
do the owners of the firm view their responsibility to the community in which the 
generation assets are located, and can we discern why their perceptions are such? 
How Does Wind Energy Development Influence and Interact With Local 
Community Social Structures (Collective-Choice Level Or Action Arena)? 
 
      The classical energy boomtown literature dealt primarily with carbon-emitting 
sources of energy generation.  This body of research critically assesses industry claims of 
enhanced material well being within host communities via job creation, enhanced local 
tax revenue, and economic development in disadvantaged rural areas (Bacigalupi & 
Freudenberg, 1983; Black, McKinnish, & Sanders, 2005; Freudenberg, 1979).  A few 
decades later, the U.S. is in another boom cycle of energy development pushed 
simultaneously by the need to expand electric generation and transmission capacity while 
converting to more environmentally sound sources of fuel; the energy industry and its 
advocates are making similar claims (Vilsack & Chu, 2010) yet again, despite scant 
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research on the community development outcomes from wind energy development.   
      Much of the advocacy on behalf of wind energy has emphasized issues related to 
environmental and economic social justice (issues of concern for community 
development scholars and practitioners).  Evidence is emerging that these arguments for 
development have been appropriated for predominantly market ends, becoming a very 
lucrative growth machine absent of socio-cultural values like so many other facets of the 
growing “green” economy (McKibben, 2007; Pellow & Brulle, 2005; Szasz, 2009).  The 
process of wind energy development exhibits many traits similar to the fossil fuel boom, 
though with some as yet not understood deviations.   
      Recent studies from the Center for Renewable Energy at Illinois State University 
(Loomis & Carter, 2011) and the University of Minnesota (Finzel & Kildegaard, 2013) 
on the community impact of wind farms indicate that the economic boost given to 
communities is front-loaded, having the biggest effect during the construction phase.  The 
long-term operations phase, while contributing to the local tax base and land-lease 
payments, provides relatively few jobs and results in capital flight due to absentee 
investor-ownership concentrating revenues elsewhere.  Additionally, longitudinal 
analyses are unavailable since the industry is in its relative infancy; this is problematic for 
communities pressured into making long-term development decisions (land leases 
contracts for turbines can range from 20 to 50 years) based on company assurances and 
short-term “return-on-investment” projections. 
      The critical community influence of wind energy development will be best 
understood primarily through exploration of localized social structures (a central 
component of community interaction field theory which posits that a community is itself 
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the smallest observable, complete social structure (Wilkinson, 1991)) and the actors 
embedded within.  The emphasis is on how the wind energy utility interacts with the 
community social structure, how the social structure is altered by the development and 
operations phenomenon, and the tension redirected back at the utility by the community 
actors in the interaction process.  The studies will then incorporate the perspectives of 
those who live within the host community to paint a more complete picture of the 
interactive processes and community outcomes (Poteete, et al., 2010, p. 52). 
How Do the Multi-Layered Governance Systems of the United States Influence 
Local Level Wind Energy Development (Constitutional-Choice/Policy Level)? 
 
    The rapid pace of growth in the wind energy industry has not occurred within a 
vacuum.  Wind energy development, by and large, is a creature of private-public 
partnerships, requiring significant capital investment.  According to the website of the 
Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (http://www.dsireusa.org/), 
the wind energy industry receives substantial federal and state subsidies in the name of 
promoting national energy independence from “foreign” energy sources.  The U.S. 
Energy Information Administration website notes 
(http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4850) that many states have established 
aggressive renewable energy portfolio standards (RPS), mandating that a given portion of 
electricity be generated from renewable sources by a given timeframe, further stimulating 
demand for wind energy.  But wind energy companies do not interact only with 
government only on matters of financing, but also matters of regulation, land 
management, and grid connectivity.   
      How do the policies of the market, state, and other governance institutions 
influence or privilege the ownership model of the wind energy firms?  To what extent can 
! 12!
the firm utilize extra-community mechanisms of power and influence to subvert local 
policymakers (“level-jumping” behavior (McGinnis, 2011b))?  What are the unique 
impediments to development faced by the two ownership models of the wind energy 
utility (the IOU’s for-profit status verses the co-operatives not-for-profit categorization)?  
How do these policies determine how the wind energy firm operates at a local level?  
Further, how do other exogenous individuals or groups exert influence on wind energy 
development at the local community level? 
      Of additional interest is the co-operative question, namely what discourages 
development of co-operative-owned wind farms?  If indeed the co-operative model of 
community wind is demonstrated to offer enhanced local community development 
outcomes, it is critical to understand why is there only two industrial-scale co-operative 
wind farms in the United States as of 2013, lest policymakers lose out on a robust tool 
and communities are denied the potential to reap the full potential rewards of wind 
energy development. 
The Structure of the Dissertation 
      As has been noted throughout this chapter, wind energy is a rapidly growing 
industrial sector, yet little is known about the community development implications of 
this growth.  More to the point, the research has yet to assess the community and 
economic development differentials of privileging one ownership type over another (the 
investor verses co-operative owned question).  The dissertation intends to address the 
three broad sub questions posed in an effort to evaluate the implications of the current 
policy and market orientations, as well as assist community leaders, development 
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practitioners, and policymakers in making choices better suited to the needs of those most 
impacted by wind energy development.  
      The dissertation is structured as follows.  Chapter Two reviews the literature 
within which the broader analysis is couched.  Chapter Three lays out the methodological 
approach to how data were collected and analyzed in this study.  Chapters Four and Five 
present the two case studies, each study covering how national and state energy policy 
and investment phenomena propel wind energy development.  Chapter Six will compare 
the two case studies, analyzing the potential influence of the wind utilities on their host 
communities, while concluding the dissertation with final thoughts on the research 
findings, as well as proposals for future research on renewable energy and co-operative 
businesses.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 
      An understanding of the community development implications of the wind energy 
boom requires an understanding of the types of wind energy institutions, the actors 
comprising the institution, how those actors interact with their host community, and the 
public policy the enables or constrains these interactions.  Since the community 
implications are of central concern, it is also important to conceptualize community, as 
well as what it means to undertake community development.  Therefore, the theoretical 
lens used to analyze these variables must account for interpretation of institutional 
design, the impact of government and market policies, and put forth a conceptualization 
of the community itself. 
      This review begins with a discussion of the theoretical literature on community 
development, stressing the Bloomington School’s institutional perspective on complex, 
dynamic social systems and development.  The review then moves to a critical analysis of 
top-down development approaches, with an emphasis on how these systems influence a 
community’s capacity to self-govern, particularly during periods of state and market 
failure when such capacity is of critical necessity for individuals to thrive in times of 
crisis.  Attention then pivots to the theoretical premises, which undergird the 
development potential of the co-operative model, as well as the breadth of the U.S. 
electric co-operative sector.  The review necessarily concludes with a discussion of the 
limited scholarship on co-operatives as community-building institutions. 
Community Development 
      The capability to choose to enter or exit an action arena, to act collectively when 
needed, is an essential prerequisite for democracy (Aligica & Boettke, 2009, pp. 24–25).  
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The community and the community “space” is the action arena where collective action 
plays out; the structure of that space is a critical determinant for a robust democracy. 
First, we must understand what community is, and how institutions of governance 
(managed concentrations of power) are utilized for community development and how a 
community’s social structure is nested within a socio-ecological system (SES). 
      Community has been conceptualized as identity, solidarity, or place.  Some 
scholars take a somewhat cynical view of community as lost by claiming that community 
cannot be clearly defined, that it is an amorphous, shifting concept (Bauman, 2001).  The 
concept of community remains unsettled, yet there are a number of theories that exhibit a 
level of overlap.   
      Most people and institutions are rooted to a place and meet their everyday needs 
within a more or less physically bounded environment.  Michael Taylor (2006) identifies 
key attributes useful for pinpointing a community.  A community is a 
…group of people with durable, multiplex and direct relations.  They expect to 
continue to interact for some time to come (so group membership must be fairly 
stable); they interact on several fronts, not in a specialized sphere; and their 
relations are not mediated, in particular by central government agencies (pp. 199-
200). 
   
      Community is not solely the purview of the market or the state, but is necessarily 
comprised of an amalgamation of social fields that cannot be said to be limited to just 
economics or coercive authority (Flora & Flora, 2008, p. 14).  This follows in the 
Bloomington School tradition wherein Vincent Ostrom makes an impassioned plea for 
policymakers and scholars to understand that community and civil society 
conceptualizations are about more than state, state-recognized jurisdictions, or markets 
(Aligica & Boettke, 2009; Ostrom, 1997); it is collective action, people working 
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spontaneously on an as-needed basis to address their common concerns.  The crosscutting 
commonality amongst these conceptualizations of community is that “the substance of 
community is social interaction” (Wilkinson, 1991, p. 13).  And this social interaction 
can take many institutional forms. 
      The interactional perspective sees community as a complete, general-purpose 
social field, “a place-oriented process of interrelated actions through which members of a 
local population express a shared sense of identity while engaging in the common 
concerns of life” (Stedman, Lee, Brasier, Weigle, & Higdon, 2009).  The field orientation 
of the interactional perspective is why the formal theoretical title is called community 
interactional field theory (CIFT).  The community field is not merely a map of predefined 
boundaries complete with roadways and well-designated grids.  The general-purpose 
community field arises from this ”pattern of individual and organizational interactions” 
(Sharp, 2001).  Here is Wilkinson explaining the relevance of the “field” concept in 
CIFT: 
The actions of this field serve to coordinate other action fields, organizing them 
more or less (through an unbounded, dynamic, and emergent process) into a 
whole.  The community field has actors, association, and activities, as any social 
field does. 
 
The community field differentiates from a social field along important lines, and results 
in the vying for influence, struggles for power, and attempts at varying forms of 
collective action.  This action situation is where culture arises and the tendencies of social 
systems are observable (Flora & Flora, 2008; Zacharakis & Flora, 2005). 
      The community field can serve as a node that strengthens the centralizing 
tendencies of a larger social order or as one of a number of points diversifying society.  
Community members strengthen the community field (Stedman, et al., 2009, p. 182) 
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when they interact not just within their private-interest social fields (such as a small 
business), but also across linked social fields to distribute benefits throughout the 
community (Wilkinson, 1970, 1972).  The community field itself can be identified by 
how the local population addresses any one of the following problems occurring during 
an action process: “problems of awareness, organization, decision making, resource 
mobilization, and resource application” (Wilkinson, 1991, p. 89).  Communities 
commonly utilize more formal mechanisms for addressing such problems (such as police 
enforcement of evacuation from an impending forest fire, or community mobilization 
centered around building a multi-purpose community center), though adaptable, robust 
communities also exhibit tendencies to mobilize, ad hoc, should the need arise. 
      The “place” or territory where major policy and economic development often 
intersects is at the community level, the community being the smallest, complete social 
unit nested within the larger social structure (Wilkinson, 1991).  The features that 
comprise a community should not be conflated with community development.  
Community development orients the “developer” toward the social structures as opposed 
to the atomized projects in an ongoing social maintenance process.  Community 
development requires a critical understanding of who wields control and influence –
power – over vital resources (pp. 94-95). 
      Community development entails more than strengthening the community field.  
Community development is itself the practice of identifying and attempting to change the 
actual social structure underlying the community field itself (Wilkinson, 1991).  The… 
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…interest that guides this field is an interest in structure rather than in specific 
goals such as economic development or service improvement.  The structural 
interest in the community field is expressed through linking, coordinating action, 
action that identify and reinforce the commonality that permeates the 
differentiated special interest fields in a community (p. 90). 
 
What matters for community development in practice is the attempt to alter the social 
structure; should the social structure remain unchanged is not a sign of failure, but an 
opportunity for community developers to regroup and innovate new approaches toward 
those ends.  In other words, a failed attempt at changing the social structure is still 
community development6 in that an attempt is a step toward changing the social order. 
      Forms of development, even if they might be termed community development, do 
not meet the basic criteria if the approach does not attempt to change the local level social 
structure; even though the community field is the intersection of the public economy, 
nature, civil infrastructure, markets, and state, it is the social structure that in the end 
determines elements of control and access to resources, hence the central importance of 
“structure” to CIFT.  What follows is a discussion of the two divergent tendencies of 
social system structure -centralized verses decentralized- the tendencies that these 
structures exhibit and the implications the tendencies have for collective action. 
      Social system structure and order.  Top-down development (colonization, 
consensus capitalism, neoliberalism and bureaucratic administration to name a few 
typologies) is justified on a number of grounds.  Host populations have been deemed 
chaotic, disorganized, or backwards by some authority.  Host populations are promised 
shared prosperity so long as the population acquiesces to the grand designs of the 
development power (be it a corporation or occupation force).  Reflective of the growth !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6     One can coach this in terms of the recent Iranian “Green Revolution” where the citizen uprising –the first in many years- exposes 
individuals to activist tactics never before witnessed.  Viewed through this lens, one can call the initial activists early adopters, taking 
on greater risk than future innovators who can avoid costs incurred by the first generation of activists. 
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machine concept (Molotch, 1976, 1993) community is enabled only insofar as to allow 
local elites to control the economic process, not to actually govern for the broader 
community.  More to the point, these methods of development tend toward centralization, 
contributing to a bureaucratic administrative paradigm in which alternative, innovative 
governance structures are derided as ineffective or unproven due to the “known” efficacy 
of predominant decision-making processes.  Alternatives to such systems are then 
crowded out (Miraftab, 2004a, 2004b) in favor of the elite perspective: 
The entire exercise comes to be power-centered in ways that may become extreme 
and limiting. Choices, decisions, rules, preferences, ideas, values become 
secondary. They are just inputs or outputs in the power process or, even worse, a 
“veil” that is clouding the view of “reality” (i.e. power and its workings) (Aligica 
& Boettke, 2009, p. 3). 
 
      Advocates of centralization presume social order and stability, influenced by 
staunch market theorists, Taylorite scientific management, and the supposed necessity of 
Woodrow Wilson’s administrative paradigm (the Hobbesian Leviathan).  Critics of the 
one-size-fits-all approach highlight the susceptibility of centralized social systems to be 
captured by a select few (Aslanbeigui & Summerfield, 2000; Miraftab, 2004b; Ostrom, 
2005), be disrupted, and operate with an immense amount of inefficiency in the form of 
socialized costs (Carson, 2008; North, 1990); the more centralized and larger the scale, 
the greater the cost or “tax” involved in shoring up proverbial chinks in the institution’s 
armor (Assange, 2006; Robb, 2008).  Centralization –even in more benevolent systems 
such as Post War era consensus capitalism –often intersect with systems of dependency, 
weakening the capability of actors to govern in times of crisis (Gaventa, 1982).  Marxist 
scholars refer to the outcomes of centralizing processes as hegemony, a complete system 
that attempts to push down the social system hierarchy (Duménil & Lévy, 2004), 
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culturally inculcating the population into accepting the legitimacy of the ruling powers 
(Bourdieu, 1986).  Dependent host populations are then highly susceptible to system 
shocks should extra-local authorities be derelict in their responsibilities to that 
community during times of crisis (Martinez, 2009).7   
      Vincent Ostrom applied the term monocentricity as a label for contextualizing the 
processes of social system centralization and the tendencies inherent within that system 
(Ostrom, 2010).  Monocentricity adds to our understanding of social system structure and 
cultural inculcation by explaining the underlying mechanisms enhancing hierarchical 
power through a critical analysis of the weaknesses of centralization, namely in the lack 
of choices, lack of information and knowledge flows, and lack of new innovative ideas 
and approaches (institutional monocropping (Evans, 2004)).  Authority figures in 
centralized social systems tend to create power structures that do not ask if local citizens 
can manage their own affairs, presumes passivity (Ostrom, 1972), do not view capacity-
building toward self-governance ends as a necessity, and may actually harm community 
governance by limiting interaction and dialogue over issues of vital collective necessity 
(Flora & Flora, 2008;  Martinez, 2009).  Corporate and state strategies of community 
atomization, for example, hurt the capacity for collective action by limiting the flow of 
information, interaction and trust amongst community members and exogenous 
institutions (Ahn & Wilson, 2010).  We know that if people cannot cooperate or work 
together, collective action becomes more difficult (Martinez, 2009).  What results is a 
public service paradox in which those who pay for or have a right to a given service are 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7     We saw this during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in which the Federal Emergency Management Agency, federal and state 
governments failed to adequately coordinate critical disaster mitigation efforts.   
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not given voice to the process to enhance the product provision of public goods (Aligica 
& Boettke, 2009, p. 33). 
      Monocentric governance then furthers a process that pushes social systems toward 
centralization, reducing the variety of institutional arrangements.  Ever increasing 
centralization creates a downward spiral of systemic crisis tendencies.  This then further 
complicates not only initiatives for reform by reducing the potential for alternative, 
diverse institutions, but also by developing restrictive, monopolistic social structures that 
fail to teach new entrepreneurs from experiential learning. 
      Scholarly understanding of social dilemmas faced a number of constraints in the 
social sciences during the era when Vincent Ostrom conceptualized the harmful impacts 
of monocentric governance.  Action situations observed by policymakers that seemed to 
be de-linked from centers of power were “neglected” or “considered marginal” (Aligica 
& Boettke, 2009, p. 3).  Hardin’s classic work (Basurto & Ostrom, 2009) The Tragedy of 
the Commons is oft referred to as the operational and scholarly standard of the era, 
presuming top-down centralization was needed in order to maintain social order and 
sustained resource allocation.  Social systems were assessed in isolation, separating an 
action situation from other adjacent action situations.  Analytically, monocentricity 
situates social systems as stemming outward from a locus of power, problematic in that it 
presumes central power structures as a prime mover of sorts; everything is generated or 
stimulated by the core.  Structural concepts were overly simplified, tying private solely to 
“the Market” and public solely to “the State.” 
      The inability to see alternatives means that users and administrators of institutions 
may not observe obvious structural problems in their institutions, and fail to adapt when 
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needed most.  Former change agents are co-opted, subdued, and slowly diminished in 
stature and capacity as they become dependent on the status quo, reducing overall 
effectiveness of a given social cause8 (Aligica & Boettke, 2009; Ledwith & Campling, 
2005; Santos, 2012).  The squeezing out of alternatives and discouragement of civic 
participation is troubling.   
      Systems are in a sense about coping with “the threats of uncertainty” (Aligica & 
Boettke, 2009, p. 65) through “a set of ordered relationships that persists throughout time 
(p. 19). Institutions structured on broad, inclusionary citizen participation have been 
shown to prevent elite capture of power and resources (Dasgupta & Beard, 2007) and 
sustain system shocks.  While civic engagement will not always be the answer –and in 
some cases may not be desirable for short durations of time- it certainly plays a critical 
role in community development.  
      Monocentricity as an end is a flawed premise –as are all panaceas, according to 
the persistent caution of Elinor Ostrom- in that it presumes there are no other existing 
solutions or functional alternatives. Solely market or state orientations toward 
development then trend toward monocentrism due to their emphases toward singular 
solutions.  These models of economic development are problematic due to the propensity 
of development to be usurped for decidedly non-collective ends.  The orientation of the 
public as “the” state or as “the” market is stifling to innovation, experimentation, 
adaptation, and even subversion of existing social systems.  A result is a state-supported 
system privileging a few, fostering dependency upon market actors in the name of shared !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8     The demise of the community-organizing group ACORN is particularly prescient.  ACORN was initially a group steeped in the 
Alinsky model (Alinsky, 1971) of community organizing and agitation, funded by member-dues and organized labor.  As their power 
increased, the group began offering critical member services through state-funded grants.  ACORN became so dependent on this 
singular, large source of state funding that they collapsed almost overnight when a scandal prompted the US Congress to pull all 
sources of federal funding, thereby destroying a community-building group critical to many individuals and families in hard hit inner 
cities, all with a singular legislative action. 
! 23!
material prosperity.  These actors choke out alternative approaches.  Institutions that 
would have been innovated by those at the bottom of the power pyramid are stymied 
through denial of viable, complementary alternatives to the state-market dichotomy.  
How can development be reoriented to hedge the outcomes toward community ends?   
      Despite the perceptions of monocentric theorists and policymakers, multiple 
centers of power are always at play, running parallel, competing, or intersecting with 
existing systems.  New Institutionalist perspectives (North, 1990) are challenging this 
reliance upon blueprint thinking.  They criticize the policy and scholarship that ignores 
the rich alternatives to this limiting state-market dichotomy.  Elinor Ostrom and Vincent 
Ostrom, two scholars whose work is exemplary of –though much broader than- New 
Institutionalism, have 
…explored a new domain of the complex institutional reality of social life—the 
rich institutional arrangements that are neither states nor markets. They are small 
and large, multi-purpose or just focused on one good or service: suburban 
municipalities, neighborhood organizations, condominiums, churches, voluntary 
associations, or informal entities like those solving the common-pool resources 
dilemmas they studied and documented around the world. Yet, once the 
functional principle behind them was then identified, the very diverse forms could 
be understood as part of a broader pattern, and the logic of the institutional 
process involved could be revealed with relative ease. They could be seen as a 
“third sector” (“public economy” was one of the suggested names for it) related 
to, but different from, both “the state” and “the market”. Irrespective of what we 
call these domains, the fact is that a theoretical perspective that takes it into 
account is substantially different from the one based on the classical dichotomy 
(Aligica & Boettke, 2009, p. 6). 
 
      New Institutionalists hypothesize that a part of the solution to pitfalls of 
monocentricity is the diffusion of power into multiple systems that may compete, 
cooperate, or coexist within a social system.  Most importantly, this perspective offers 
individuals and institutions alternatives through autonomy yet remain interdependent.  
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This diffuse system of alternatives is referred to as polycentricity (Aligica & Boettke, 
2009, p. 3). 
No single center of authority is responsible for coordinating all relationships in 
such a “public economy”. Market-like mechanisms can develop competitive 
pressures that tend to generate higher efficiency than can be gained by enterprises 
organized as exclusive monopolies and managed by elaborate hierarchies of 
officials…”  (p. 7). 
 
      In other words, when opportunity structures are not unduly hindered and when 
certain conditions exist, people can act collectively to find common solutions to social 
dilemmas that are outside of just “the State” and “the Market” perspectives (p. 6). 
Diffusing power away from these actors and into the hands of multiple stakeholders is a 
viable approach to combatting the deleterious effects of monocentricism, advancing more 
options available for the administration of public goods (pp. 38–39). 
An alternative should be constructed, “suggesting that a system of ordered 
relationships underlies the fragmentation of authority and overlapping 
jurisdictions that had frequently been identified as chaotic": a polycentric political 
system viewed as “a set of ordered relationships that persists through time” and 
“having many centers of decision making that are formally independent of each 
other (V. Ostrom [1972] in McGinnis 1999b, 53). 
 
      Poorly stewarded institutions are capable of sustaining themselves for great 
periods of time with the assistance of external actors and their resources (North, 1990).  
Institutions and communities were able to justify dependence on state and federal 
governments for critical necessities during an era when governmental entities were more 
capable of providing vital resources (Adger, 2000).  But the capacity and the role of the 
state are rapidly changing as socio-ecological issues continue to play out across state 
boundaries (Flora, 1998; Florini & Sovacool, 2009).  Dependency on centralized 
institutions then makes actors more vulnerable to a loss of livelihood and diminished 
security during times of system disruption when the chances of state failure become 
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palpable (Adger, 2000; Gaventa, 2002),  as is painfully obvious from the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans (Horwitz, 2009).  It is critical to understand that in this 
era of impaired government, self-governance has been and can be achieved through a 
variety of institutional arrangements (Florini & Sovacool, 2009; Ostrom, 1991). 
      Analytically, polycentricity then reorients research and practice toward a robust 
social systems perspective, “disarming simplicity” (Aligica & Boettke, 2009, p. 4; 
Ostrom, 2005; Poteete, et al., 2010), putting social dilemmas in a more complex feedback 
loop by engaging the “consumers” or citizens not as mere recipients of a product from the 
state or market but as engaged co-producers of the good or service (Aligica & Boettke, 
2009).  Social systems are seen as nested and interactional.  Such institutions then have 
an incentive to work with the community to meet mutual ends, unlike extractive 
enterprises having a singular bottom line as the desired outcome: 
Multiple centers of power, overlapping in competition and cooperation, 
individuals acting in specifically defined social and institutional settings –
ecological rationality, emphasis on dynamics that takes place between ideas-rules-
decisions-learning. All these as part of an effort to reject the vision behind the 
(Wilsonian) mainstream approach and indeed as an attempt to contribute to the 
growth of an alternative to it (Aligica & Boettke, 2009, p. 4). 
 
      Scholars of the Hobbesian-Wilsonian tradition are wary of the propensity for 
chaos stemming from decentralized, multiplex, redundant social systems. (Aligica & 
Boettke, 2009).  But just because a polycentric system lacks a central head does not mean 
it is incapable or ordering itself (Poteete, et al., 2010, pp. 39–41).  The institutionalist 
approach is reoriented toward a more complex perspective on social systems that sees 
their stability and progression as emerging from innovations in multiple types of 
institutions, and not necessarily reliant on the state-market dichotomy.  Indeed the “state 
and market” need not be presumed a prerequisite for a robust civil society to flourish, 
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particularly when one considers the recent attention paid to so-called “alternative” 
institutions embedded within what proponents call the solidarity, social, or public 
economies. 
      Innovative institutional arrangements (social-purpose businesses, non-profits, 
etc.) for collective action arise when certain prerequisites exist.  These polycentric 
approaches require a foundation with which to prosper (Aligica & Tarko, 2011).  Without 
certain pretexts, functions like basic interaction, information sharing, trust, contractual 
obligations, and sustained collective action are unlikely to endure (Poteete, et al., 2010, 
pp. 100-101).  Individuals must be aware of boundaries, processes must be accessible, 
fair and cautious of rigidity, legally recognized, and connected to other similar 
institutions in order to adapt to best-practice approaches.  Barring such prerequisites 
makes systemic innovation and adaptation more difficult and therefore prone to the 
pitfalls of monocentricity. 
      Individuals must have the space to be able to work collectively, build new 
institutions, and challenge centralized power by aggregating up the existent social 
hierarchy or having the tools necessary to create their own social structure.  A powerful 
approach toward building a prosperous polycentric system, to build and challenge 
overbearing hierarchies, is at its base embedded within the capacity of individuals to 
interact at the smallest identifiable emanation of a complete society: the community.  
Researchers must better understand what makes community governance work optimally 
in given settings, how such governance structures arise, and who participates in these 
processes.  A discussion of the critical importance of community governance follows.  
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      Community governance.  Development of the community field is by its very 
nature not a private endeavor, but one that enhances the “common concerns of life” 
through interactive processes.  These common concerns of life occur both spontaneously 
in daily interactions and through an orderly, intentional social process, also known as 
community governance. 
      Community governance is “the structure of small group social interactions-
distinct from markets and states-that, along with these more familiar forms of 
governance, jointly determines economic and social outcomes” (Bowles & Gintis, 2002).  
Community governance “is an amalgam of specific practices that make the difference 
between stagnating and flourishing communities” (Stark, 2007), providing an 
engagement process for “citizen participation beyond voting” (Gaventa, 2002, p. 29) in 
which citizens are not viewed merely as electors or consumers; community governance 
also provides a “flexible structure by which communities can respond to challenges and 
opportunities” (Flora & Flora, 2008).  Studies of community governance then move away 
from a monocentric statist perspective toward a polycentric, collective action orientation. 
      A discussion of community, development, and governance necessarily draws us 
back to the issue of social structure.  Scholars in social network analysis are necessarily 
interested in how the structure of these processes influences an actor’s capability for 
action (Sharp, 2001, p. 422). The focal level, the community action arena (Martinez, 
2009, p. 3), may operate in such a manner that encourages or discourages individual 
participation.  Actor agency is neither isolated nor absolute, but shaped by individual 
capability, social interconnectedness, and access to resources, which has significant 
ramifications in terms of control and power (Burt, 1992; Flora & Flora, 2008; Freeman, 
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2004; Knoke & Yang, 2008; Lukes, 2005; Scott, 2000; Wasserman & Faust, 1994).  The 
individuals and networks within their social fields may try to change the community 
action arena by gaining control at a different level outside of but adjacent to the 
community field (such as within social groups in the community, or attempting to use the 
state for influence).  Therefore a system can be structured in such a manner as to prevent 
individual and collective action for purposes of atomization or centralized power, or to 
subvert stifling social systemic concentrations by entering into voluntary collective action 
arrangements elsewhere. 
      Social network research has consistently demonstrated that individuals and 
community actors with a balance of strong (family and close friends) and weak (work 
acquaintances, civic associations, etc.) social connections or ties generally do better, are 
more prosperous, live longer lives, are happier, and more prone to contribute back to the 
community and its field (Christakis & Fowler, 2009).  Granovetter (1973) wrote about 
the resource potential of weak ties in networks (the “strength of weak ties” concept). 
Freudenburg’s (1986) research of a rapidly changing boomtown assessed how an influx 
of job seeking inmigrants moved to the community for new opportunities at the recently 
built power plant causing a cell division of sorts within the preexisting community 
networks. The division diminished longstanding residents’ access to community 
resources, the density of acquaintanceship decreased (the amount of actors comprising a 
network), community trust and capacity for collective action diminished, and individuals 
erected barriers based on cliques.  And yet network disruptions may offer new 
opportunities as well.  Burt’s (1992) elaboration on Granovetter’s weak ties proposition 
builds theory around the manner which actors gain structural advantages by connecting 
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weak ties over structural holes (non-linkages between network clusters) or “brokering” 
linkages to other networks.    
      A community’s governance structure can catalyze adaptability via interactive 
processes linking diverse actors with multiple interests, strengthening the community 
field.  Nurturing a community space helps to encourage a wide array of community 
participants that reinforces polycentric governance and innovative institutions (Bowles & 
Gintis, 2002; Ostrom, 2005).  The empirical work demonstrates that for conditions 
relevant to community robustness to arise, governance structures must allow for 
inclusive, redundant, social institutions of a number of varieties so that optimal 
institutional types may arise and adapt to unique, local SES features (these variables are 
the commonly utilized design principles of robust common resource regimes (Poteete, et 
al., 2010)).   
      Theoretically, the optimized polycentric community structure is coalitional, 
(illustrated in Figure 1) in which an abundance of local social networks are adequately 
linked (brokerage) while retaining their identity (closure).  Such a structure provides 
moderated access and reasonable boundary maintenance to material and social resources, 
exhibiting great capacity to adapt to change processes (Flora & Flora, 2008, pp. 129–
133). 
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Figure 1. Typology of community structures 
 
Source: Sharp, 2001, p. 407. 
 
      One must be cautious of treating social system structure as a panacea or the 
answer. Polycentric systems are not an end to themselves. A community may be highly 
polycentric, but lack adequate coordination mechanisms (amorphous) or purposefully 
isolate themselves from other groups (siloed or factional), as illustrated in Figure 1.  In 
cultures and societies that lack the capacity to interact and communicate (for example, in 
instances of internal strife) top-down governance (pyramidal) may be necessary to 
preserve social order.  Even then such an approach should be seen a short-term solution 
in critical, fleeting moments (Poteete, et al., 2010).  These processes are unending, 
forever requiring the policymaker to reflect critically and adapt whenever new social 
dilemmas arise. 
      Orientations of structural “centrism” are theoretical devices used to assess a social 
system; in some instances, monocentricity is a temporary though beneficial stopgap, 
whereas in most instances polycentricity is something to aspire to for enhanced 
development, though structure and connectivity tell only part of the story.  Individual 
actors can wield significant control or power over a given situation due in part to their 
connectivity, but also because of their access to resources not necessarily confined to 
social structure (leadership capacity, access to natural resources, knowledge skills, or 
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understanding of local history and culture).  How people interact, and how those 
interactions facilitate transference of trust, knowledge, and other resources are crucial to 
better understanding both the impediments to community development, as well as how to 
better develop the community field; the flatter or more accessible the governance 
institutions, the greater the potential for individual and community-wide collective action 
through interaction (more recent work finds the social order itself is maintained when the 
gap in inequality is lessened, for example) (Ostrom, 2005).  Therefore it is critical to 
understand the social structures of the local community “to recognize how resources and 
information flow within the community, to determine who does and does not have access 
to these resources and this information, and to identify” structural attributes “that enhance 
general capacity for local action” (Sharp, 2001, p. 423).  Social network theory is 
therefore an appropriate theoretical framework for conceptualizing actor interactions that 
affect the community field so long as actor attributes are factored into the analyses. 
      Vibrant, active communities serve as incubators of democracy by giving actors 
the ability to see how governance works, participate in the process, and work with others 
who also desire to govern themselves.  These participatory communities are more 
adaptable to change and system shocks, and actors are likely equipped with greater 
capacity to steer change into a positive direction for community development, enhancing 
collective agency and local control (Emery & Flora, 2006; Shragge & Toye, 2006).       
Therefore social structure matters, but so too does the manner in which collective action 
occurs within that structure and for whom those actions endow benefits.  So then if 
polycentricity is the optimal social structural approach for avoiding capture and 
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enhancing resource creation and distribution, how might institutions9 enhance polycentric 
systems through sustained community-oriented collective action and development? 
Institutionalizing Community Development; The Co-operative Business Model 
 
      The scholarship on community has thus far failed to advance “implementation 
strategies” for community development.  A hypothesis of this study is that co-operative 
business development is itself an under looked community development implementation 
strategy (Zeuli & Radel, 2005).  “The potentials for cooperatives as a strategy” fall 
“under three contemporary community development paradigms: self-help, asset-based, 
and self-development” (p. 44).  The tangible benefits of economic opportunities, job 
creation and community-cohesion are obvious (Brennan, 2009; Ki-moon, 2009), and so 
too are the little understood entrepreneurial and self-governing processes.  But what 
precisely are the features of a co-operative that gives it a community-orientation, 
uniquely differentiating it from the traditional corporation, and how then might co-
operatives be used for community development? 
      The features of an institution determining their value proposition are informed 
partly by the institutional logics, defined as: 
the socially constructed, historical pattern of material practices, assumptions, 
values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their 
material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social 
reality... Institutional logics are both material and symbolic—they provide the 
formal and informal rules of action, interaction, and interpretation that guide and 
constrain decision makers in accomplishing the organization’s tasks and in 
obtaining social status, credits, penalties, and rewards in the process... These rules 
constitute a set of assumptions and values, usually implicit, about how to interpret 
organizational reality, what constitutes appropriate behavior, and how to succeed 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9  Institutions are human-constructed constraints or opportunities within which individual choices take place and which 
 shape the consequences of their choices (McGinnis, 2011a). 
! 33!
     A fundamental goal of the modern day corporation is wrapped in the institutional 
logic of markets (Thornton, 2002), whereas the institutional logics of member-service or 
need are a foundation of the co-operative.  A co-operative is an inherently political form 
of institutionalized collective action (Mooney, 2004), a common-property regime that 
according to the International Co-operative Alliance’s website (http://www.ica.coop) is 
“an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily10 to meet their common 
economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations, through a jointly owned and 
democratically controlled enterprise.”  The co-operative model of business, like the 
corporation, is utilized in virtually every industrial sector but operationally functions 
much differently (Brennan, 2009; Restakis, 2010). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10     This is true for most co-operatives.  However, utility co-operatives typically service their region in a monopoly capacity;  
meaning membership is compulsory, not voluntary. 
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      The divergent institutional logics results in a number of differential processes, the 
ramifications of which should be on the radar of any policymaker when assessing 
aligning policy to desired outcomes (Table 111 outlines some of the key differential 
institutional logics between the co-operative and investor-owned corporation).  Whereas 
the corporation ties control to an investor’s share of total investment, voting rights in a 
co-operative are equitable (one-member, one-vote) providing for a more representative 
governance structure; whereas the board of a corporation is mostly staffed by the largest 
investors, the board of a co-operative comes from and is elected by the ranks of the 
membership; whereas corporations produce profits (and pay dividends on stocks), co-
operatives produce patronage refunds12 or surplus wealth that is distributed back to the 
membership based on the level of patronage13, creating an environment of shared 
prosperity and enhanced individual opportunity ; whereas corporations seek value 
appropriation and profits (Flora & Flora, 2008, p. 15), not value creation (Santos, 2012), 
co-operatives generate value in the form of collective wealth stewarded with guidance by 
the seven Co-operative Principles14, principles that actively acknowledge “the link 
between cooperatives and the institutionalization of community development” (Zeuli & 
Radel, 2005, pp. 45-46), creating value by linking the Principles to governance and 
operations; whereas corporations are associated with capital flight, co-operatives are 
known to invest their financial wealth back in their host communities, closer to the 
member-owners (p. 50); whereas corporations build selected capacity amongst a marginal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11     Table 1 inspired by a similar chart listed in Thornton, 2002, p. 85. 
12     Co-operatives operate on an at-cost basis, meaning they are member-need oriented, not profit-oriented. 
13     Note that law or institutional governance policy typically caps patronage dividends in order reduce the potential of one member 
receiving a grossly inordinate amount of benefits above the general membership. 
14     The seven Principles listed on the website of the International Co-operative Alliance (“Co-operative identity,” n.d.) are: 1) 
voluntary and open membership; 2) democratic member control; 3) member economic participation,; 4) autonomy and independence; 
5) education, training and information; 6) cooperation among co-operatives, and; 7) concern for community. 
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spectrum of institutional stakeholders, co-operatives generally build community capacity 
(human, social, political, and financial capital), serving as incubators of democracy 
fostering local leadership  and educational opportunities for virtually all stakeholders of 
the co-operative (members, managers, employees and the broader community) (p. 48).   
      Taken together, the features of a co-operative foster civic interaction by providing 
a venue for assembly, creating new reasons for otherwise disconnected, segmented 
populations to come together, which then facilitates the building of norms, trust, and 
relationships (Putnam, 2000; Small, 2009; Tolbert, et al., 2002).  The co-operative 
business model then serves a pedagogical and cultural reproduction function by instilling 
self-governing, democratic values into its membership and partner organizations through 
practice, operations, and trainings.  The underlying Co-operative Principles and values 
lay the foundation for organizations with a strong social-tilt to use market-like features 
(i.e. revenue streams from services rendered) to sustain prolonged struggle against the 
fluctuations in resources that other organizations (such as non-profits) most acutely face 
from state and market forces (Brennan, 2010, p. 2; Mooney, 2004). 
      The co-operative business model, on paper, parallels Elinor Ostrom’s prescriptive 
Design Principles for enduring sustained collective action through robust institutional 
arrangements (Poteete, et al., 2010, pp. 100-101). In this manner, co-operatives should 
mitigate disempowerment, alienation, and dependency-building mechanisms of 
monocentric systems and enhance the potential for the development of polycentric self-
sustaining, self-governing institutions with a community development bend.  Yet despite 
all of these positive community development features, there has been a reluctance by 
scholars to outright claim co-operatives as community development institutions, due in 
! 37!
part to a body of academic literature that narrowly defines and treats co-operatives as a 
“business first and foremost” (Zeuli & Radel, 2005, p. 48) run predominantly for the 
direct benefit of the membership.   
      No doubt some co-operative models that have evolved in the last decades present 
challenges for community development purposes (co-operatives such as REI sporting 
goods cross state boundaries, complicating place-based development by separating 
member-owners over a large distance).  The explicitly stated purpose of the co-operative 
and the actors operating it all determine the member and community-orientation of the 
co-operative (bottom-up, top-down, or peripheral (Zeuli & Radel, 2005, p. 48)), meaning 
the community aspects of co-operatives are certainly not predetermined.  Consider that 
some communities may not even have the basic capacity to act collectively and sustain a 
co-operative, nonetheless start a new one (p. 51).  And even though US co-operatives 
predominantly adhere to the Co-operative Principles, they typically specialize in the 
provision of a singular service unlike their social co-operative counterparts in Great 
Britain, Sweden, Canada, and Italy (Fazzi, 2011; Zeuli & Radel, 2005), potentially 
limiting their socio-community reach.  It could be that the pervasiveness of the corporate 
system has instilled a dominant logic in co-operative organizational governance and 
operations, weakening the influence of the Co-operative Principles.  Scholarship must 
then be directed toward understanding the exogenous and endogenous dynamics of the 
co-operative institution to better contextualize the value-orientation, and how that 
orientation impacts community development. 
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Advancing Understanding of the Development Impacts of Institutional Models 
      Much is not known about the outcomes of co-operative development, particularly 
outside of the agricultural economic literature on the agri-foods sector.  The accessible 
literature by and large presumes co-operatives maintain adherence to the Co-operative 
Principles underlying the co-operative enterprise; yet the literature says nothing about 
this.  How can an understanding of the institutional logic, design, and implementation 
give us insight into how co-operatives –and other types of firms- interact with their 
communities?  There is a presumption that co-operatives are local businesses since they 
are often situated within spatial proximity of their member-ownership.  But do locally 
rooted co-operatives act in a manner comparable to other types of local enterprise 
(Tolbert, et al., 2002)?  We know that in the U.S. some co-operative firms are grouped 
together with corporate models in terms of state regulation (such as is the case with credit 
unions), whereas co-operatives in the electric industry are left to be regulated by market 
actors, individuals states, and the membership served by the co-operatives; how do these 
diverse governance arrangements influence the operational attributes and processes of co-
operatives?   
      Significantly, little attention has been given to utility co-operatives, particularly in 
the energy sector, despite their penetration into vast swaths of the U.S. and their central 
importance to the livelihoods of over 40 million Americans.  Whereas the literature has 
addressed many community aspects of investor-owned hydrocarbon energy development, 
the critical literature is sparse on the community outcomes of renewable energy, 
particularly wind.   
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      The dissertation research focuses on contextualizing the community development 
outcomes of wind energy development by both co-operative electric utilities and IOUs.  
While IOU wind energy has been touted for it community development capability, 
institutional theory posits that community-based wind power development could serve as 
a new, community-enhanced model of ownership for rural development.  This has been 
mentioned in the community wind literature from organizations in Minnesota, Oregon, 
and Maine, in treatments by a few scholars, as well as analysts at USDA. Most studies 
however, focus primarily on municipal or collective arrangements of wind power 
ownership as opposed to co-operative models.  There still remains an overall lack of 
diverse implementation strategies for community development (Zeuli & Radel, 2005).  
This dissertation seeks to address these gaps while advancing new contributions to how 
policymakers, leaders, and researchers think about the intersection of government policy 
and community development.!!
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Chapter Three: Methodology - A Comparative Case Study of Two Wind Power 
Communities !
      Analyses of social dilemmas cannot be left to analytical methodologies that 
condense complex phenomena into overly simplistic understandings of social processes.  
A robust methodological approach is needed to understand the firm, policy, and 
community interactions.  The dissertation is in part an exploration of the co-operative 
organization model as well as the firm’s potential influence on community development 
outcomes.  This will be performed through a critical analysis of the co-operative and 
investor-owned (a control variable) wind energy utilities in these two case studies.  
Therefore, the emphasis of this project is to better understand how the stakeholders 
(community, the firm, and extra-local actors) interact, what the products of these 
interactions are, and the applicability of the given ownership model to the resource 
system (electric energy).   
      This chapter will justify the utilization of the case study methodology as an 
optimal fit for better understanding the social phenomena at play in the interactions 
between the wind energy firm and the community.  The justification is followed by a 
discussion of the utilization of Bloomington School analytics for optimal data exploration 
and evaluation (the analytics allow the institutional analyst to understand system 
structure, as well as the robustness of a given institution).  Finally, the chapter concludes 
with some identified threats to validity. 
The Case Study Methodology 
      A comparative case study methodology is utilized to address the broader question 
“how does wind energy development interact with community development?”  Case 
studies are “chosen for the likelihood that they will offer theoretical insight” (Eisenhardt 
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& Graebner, 2007, p. 27) from an observed phenomenon or case, “bounded by time and 
activity” (Creswell, 2008, p. 15; Yin, 2008).  The rise and fall of a boomtown (Broadway 
& Stull, 2006) or the outcomes of a community development project (Zacharakis & 
Flora, 2005) are examples that might serve as the unit of analysis for such studies.  The 
case study method is a nonrandom empirical research strategy (Yin, 2008) used by 
scholars seeking to analyze complex system processes through the triangulation of the 
broad range of data collected and the incorporation of actor perspectives (Tellis, 1997). 
      The interest here is primarily in the structural attributes of the community, the 
wind energy utility and the community outcomes of these interaction processes.  These 
three units of analysis will be assessed through two cases: the co-operative PrairieWinds 
wind farm in Ward County, North Dakota, and the IOU Twin Groves wind farm in 
McLean County, Illinois.  The broad question being researched could then be rephrased 
from a more technical perspective: “how does wind energy development interact with 
local social structures (the community or action situation)?”    
      The underlying hypothesis is that the community development outcomes vary 
dependent upon the ownership model, hence the subquestion “how does the ownership 
model of the wind energy firm interact with community development?”  Though there 
exists a number of wind energy ownership models, only two are compared in this study: 
the investor and the co-operative owned utility.  While there is an abundance of investor-
owned wind farms in the United States, researchers have a much smaller population of 
co-operative-owned wind firms to choose from: currently there exist only two utility-
scale co-operative wind farms, both of which are owned by Basin Electric Power Co-
operative.  While this study is like many case studies, a small N, there is a great deal that 
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can be learned –and theory advanced- from the study of an extreme outlier, providing 
differential findings in the subject matter (though theory can also be advanced from case 
studies with consistent findings, which advances research hypotheses toward 
verification). 
      A thorough analysis of the complex levels of social systems at play is critical for 
understanding the outcomes within the community (Miraftab, 2004b, p. 92).  The case 
study methodology lends itself to better understanding community power dynamics by 
discerning “socially structured and culturally patterned behavior of groups, and practices 
of institutions” (Lukes, 2005, p. 26). And since case studies attempt to be thorough in 
“observation, reconstruction, and analysis” (Tellis, 1997, p. 3), incorporating the voices 
of actors embedded in the case, the methodological approach will be to use IAD to 
analyze the interactions between the wind energy firm and the community (Ostrom, 
2005).  
Data Collection and Analytical Methodology  
      Data sought and collected are predicated on an IAD-informed systems approach, 
meaning the community and the wind firm are not isolated, but instead nested within a 
complex social structure, each level having an impact on the interactive processes.  The 
attributes of an given case, the contextual realities, and the participants (see Figure 2 for a 
visual representation) operate to varying degrees at multiple levels of analysis. 
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Figure 2. Institutional Analysis and Development Framework 
 
 
Source: Ostrom, 2005, p. 15 
There exist three levels of analysis utilized under IAD (Figure 3): “(1) Operational level, 
the level of day-to-day decisions made by participants in any institutional setting” (i.e. 
the wind firm); “(2) Collective-choice level, the level determining the operational 
activities and results through specific, domain-focused institutional and organization 
structures and operational rules” (i.e. the community), “and (3) Constitutional-choice or 
policy level, the level that defines the broad parameters of social action and social order 
creating the foundations for the institutional arrangements and the rules to be used in 
crafting the set of collective-choice rules that in turn affect the set of operational rules” 
(Aligica & Boettke, 2009, p. 86).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
! 44!
Figure 3. Levels of analysis and outcomes 
 
 
Source: Ostrom, 1999, p. 60. 
 
      Understanding the contributions and costs of an electric utility requires attention 
to extra local actors.  The very design of the national electric grid overlays every 
municipality in the U.S.  And the capital-intensive nature –as well as the national 
characteristic- of the grid means electricity generated is hardly if ever of endogenous 
origin.  These constitutional and collective-choice levels (external of the 
community/action situation) are analyzed through an assessment of government energy 
policy and relevant market actors.  This is then triangulated against the findings from the 
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field to assess how these social forces influence aspects of the community development 
process. 
      The community members or actors can be represented as individuals, groups or 
organizations, but they are all characterized “by four clusters of variables” which can be 
utilized to understand an actor’s development role in the community (Poteete, et al., 
2010): 
1.  the way actors acquire, process, retain, and use information and knowledge   
      about contingencies; 
2.  the preferences of an actor related to actions and outcomes; 
3.  the conscious or unconscious processes actors use for selection of particular       
                 courses of action; and 
4.  the resources that the actor brings to the situation.15 
 
These characteristics are used to analyze the data and ascribe the motivations and level of 
influence given actors has within the action situation. 
      From the perspective of the Bloomington School, an action situation broadly is 
comprised of seven attributes affecting the “actions of participants” though to differing 
degree based upon contextual realities (Poteete, et al., 2010): 
1.  the set of participants confronting a collective-action problem. 
2.  the sets of positions or roles participants fill in the context of this situation,  
3.  the set of allowable actions for participants in each role or position,  
4.  the level of control than an individual or group has over an action,  
5.  the potential outcomes associated with each possible combinations of actions,  
6.  the amount of information available to actors, and 
7.  the costs and benefits associated with each possible action and outcome 
 
(See Figure 4, which represents a detailed “zoom” of the “action arena” of Figure 3). 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!15     As noted by Poteete, et al., (2010), “The first three” of these four cluster variables “are the core working parts of any theory of  
human behavior, while the fourth is situation-dependent.”  This is critical for scholars to be cognizant of so that a number of variables  
may be factored in to analyses, building toward a comprehensive theory of human behavior. 
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Figure 4. Attributes of an action situation 
 
Source: Ostrom, 2010, p. 651. 
Data collected from participants were analyzed based upon these seven participant 
attributes in an attempt to reconstruct the action situation and weave a cogent narrative 
that addresses processes and patterns relevant to the research questions (more on that 
below). 
      The action situation (here it is the interaction between the wind utility and the 
community) is contextualized through archival analyses and semi-structured interviews 
either in person, via phone, or email.  An archival analysis was utilized to explore official 
organizational documentation (agency or business literature), how local media outlets 
depicted wind energy development processes, and other relevant archival documentation.  
This then set the tone for entry into the field. 
      Fieldwork is time-consuming and requires a social skill set to gain access to 
critical gatekeepers (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998, pp. 24-27).  Being in the field added a level 
! 47!
of access to on-the-ground realities that would have been missed offsite.  The relative 
scarcity of such research endeavors focused on wind farms (Poteete, et al., 2010, p. 88), 
coupled with other sources of data collected for analysis, means that such data are of 
critical importance to furthering our knowledge of SES’s so that researchers might have 
access to richer, more complete information with which to draw scholarly conclusions.  
      A total of four weeks of fieldwork was carried out in the two communities 
(roughly two weeks in each community). Fieldwork in Ward County, North Dakota 
occurred in August of 2011, whereas fieldwork in McLean County, Illinois was spread 
out over late summer, early fall of 2011. Purposive access was sought in order to interact 
with national and local level actors through gatekeepers in academia (initially through 
university extension offices) and the researcher’s own contacts in the wind and co-
operative energy sectors.  Fieldwork was comprised of observation of and interviews 
with participants in the action arena (reputational leaders, landowners, government 
officials, wind energy developers, and other wind energy related stakeholders that 
snowballed on an as-needed basis).  The semi-structured interviews were carried out with 
these individuals in an attempt to assess local power structures, community interaction 
processes with the wind energy firm, how governance functions, and how critical 
material and social resources are distributed locally.  The University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved the interview protocol as minimal 
risk to the participants. 
      The research then incorporates the perspectives of those who live within the host 
community to paint a more complete picture of the interactive processes and community 
outcomes (Poteete, et al., p. 52).  86 total interviews were conducted with 49 people.  Of 
! 48!
that, 34 interviews were conducted with 15 national-level actors at co-operative business 
associations, the Department of Energy, and the United States Department of Agriculture 
(the nationally-oriented, investor-backed wind energy associations was not accessible for 
this research project despite a number of attempts).  Illinois interviews were carried out 
32 times with 20 participants in the investor-owned wind energy sectors, agricultural 
interests, developers, landowners, and local public officials.  North Dakota interviews 
were conducted 20 times from a pool of 14 participants in the co-operative, wind and 
public sectors.16  
      Some of the interviews were audio recorded with the approval of interview 
participants, taking 30 -60 minutes to complete; confidentiality is provided through 
pseudonyms, and the process conformed to the IRB agreement.  Field notes were taken 
throughout the entire fieldwork process and archived on a secure University of Illinois 
server. 
      The questions in the interview protocol were geared toward an assessment of the 
local community social structure (Zacharakis & Flora, 2005).  The questions it turns out 
did not provide the anticipated outcomes, but instead elicited responses oriented toward 
identifying locally oriented actors with direct involvement in the wind energy 
development process; the responses provided additional insight useful for further 
analyses.  The data here were used to assess the actors engaged in the localized wind 
energy development process.  The interconnectedness and characteristics of the 
community-level actors are weighted against the patterns of structured interactions to 
better assess who most benefitted from the structural and material returns. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!16     While a greater number of participants were interviewed in Illinois, interactions with North Dakota participants were on the  
whole longer in duration, many who spent hours or the entire workday discussing the topic of this research. 
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      Data collected from interviews have been criticized due to the expression of 
individual values and capacity for subjectivity.  Yet this is not to say that interview data 
have nothing to offer; semi-structured interviews allow for open discussions and greater 
discovery of new phenomena (Hatton-MacDonald, et al., 2013).  This study highlights 
specific quotes that when triangulated with other findings from the field help to highlight 
key facets of the case whilst maintaining validity of the intended meaning conveyed by 
the interview participants.   
      The contextual realities matter as well (listed under “External Variables” on the 
left side of Figure 2) in further triangulating findings from the action arena.  Institutional 
analysts may use any combination or all three of these exogenous, contextual variables in 
their analyses (listed below in numbered order (Ostrom, 2005, p. 16; Poteete, et al., 2010, 
p. 41)):  
“(1) the structure of the resource system involved (size, complexity, predictability).” 
Electric power generated from wind is part of a complex biophysicial system that entails 
not only natural resources, but also built infrastructure that is constrained by the next 
contextual variable.  This research focuses primarily on wind and the complementary 
resources necessary (land for the siting, access to transmission lines, capability of local 
actors to interact with the electric power system).   
“(2) [T]he rules used by participants to order their relationships.” 
Wind power infrastructure is typically sited on a mix of private and public property 
arrangements, and formally regulated by regional transmission organizations, state law, 
and private contractual agreements.  This entails norms, laws, regulations, and 
agreements, both formalized through contract and informally through basic 
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understandings built upon trust and reciprocity.  The electric power is then sold and 
transmitted to the grid infrastructure through a tightly managed market regime discussed 
within each case study.   
“(3) [T]he structure of the more general community within which any particular arena is 
placed.”   
The research design is concerned not only with the structure on the community, but how 
actor networks interact with the wind firm and the community in order to tease out if 
there exist any tensions or complementary benefits.  Data collected from archival 
analyses, participant observation, interviews, and social network analyses are applied 
toward identifying the distinct community field and how it interacts with the wind energy 
utility. 
      Analyzing the data.  Taking a bird’s eye view, the data analyses applied to this 
research can be summarized thusly: 
1. Perform a snapshot assessment of the polycentrism of the IOU and co-operative  
 
wind energy systems; 
 
2. Contextualize the host communities, and; 
 
3. Critically analyze the interactional patterns observed between the host  
 
communities and the wind firms. 
 
      The IAD framework (a visual representation of the diagnostic elements is found 
in Figure 2) is used for analytic triangulation.  IAD is a consistently tested and utilized 
framework17 embracing the inherent complexity of institutions and social systems 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!17     What makes case study design particularly difficult is the lack of resources available on design, and the differentiation of design  
techniques that are dependent upon the phenomenon studied and the “quasi-experimental situation” (Yin, 2008, p. 20).  The strength  
of the IAD framework is that it was crafted through decades of inductive analyses of 1000s of case studies, creating a scalable 
template of sorts that can be consistently applied across a number of disciplines.  This then allows small N studies to be grouped 
together into large N meta analyses.   
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(Ostrom & Kiser, 2000; Poteete, et al., 2010).  In this case, the study uses the 
Wilkinsonian theoretical conceptualization of community as a structured interactional 
social field and plies those concepts to the action situation within IAD (in Figure 2, this is 
represented as “Evaluative Criteria”).  The CIFT is useful for understanding both the 
exogenous variables that interact the community field and the endogenous community 
interactions, specifically the interaction of wind energy development with the community 
field. 
      CIFT is employed to understand how individuals interact through their relevant 
social fields, how they are structured, and how these collective interactions impact the 
community field.  CIFT posits that interaction amongst social fields is a critical 
component of community.  Social structural impediments are of central concern to 
community development; therefore understanding the local social structure is critical.  
Contextualizing the structure of the community helps to assess if the community and the 
wind energy actors have polycentric or monocentric tendencies, and what that means for 
the livelihoods of people living there.  Here interest is acutely focused on how the 
community interacts with the localized wind farm, and if that interaction lends itself to 
community development.  Methodologically, data collected are used to discover the 
structure of the social field that interacted with the wind utility with the partial assistance 
of a simple social network analysis.  Additionally, the system itself is further analyzed to 
assess systemic tendencies toward polycentrism or monocentrism.   
      Aligica’s and Tarko’s (2012) logic structure of polycentric systems (p. 257) 
complements the structural analyses of the wind energy system. The logic structure 
accounts for the three basic features: 
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1.  the multiplicity of decision centers, 
2.  the overarching system of rules, and  
3.  the spontaneous order generated by evolutionary competition between the 
different decision centers’ ideas, methods, and way of doing things (p. 257). !
Figure 5.  Logical structure of polycentricity !
!
Source: adapted from Aligica & Tarko, 2012, p. 257. 
 
A polycentric logical structure (see Figure 5. Logical structure of polycentricity) 
elaborating the three basic features provides the systems or institutional analyst with an 
additional diagnostic to assess “nine fundamental ways in which polycentricity may 
break down: 
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• “Multiplicity of decision centers breakdown: 
o Non-P1: active exercise of diverse opinions eliminated; 
o Non-P2: the system becomes hierarchical; and 
o Non-(A1 # A2): the activity becomes considered meaningless (the goals 
disappear, the polycentric system disappears because it no longer serves a 
function). 
• Overarching system of rules breakdown:  
o Non-P3: rules no longer considered useful by agents; 
o Non-(B1 # B2): agreement about territoriality disappears (decision centers 
fight over territorial authority); 
o Non-(C1 # C2): no agreement about rule design (rules are no longer 
considered legitimate and their enforcement becomes difficult to 
impossible); and  
o Non-(D1 # D2 # D3): the rule of law breaks down—power-based 
decisions (authority rule). 
• Spontaneous order breakdown: 
o Non-(E1 # E2 # E3): no entry (monopoly); 
o Non-(F1 # F2): the constituency of the system is unclear (some decision 
centers accept X as part of the system while others do not);  
o Non-(G1 # G2): no available information relevant to decision making 
(random decisions, relation between consequences and rules unclear, 
spontaneous order turns into drift)” (p. 258). 
The diagnostic will be used in this research to assess the structural features evident within 
the wind energy sector, and if that structure allows for institutional innovation (getting at 
the “why does only one co-op own a wind farm” question).   
      The paths available for alternative institutions within the rapidly growing wind 
energy sector are important to understand as absentee firms –or outsiders- have been 
linked to community atomization.  Aligica and Tarko (2012, p. 254) note one potential 
explanation in that “”outsiders” are those agents who are not subjected to the same 
system of rules as “insiders” are”; the potential for disruption is evident.   Certain 
institutions may be a better fit with regards to community development, and social 
systems may be a determinant for the institutions applied.  Therefore, an assessment of 
the centricity of the wind energy industrial social system allows for enhanced capacity to 
analyze and assess the state of the community field, the local dimensions of power 
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(Brennan, 2009; Lukes, 2005), and how key institutional actors develop the community 
field. 
      Finally, it isn’t enough to assess systems; one must assess the organizational 
manifestation itself, the wind firm.  The Ostrom “Design Principles” are utilized to 
enhance analyses of each of the wind firms (listed in Table 2).
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Table 2. Ostrom Design Principles 
 
1A#
User boundaries: Clear boundaries between legitimate users and 
nonusers must be clearly defined.  
1B#
Resource boundaries: Clear boundaries are present that define a 
resource system and separate it from the larger biophysical 
environment.  
2A#
Congruence with local conditions: Appropriation and provision 
rules are congruent with local social and environmental conditions.  
2B#
Appropriation and provision: The benefits obtained by users from a 
common-pool resource (CPR), as determined by appropriation 
rules, are proportional to the amount of inputs required in the form 
of labor, material, or money, as determined by provision rules.  
3#
Collective-choice arrangements: Most individuals affected by the 
operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules.  
4A#
Monitoring users: Monitors who are accountable to the users 
monitor the appropriation and provision levels of the users.  
4B#
Monitoring the resource: Monitors who are accountable to the 
users monitor the condition of the resource.  
5#
Graduated sanctions: Appropriators who violate operational rules 
are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the 
seriousness and the context of the offense) by other appropriators, 
by officials accountable to the appropriators, or by both.  
6#
Conflict-resolution mechanisms: Appropriators and their officials 
have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts 
among appropriators or between appropriators and officials.  
7#
Minimal recognition of rights to organize: The rights of 
appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by 
external governmental authorities.  
8#
Nested enterprises: Appropriation, provision, monitoring, 
enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are 
organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.  
Source: (Cox, Arnold, & Villamayor Tomas, 2010, p. 15) 
 
      The Ostrom Design Principles serve as a diagnostic to assess organizational 
robustness or the ability of the firm to adapt to disturbances (Ostrom, 2005, p. 258).  This 
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is critical for several reasons.  Government-driven wind energy policy may be privileging 
one type of institution over another.  Perhaps that particular institution may be more 
prone to poor owner governance or market shocks.  Should that be the case,  “we can 
conclude that there are ways of organizing governance that increase the opportunities for 
adaptation and learning in a changing and uncertain world with continuing advances in 
knowledge and technologies” (p. 257).  In doing do, we can bring about greater stability 
in policy and development, while enhancing the day to day lives of the people on the 
ground that intersect with these dynamics. 
Threats to Validity 
      The threats to validity relate primarily to persisting criticism of the case study as a 
methodological approach.  The case study is oft-criticized for an inability to draw 
generalizations due to the uniqueness of each case, selection bias and related 
nonrandomness of the subject, and therefore its inability to contribute to the scientific 
literature (Flyvbjerg, 2006).18  But a case is a subject of interest that does not 
delegitimize the necessity for understanding the underlying, nonrandomized 
phenomenon.  
      Such ascribed weight given to randomness over “convenience” fails to account for 
the potential of the case study to introduce controls for the participants within the 
methodological design, maintaining internal validity, reducing threats to external validity 
(the scholars misinterpretation of findings), while accounting for the nonrandomness of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!18     What is left for nonrandom data collection purposes is typically referred to as a convenience sample, a somewhat misleading term 
than could imply lack of scholarly rigor, or as noteworthy methods scholar John Creswell declares: “a convenience sample makes it 
difficult to randomly assign individuals to groups, a hallmark of a true experiment” (2008, p. 164). Oddly enough, Creswell 
recognizes the broad usage of the case study in the study of processes and events earlier in his book (2008, p. 15, p. 91), 
acknowledging its potential for scholarly pursuit. He falls into the common trap of tying the case study to the exploratory phase of a 
major research endeavor (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 2008, p. 12) when he explains the experimental design processes available to 
researchers, forgetting his earlier postulate that the case study stands on its own as a complete research strategy  (Creswell, 2008, p.  
168), including experimentation (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Creswell’s stance becomes somewhat confusing in this context. 
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the subject under study (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Furthermore, it fails to 
acknowledge that a properly controlled or justified convenience sample may offer 
credible explanatory power comparable to a randomized sample. However, the plying of 
the IAD framework and transparency in data collection and analysis are intended as a 
stopgap measure to addressing many of these criticisms.  The attempted transparency of 
this project ideally allows for critics to assess the quality of the data collected as well as 
the fairness of the analysis.  Furthermore, the framework used (IAD) was created with the 
intention to enhance these attributes, while allowing for replicability.    
      Because of the complexity of SES’s, we must be comfortable knowing that many of 
the results plucked from empirical research are not necessarily precise, but instead reveal 
a pattern of behavior and outcomes in a given context (Ostrom, 2005, p. 10).  This holds 
just as true with co-operative business models, operating across multiple market sectors 
and in varied community contexts; just because a co-operative grocery store works well 
in one community, such an endeavor may be doomed for failure in another community.  
A case study methodology may lead us to new discoveries and research trajectories, as 
well as contribute to scientific development through an element of generalizability by 
applying empirical observations to the greater bodies of literature (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007; Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 225), which is exactly what Natural Resource 
Council committee demonstrated in their assessment of hundreds of case studies (Poteete, 
et al., 2010). More importantly, the acquisition of knowledge is still a fundamental 
feature of science, even if it “cannot be formally generalized” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 227).  
This research is not seeking to generalize so much as to study relatively unexplored facets 
of wind energy development. 
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      The case study methodology imposes natural limits regarding the choice of 
randomized samples.  This is particularly true when analyzing smaller communities or 
emergent development phenomena such as the green economy.  The two cases of interest 
here no doubt can be assessed under such a lens, considering that while there exist 
numerous corporate wind communities, the North Dakota wind farm is one of two co-
operative, utility-scale wind farms in the nation, hence the purposive sampling.  
PriairieWind’s relatively short operational life thus far makes a longitudinal analysis 
impossible at this juncture, further limiting our understanding of long-term impacts. 
      However, the uniqueness of this case is demonstrable of a phenomenon-driven 
case study (Yin, 2008), a phenomenon being what typically draws the attention of the 
researcher in the first place, since, as stated at the beginning of this chapter, case studies, 
like lab experiments, are “chosen for the likelihood that they will offer theoretical 
insight” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 27).  After all, the case study is the study of a 
particular case of interest, thereby necessitating analysis of a nonrandom sample of 
participants or phenomenon (Eisenhardt, 1989; Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 229).  This of course 
can draw allegations of selection bias, and if true does not diminish the merit of the 
research endeavor so long as the justification matched legitimized needs.  Recall that one 
of the questions of this research is “why has only one co-operative developed co-
operative-owned wind farms in the United States?”  For us to be able to answer that 
question, it follows that direct inquiry of the co-operative wind farm is of necessity.  And 
since it would be virtually impossible to study the entire co-operative population, we 
must delimit a methodologically useful sample. 
      Criticisms of the case study methodology include the notion that context-
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independent theory is more valuable than the empirically-driven theory embedded in a 
case study (Flyvbjerb, 2006, p. 221); this is a flawed criticism stemming from a 
misunderstanding of the methodology’s capacity to contribute to scientific knowledge. 
Empirically testing theory for validity is vital for assessing a theory’s inherent 
applicability to explain social phenomena; the case study methodology is equipped to do 
just that. Precision in theoretical application to scholarly inquiry is therefore key since 
lack of exactitude may lead to invalid findings.  Being that co-operative owned wind 
energy is a relatively new phenomenon, a case study may offer a significant amount of 
insight into the questions posed. 
Concluding Thoughts on the Methodological Approach 
 
      Complex social dilemmas require sophisticated tools for analyses.  Bloomington 
School analytics were designed for that exact reason.  IAD allows for input-output 
analyses (the social forces which interact with the community), whereas the polycentric 
logical structure diagnostic allows for a refined evaluation of the social systemic 
attributes (the question of government policy and market influence).  The Ostrom Design 
Principles then allows the analyst to better understand how the structured design of the 
firm may interact with the host community, contributing to enhanced knowledge of the 
institutional design of the wind energy firm. 
      Embedding these analytics within the case study methodology is a potent 
approach toward the exploration of heretofore little-understood social dilemmas.  The 
emphasis on outliers or uniquely interesting social phenomena allows the analyst to 
observe noteworthy social processes that may be obscured in large N studies.   
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Chapter Four: Case Study - The Investor-Owned Wind Farm 
 
      Wind energy is the fastest growing segment of the electric energy generation 
market.  This is in part due to two factors.  First, the uncertainty of proposed emissions 
regulations -as well as political pressure groups- have made it increasingly difficult to 
build new coal, natural gas, and nuclear power plants.  Wind energy bypasses many of 
the debates associated with these more traditional, exhaustible energy sources.  Second, 
wind energy development is further propelled by subsidies at the federal and (some) state 
levels.  The most advantageous subsidies are only available to those entities and investors 
with a tax appetite.19   
Historically, federal incentives for renewable energy development in the  
United States largely consisted of the investment and production tax credits  
(ITC [investment tax credit] and PTC [production tax credit]) and the accelerated 
depreciation benefit for renewable energy property [the Modified Accelerated 
Cost Recovery System (MACRS) and the bonus depreciation]. Both the ITC and 
the PTC provide financial incentives for development of renewable energy 
projects in the form of tax credits that can be used to offset taxes paid on company 
profits. Given that many renewable energy companies are relatively nascent and 
small, their tax liability is often less than the value of the tax credits received; 
therefore, some project developers are unable to immediately recoup the value of 
these tax credits directly. Typically, these developers have relied on third-party 
tax equity investors to monetize the value of the main federal incentives for 
renewable energy project development (Steinberg & Porro, 2012). 
 
The tax-equity partners are by and large major financial firms, incentivized by  
government energy policy to invest in wind energy. 
…a so-called "tax-equity partner," usually a bank or other large company with a 
hefty tax bill, that can take advantage of the tax credits and either provide a loan 
for the project or buy it. Bank of America, U.S. Bancorp and other banks, and 
corporations like Google Inc. have used the tax-equity structure to invest in solar 
power and other renewable-energy projects (Tracy, 2012). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19     “Income from certain types of investments qualifies as passive income. Tax paid on this income is considered passive tax.  
To take advantage of the Federal Production Tax Credit (the PTC) and Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS), you 
or a project partner must be paying taxes that fit into this category of tax liability” (“Windustry,” n.d.a). 
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The tax equity partnership allows a wind company to partner with a large firm with a 
significant tax liability.  The tax liability is reduced via tax credits (not grants or direct 
subsidies in the form of cash payouts) provided by either the PTC or ITC.  The federal 
government reduces potential tax revenue generated from new renewable energy 
production, incentivizing investment in and growth of wind energy by profit-driven 
firms.  Some wind energy companies profit further from this policy by monetizing the tax 
credits through an overhead fee for the privilege of partnering on the project (Association 
Official, personal communication, November 3, 2010).  In an era of energy market 
volatility, wind serves as a safe tax shelter and investment hedge for deep-pocketed 
investors from the financial sector.  Unsurprisingly, 98 percent of all wind farms are 
structured as for-profit in order to utilize the tax credits to create sources of capital (Co-
operative Association Official, personal communication, September 8, 2010).  
      The first case study presented below examines Illinois’ McLean County, host to 
three major wind energy farms, all of which are investor owned.  The case study analysis 
focuses on one of the wind energy firms, the investor-owned Horizon Wind Energy, a 
subsidiary of the Portuguese EDP Renewables.20  As will be discussed, Horizon is 
noteworthy because it is the first wind energy developer in McLean, and helped lay the 
foundation by which future prospective wind energy developers operate under within the 
County.  The purpose here is to analyze and assess the development implications of the 
investor-owned wind farm within its host community.  It is therefore important to 
understand the social forces that compelled Horizon to be the first wind energy developer 
in McLean (the local community, market drivers, and government policy pathways) and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20     It should be emphasized that local, national, and global interests drive the wind energy arena.  The wind energy development 
incentives found in a number of countries has created a global network of wind energy firms capable of developing and operating 
wind farms across numerous national boundaries. 
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how the community at large responded to the prospects of a major wind energy project 
being located in their community.  Fieldwork and archival analysis was performed on 
Horizon and McLean County to assess how the wind farm has influenced local level 
community development.  The chapter ends with some concluding thoughts on the policy 
and firm’s ownership design implications interact with the local community social 
structure. 
McLean County and the Horizon Wind Energy Corporation  
      McLean County in central Illinois shares many of the characteristics of other U.S. 
counties with metropolitan centers (Isserman, Feser, & Warren, 2009). There is a 
relatively prosperous urban-city core, surrounded by a rural region experiencing 
population flight and a diminishing tax base (Local Official, personal communication, 
September 5, 2011).  The rural areas are in a state of relative decline as the urban core of 
Bloomington-Normal consolidates regional resources within its borders.  Much of the 
rural decline has to do with complex economic phenomena that are difficult for rural 
communities to harness in order to guarantee enhanced social wellbeing.  A local 
university extension official noted: “Outer lying areas feel left out of development.  The 
area is becoming urban… diverse.  It’s where urban and country meet” (Extension, 
personal communication, October 24, 2011). 
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Table#3.##Comparative+economic+data+
#
#
McLean#
County# Illinois#
Population# # #
Unemployment#Rate# 6.30%# 8.60%#
Estimated#Population#Growth#Rate# 1.60%# 0.30%#
Percent#Below#Poverty#Rate,#2007M
2011# 13.40%# 13.10%#
Per#capita#money#income#in#the#past#12#
months#(2011#dollars),#2007M2011## $29,425## $29,376##
Median#household#income,#2007M2011## $59,410## $56,576##
 
Source: http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/17/17113.html:
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/150. 
 
     McLean County is not defined by an economic miracle nor a boom.  Instead, what 
makes McLean County interesting to this analysis is the relative economic stability 
brought upon the community by a diversified mix comprised significantly of 
transnational firms.  McLean is a county with a significant deal of wealth, and as Figure 6 
shows, it results in a higher median income than the rest of the state of Illinois.  The local 
economic council has been marketing McLean from this vantage point for decades: 
“Endowed with excellent location and transportation, advantages, diverse population and 
employment sectors, and enviable community assets, the area has become a sought-after 
site for commercial and industrial development” (“Economic Development Council,” 
n.d.).  Diversified public infrastructure makes McLean amenable to large-scale economic 
development initiatives.  The development profiles listed on McLean’s Economic 
Development Council’s (MEDC) website go on to note McLean’s centrality to six major 
roadways, four railroads, and a regional airport. 
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Figure 6. McLean County local level actors with wind energy developers 
 
  
      Spatially and culturally, agriculture plays a major role in the lives of McLean 
County residents; this is reinforced by the local presence of the headquarters of the 
Illinois Farm Bureau, which is quite active in local civics.  McLean’s support for 
commodity agriculture has granted it the distinction as the highest corn and soy 
producing county in Illinois (Steever, 2011).  The biotech giant Monsanto has set up a 
high-tech agricultural research station to advance new biotech with local farmers (Local 
Official, personal communication, September 5, 2011).   
      Agriculture’s prominence is further secured by a county zoning ordinance, which 
inhibits the encroachment of urbanization and sprawl on the existing stock of farmland in 
the county.   
In 1974 a zoning ordinance placed severe restrictions on residential zoning in the 
ag district.  It’s been a bit of a problem for some people in the city who want to 
live in the country.  They buy up land undesirable for farming for the purposes of 
building their country home, only to find out they’re prohibited from building out 
there (Local Official, personal communication, December 13, 2010). 
 
Horizon!Wind!Energy!
County!Government!•  Planning!&!Zoning!
Agricultural!Actors!•  Farm!owners!•  Illinois!Farm!Bureau!
Economic!Development!Council!
Higher!Educational!Organization!
School!District!
Township!Government!
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Another local public official, when asked about the effectiveness of the zoning ordinance  
agreed that it generally preserves farmland, but offered a caveat: 
Bloomington-Normal is in Veterans Parkway21 mode.  We have sprawl.  We have 
malls.  If you have a major project with a lot of money attached, the ordinance all 
of a sudden becomes more flexible (Extension, personal communication, October 
24, 2011). 
 
Despite the general effectiveness of the ordinance in preserving the local farmland, the 
agricultural scene employs relatively few people comparable to other local industrial 
sectors (roughly 2 percent during peak farm season (“United States Department,” n.d.)), 
and has been steeply declining since the 1970’s.  The institutional logic underpinning 
McLean County’s agricultural scene adheres to many of the features of large agribusiness 
enterprise.  While the land may be preserved by local ordinance, the ownership or usage 
is for extra-local actors and global markets. 
      Much of day-to-day life and the economic activity happen in McLean’s twin cities 
of Bloomington and Normal where the business community plays a significant leadership 
role.  The Chamber of Commerce is very influential (the originator of the Economic 
Development Council), perceived as the go-to group for jump-starting any local business 
initiative (Local Official, personal communication, September 5, 2011). 
      Economic growth seems to be a driving force in McLean County.  The Chamber 
“crowd” is comprised of very large corporate partners and established local business 
people (Extension, personal communication, October 24, 2011).  The headquarters of 
State Farm Insurance is located in Bloomington-Normal, employing almost 16,000 local 
residents.   Transnational corporations such as Country Financial, Mitsubishi Motors, 
Bridgestone/Firestone, and Verizon collectively employ over 5000 workers from within !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21     This is in reference to the sprawling commercial district, replete with strip malls and corporate coffee chains. 
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the twin city boundaries.  The twin cities also serve as a regional hub for medical 
treatment at its hospitals (Local Official, personal communication, September 5, 2011), 
which employ almost 3000 whilst providing specialized medical care to individuals 
throughout the region.  
      While locally produced commodity-agriculture may have limited communitywide 
economic impacts, interstate agribusiness interests help to bolster the area’s affinity with 
agriculture.  The Illinois Farm Bureau’s headquarters are in the area, as is the Illinois 
Agricultural Association, and the ag-supply provider GROWMARK, one of the nation’s 
largest ag-supply co-operatives.  
      McLean’s economy is further assisted by government investment in human 
capital and public services for the County’s 172,281 residents (“US Census Bureau,” 
n.d.).  The University of Illinois, Illinois State University, Illinois Wesleyan University 
and Heartland Community College are major drivers in cultivating the human capital 
necessary for the community to compete in a global marketplace (over 25,000 students 
enrolled during the 2011-2012 academic year).  Combined, these entities employ over 
6000 high-skilled workers within McLean and ensure workforce regeneration. 
      McLean has a thriving food service sector.  Local residents (Local Resident, 
personal communication, September 6, 2011) emphasized McLean’s place as the 
“Restaurant Capital of the World” based on per capita saturation of restaurants locally 
(though numbers were not discovered which backed the assertion).   
      Taken as a whole, locally situated industry seem to be able to handle 
Bloomington-Normal’s population growth rate as well, which outpaces the Illinois state 
rate, providing jobs that pay more than the Illinois median (see Table 3). These 
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organizations (listed in Table 4. Major McLean County employers) provide a diversified 
mix of quality jobs for the region through their involvement and positionality in the 
global marketplace, stable tax liability, and an engaged workforce involved in local civic 
life (there exists a corporate culture in McLean which encourages and incentivizes 
professional development by way of involvement in local charities, sitting on non-profit 
boards, and running for local level political office). (Extension, personal communication, 
October 24, 2011; Association Official, personal communication, November 11, 2011). 
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Table 4.  Major McLean County employers 
 
 
Source: http://www.bnbiz.org/uploads/documents/uploader/470_uploader_atanequry3.pdf 
 
      It comes as no surprise that with McLean’s mix of corporate and state investment, 
the county may boast of a stable economy with good jobs.  But that wealth is not one 
based necessarily on local robustness.  McLean’s prosperity is increasingly embedded in 
and dependent on global markets.  Even the dark, fertile farmland, often mentioned as a 
core identity of the community (Extension, personal communication, October 24, 2011; 
Local resident, personal communication, September 6, 2011) is embedded in global 
commodity markets.  A local university official stated: “We are proud of having some of 
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the world’s most fertile farmland.  We rank toward the top in the world in productivity 
per acre” (University Official, personal communication, September, 2011).  The area’s 
row-crop farmers in general bypass local markets, taking their commodities to the global  
marketplace (“University of Illinois,” n.d.).!!
      Recently, younger, non-traditional farmers and members of the professional 
business community have taken steps to start a new grocery co-operative, as well as a 
local foods hub.  This is development is politely challenging the community’s deep 
dependency on global market economies.  A regionally sourced dairy farmer notes: 
“Local foods are a niche.  A nice niche, don’t get me wrong.  But corn and soy certainly 
dominate.  I would say 99.9999999 percent of the ag-base here is corn and soy” 
(Business Executive, personal communication, December 1, 2011). 
      Interestingly, many of the core supporters come from the nested transnational 
business community.  Generally speaking, the farmland itself is treated not as a source of 
local subsistence to guard against larger social system shocks, but as something geared 
toward financial outcomes via exporting product to global commodities markets. 
      Globalization has worked for many of the residents of McLean for decades. The 
wind farms dotting the farmland and lining the highways are yet another emanation of 
transnational markets rooting themselves in fertile Midwestern soil.  Horizon Wind 
Energy is itself part of EDP Renewables, a corporation headquartered in Portugal. The 
local wind farms do not represent a normative shift so much as a continuation of long 
established local economic development policy. 
      Despite the absentee ownership of Horizon, there is a great deal of boosterism 
locally for wind (Miller, 2007b). The wind energy companies continue to fuel the 
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boosterism (Ford, 2006a) by tapping into local desires for increased economic 
development.  From the vantage point of local policymakers, absentee ownership is not 
viewed as exploitive or even extractive, but as a contribution to prosperity via utilization 
of cropland to produce electricity (instead of food), jobs, lease payments, and an 
enhanced tax base. 
      In other words, the wind farm plays a part in the social life of McLean County, 
but not a wildly influential role.  The wind farm is but one set of social processes playing 
out in a much larger arena, rife with numerous other interactive social processes, wind 
energy production is an extractive process in that the value of localized natural resources 
are maximized for consumption and profit elsewhere (though wind energy extraction is 
more subtle and less agitating, with a cleaner façade than industries, such as coal).  Wind 
is rarely viewed as a resource in and of itself, meaning contestation over harnessing the 
energy from wind would be a relatively new phenomenon.  So long as the wind energy 
company can align its values orientation with the host community, individual 
landowners, and political leadership, there isn’t a great deal a wind farm will need to do 
to interact with the local community once built and operational.  The turbines become 
just another part of the local landscape, quietly generating revenue for the investor-
ownership, landowners, and taxing bodies.  And the small, locally based Horizon 
workforce plays a role in enabling the continued development of wind energy in McLean.  
The wind farm doesn’t appear to be extracting anything from the community; wind farms 
like Horizon can appear symbolically as net community builders, converting a previously 
unused resource into something productive.  The argument exists that there is a level of 
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exploitation, but with wind it is shrouded in subtle complexity (“wind-theft” would be a 
difficult accusation to prove).   
      While McLean has relative prosperity, a high level of education and trained 
workforce, those factors aren’t what primarily attracted Horizon to the area.  A mix of 
plentiful wind, abundant and open land, easy access to the transmission lines, and 
government-generated market demand helped pave the way.  Arguably the only 
prerequisite that a wind resource rich area like McLean needed to meet was to be 
welcoming, with a favorable business environment based on tax incentives and subsidies. 
      Building and operating a wind farm is a long, drawn out process for the 
uninitiated, and ever changing for the seasoned wind energy development professional.  
The electric energy sector is a complex amalgamation of capital-intensive investor-
owned, municipal, and co-operative businesses interacting through tight regulatory 
bodies, necessitating the use of legal experts, engineers, and politically influential 
individuals.  But the development outcomes of wind energy are subtler than one might 
presume with such a visual spectacle requiring massive coordination efforts and infusion 
of upfront capital.  Elaboration of the development processes will help to tease out 
pertinent information. 
      How the transnational Horizon wind farms came to be.  The case here focuses 
on Horizon alone because the goal is to analyze one specific organization and its affect 
on community development.  In addition, Horizon is a major player in this particular 
case.  Horizon was first to the area in 2001, the first to break ground and become 
commercially operational in 2007, and the first working with local administrators to 
clarify zoning ordinances, invariably clearing the way to make additional local wind 
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energy development easier and more likely.  Horizon is the company that helped to set 
the bar locally.  
      Horizon has been ambitious in McLean.  Two of Horizon’s 27 U.S. wind farms 
are in McLean.  Horizon operates 240 turbines in McLean; moreover, they have proposed 
hundreds more and another 200 turbines in surrounding counties (Ford, 2010).  However, 
Horizon isn’t the only player in the region.  PPM Energy out of Oregon has explored 
development of 337 turbines in the same service area.  There have also been major 
proposals put forward by Navitas (143 turbines) and Invenergy Wind LLC (100 turbines) 
(Shults, 2006).  A local zoning official believes it’s feasible that 400 turbines will go 
online in the next couple of years.  This has the potential to change the landscape, culture, 
and tax revenue base. 
      Nationally, there is a rush of sorts to occupy areas where the development 
processes have been formally incorporated into local public policy (Sapochetti, 2010).  If 
the socio-political mood is amenable, the land, wind and grid are finite and may be 
consumed by a competitor; speculators must strike when the stars align.   
      McLean was attractive to Horizon for a number of reasons.  Initially the county 
met many of the biophysical prerequisites necessary for speculative development to 
begin. 1) The average wind speed in the vicinity met the calculations to make a wind 
farm viable.  As turbines grow increasingly more efficient, wind energy developers will 
be able to utilize resources in regions with lower wind speeds (Loomis & Carter, 2011, p. 
12).  2) Existing transmission lines had excess capacity.  The costs of developing a wind 
farm are expensive enough without the added burden of building new transmission 
capacity.  It becomes ideal to find a wind regime as close as possible to transmission 
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capacity to limit infrastructural investment needs.  Fortunately for wind energy 
developers, the Illinois electric grid was designed primarily to send power from the rural 
countryside to be consumed by the Chicago electric market (Association Official, 
personal communication, November 3, 2010).  Illinois transmission was designed for 
growth.  Transmission infrastructure spiders-out from the Chicago area southward, 
intersecting with wide-open spaces and blustery wind. McLean happens to be one such 
area in which this intersection of transmission and wind regime occurs. 3) Large tracts of 
relatively contiguous plots of land must be available.  The closer the turbines are to the 
transmission infrastructure, and to each other, situated on vast tracts of empty parcels of 
land, the better to reduce connectivity overhead costs. 
      Beyond the biophysical prerequisites, there are a number of adjacent social 
processes that play into the wind energy development process.  Since electricity 
generated locally is most often transmitted to the national grid, a number of socio-
political considerations come into play at varying scales of action. 
Enabling Wind Energy Development  
      Speculative wind developers don’t have to guess as to where wind energy 
resources may be in abundance.  A broad array of wind data have been publicly 
accessible through the Department of Energy (DOE) National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory (NREL) where the wind data estimates are kept up to date on a regular basis.  
Communities such as McLean are in prospective wind energy developer’s databases, 
waiting to be assessed for development potential. 
      While NREL’s wind energy datasets are useful for wind energy speculation, 
developers must still collect on-the-ground data to assess operational feasibility.  The 
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wind energy developers undertake localized precision testing to isolate ideal conditions 
for wind farm infrastructure.22  The testing assesses if the land is capable of hosting a 
large wind farm.  If so, developers must make sure the wind patterns align with available 
land through exacting measurements.  This is done through the utilization of a 
meteorological or “MET” tower over a one to two year time period to better isolate the 
ideal placement of the wind farm with respect to a reliably productive wind flow at the 
local level.   
      As the biophysical requirements are being assessed, the wind energy developers 
may begin the speculative land development process should the investment projections 
bear out in favor of such a project. This is the second tier.  Wind developers begin the 
long process of cultivating the community (opinion leaders, policymakers, and 
landowners) by preparing the population to understand what hosting a wind farm entails, 
as well as the material benefits they can expect. 
      Typically before the wind developers spend the time to deploy a MET tower or 
hire a contractor to assess overall transmission grid accessibility, they assess community 
sentiment.  A feasibility prerequisite is determination of the community’s willingness to 
host a wind farm; if outright, mobilized hostility is apparent; the wind developers are 
likely to look elsewhere toward a more welcoming community.  Should initial contact 
with the community look positive, a two-tiered process begins locally.   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22     Individuals in rural communities throughout Illinois, buoyed by the perception that wind energy development offers economically 
depressed regions new sources of jobs and revenues, are performing some of the prospecting for wind energy companies on a pro 
bono basis.  McLean County’s Center for Renewable Energy (based out of Illinois State University) and Macomb’s Illinois Institute 
for Rural Affair (based out of Western Illinois University) enable these “wind prospectors” by providing them with a limited number 
of MET towers to assess local wind resources (University Official, personal communication, May 10, 2010; University Official, 
personal communication, May 12, 2010).  The data collected are then housed on publicly available websites and used by these 
prospectors to entice wind energy developers.   According to an official in one of these programs 
“these projects have caught the attention of some companies.  The Rail Splitter wind farm on your way in to town came 
about because a prospector collected the data, and worked with us to talk to a wind company.  See, they demonstrate not 
only feasibility, thereby lessening the wind company’s development overhead, but also a welcome feeling by the 
community”  (University Official, personal communication, May 10, 2010). 
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      Horizon began publicly speculating McLean for wind energy development in 
2001 and talking with the community with its first turbine “going live” in 2007.  The 
wind farm achieved commercial operation in June 2007 and was financed through an 
investment by the commodities division of Goldman Sachs, and the energy utility 
FirstEnergy procured a PPA for the energy generated by the wind farm. “Horizon had 
years of broad community conversations before they committed to the wind farm (they 
were clear they were non-committal)” (Local Official, personal communication, 
December 13, 2010). 
      As is typical, a multi-pronged, parallel process began in which Horizon 
developers started talking to two groups serving as critical determinants of development: 
local government officials and landowners.  Any major wind farm will need access to 
land, most often owned by a collection of local landowners.  The development staff must 
know first that a group of landowners are open to sign long-term leases and that the local 
government bodies are willing to issue new building and zoning ordinances to 
accommodate the unique attributes of a wind farm.  According to a zoning official: 
We worked hard to make this happen.  We had to learn a great deal about what 
wind energy projects would do in the County.  But now we get a lot of calls from 
other communities being approached to build out wind farms.  It was a long 
ordeal, but we have become experts in the field (Local Official, personal 
communication, December 13, 2010). 
 
      Horizon hired two individuals from within the local community to serve as their 
lead project developers.  They were seen as young, ambitious, and knowledgeable of 
local socio-cultural specifics.  These professionals are project-dedicated, expected to 
devote 2 to 5 years to seeing a given project to fruition.  The individuals chosen to be 
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local level developers must by the very nature of the job be highly entrepreneurial, so as 
to be able to adapt to sudden changes on the ground.   
      Despite the significant amount of capital wind energy development, and the 
precision engineering studies, wind energy developers are still developing best practices.  
When Horizon’s development staff was asked about the extent to which developers 
shared best practices amongst other developers, one staffer responded: “Well, all 
developers share information with corporate, and corporate then shares it with us.  We 
follow trade publications, the news, and we even apprentice new developers from other 
wind energy companies” (Wind Developer, personal communication, November 9, 
2011).  When one of the local developers was asked about the best practices they used for 
community organizing around wind energy, the response was  “do you have a 
development handbook?  I would love to have one of those!”  (Wind Developer, personal 
communication, November 8, 2011). 
      It seems as though there is not an official “how-to” guide yet developed for 
individual wind energy developers.  But the interactive, iterative processes crafted by 
staff working across firms signals there are some best-practices arising.  Successfully 
developed communities like McLean serve as valuable learning experiences, enhancing 
the development capabilities of wind energy firms.   
      The staff seemed to view themselves more as economic development 
professionals seeking broad-based buy-in as opposed to community organizers 
advocating for social change, specific events seem to support that assertion.  It was 
interesting that in conversations with the development staff specific community 
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organizing strategies or techniques were never mentioned, even though many of the 
mechanisms utilized were reminiscent of traditional mobilization techniques. 
      The Horizon developers set up community dinners with prospective local 
landowners, who were by and large from the farming community.  Horizon asked 
committed landowners to host neighbor open houses in an attempt to trade in on brokered 
social capital, also hosted open houses for the community at local schools and firehouses 
(Ford, 2010) in which they handed out packets of literature and gave PowerPoint 
presentations.  The use of respected individuals and civic institutions for meeting locals 
proved to be a solid approach to harness social capital, to creating buy-in and 
engendering trust.   
      Transparency with the local community is seen as essential by Horizon.  A 
Horizon wind developer stated: 
 Transparency is crucial.  Everything has to be above bar.  Perception is  
everything.  No meetings are done on short notice.  All of our meetings, we  
give plenty of notice.  We make sure to note that everyone gets the same  
amount for their leases (we have to avoid any inference of favoritism), and if in 
the future we build another wind farm with a more favorable lease agreement, 
then existing landowners will also get that (Wind Developer, personal 
communication, November 8, 2011). 
 
A second Horizon developer noted: “the more community outreach, the more you reduce  
lawsuits.  Our practice is at least four public events” (Wind Developer, personal  
communication, November 9, 2011). 
      Community interest appears to have been substantive on the outset, with turnout 
for initial public forums reaching 300+.  The content of these initial community meetings 
typically covered the number of turbines, the impact on day-to-day life, and the new 
financial benefits for the community.  The numbers quickly tapered off as it became 
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obvious that only a handful of locals would be directly interacting with the development 
project and receiving material benefit (Local Official, personal communication, 
December 8, 2011).  Indeed, interviews with key leaders involved in wind energy 
development demonstrated that the breadth of stakeholders involved in the standard wind  
energy development project is relatively narrow (pictured in Figure 6). 
As the wind farm went from vision to reality, the wind energy developers are 
typically tasked with providing a number of reports to not only meet regulatory 
requirements, but to appease local critics and mitigate the strength of organized 
opposition.  In this manner, Horizon builds ever-greater trust in that it demonstrates 
concern for a number of local issues by spending a great deal of time and money on these 
reports. 
      As the project advances beyond prospecting into actual development, the 
developers seek options contracts with landowners to guarantee that once build-out 
begins, the wind firm has approval to build on desired parcels of land.  From Horizon’s 
website (http://www.horizonwind.com/about/landowners/optionleaseagreement.aspx):  
Horizon works with landowners who are interested in long-term business 
relationships. There are two phases to these relationships: the option phase and 
the lease phase. During the option phase, Horizon has the flexibility to execute the 
lease once the project is ready to be constructed. The option phase usually lasts 
approximately five to seven years and gives Horizon the time needed to measure 
the wind, secure access to transmission and obtain permits. In some cases, an 
extended option phase is necessary due to regulatory variations at the state or 
federal level or slower growth of the wind energy market in the region. 
 
While developers from Horizon would not divulge the terms of an option, other wind 
developers claimed that many of these contracts are for five to ten years, providing 
annual retention stipends of one to ten dollars a year per proposed turbine (Wind 
Developer, personal communication, March 25, 2010).   
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      Horizon did eventually exercise its options in 2006 and locked in a lease rate of 
$10,000 a year per turbine per year, during the life of the contract.  [Neighbors directly 
adjacent to a parcel of land hosting a turbine were given the option by Horizon to receive 
“good neighbor agreements,” a $1500 annual payment.  The payment is to compensate 
landowners for the burden of being near a turbine, and serves as a waiver of legal 
liabilities related to shadow-flickers, noise pollution, and other common complaints].  
Once Horizon locked in the necessary options, they were then able to move into 
procuring the capital to purchase the infrastructure. 
      Mandates, subsidies, and market demand.  There must be demand for wind 
energy to encourage its development in a market economy.  Typically such market 
demand for wind energy comes from one of two sources.  First, there is the consumer 
demand,23 usually stemming from environmental or price-oriented consumer preferences.  
Broad consumer demand for renewable energy is substantive.  Recent cost reductions in 
wind have made it more attractive as well as higher gas prices: “Three-dollar gas 
contributes to more wind energy. Political and policy issues also provide incentive. 
Energy is expensive and it's not going to get cheaper" (Anderson, 2006).  But consumer 
preference alone is considered a poor indicator in the electric energy sector.  Wind may 
not be cheap relative to other sources of energy, particularly during the infancy of the 
industry (Regulatory Official, personal communication, October 25, 2010). Wind must be 
cost competitive to be effectively marketable.  The same consumer who agitates for wind 
energy may become less demanding should wind energy prices increase and competing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23     What is oft misunderstood is that a local wind farm does not produce energy for local community consumption (Local Resident, 
personal communication, September 6, 2011; Business executive, personal communication, December 1, 2011).  The grid is designed 
on a spoke and wheel system, centralizing power generation in pockets, which then is directed outward toward the grid and end 
consumers.  Once transmitted to the grid, the energy is distributed mechanically, arranged through market transactions or contractual 
agreements.  In virtually all situations, wind energy produced locally is likely transmitted elsewhere regardless of local demand, just 
the same as coal, nuclear, and other energy generation source. 
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energy sources become cheaper, such as is the case with the recent supply glut of natural 
gas.  The fleeting desire of consumers to be environmentally friendly is not enough to 
justify major capital investment in wind energy if prices cannot be contained. 
      Another effective venue with which to drive up market demand for wind energy is 
with government regulation ("American Wind Energy Association," 2012b).  Currently, 
the regulatory environment for coal and nuclear generation (Illinois has a state ban on 
new nuclear development) has made investment in more traditional energy sources 
unattractive, which then pushes electricity generators to look toward alternative sources 
to meet consumer demand. 
      Another form of energy regulation relevant to wind is the continuing emergence 
of government renewable portfolio policies (RPS).  A mandated standard… 
…requires electric utilities and other retail electric providers to supply a specified 
minimum amount of customer load with electricity from eligible renewable 
energy sources. The goal of an RPS is to stimulate market and technology 
development so that, ultimately, renewable energy will be economically 
competitive with conventional forms of electric power (“US EPA,” 2009). 
 
Such a policy then promotes one source of energy over another, critical for an industry  
dependent on finite resources contributing to climate change.  Figure 7 illustrates the 
current national state of RPS standards in the USA (highlighted within the yellow box 
positioned over Illinois).  Illinois is one of 31 U.S. states and territories with an RPS.  
The Illinois Power Agency Act created a RPS of 25 percent, 75 percent of which must 
come specifically from wind (Loomis & Carter, 2011, p. 6).  Energy distributors are 
responsible for meeting the RPS, which they can do from purchasing wind energy from 
within or outside of the state border. 
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Figure 7. Renewable portfolio standards 
 
 
Source: http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps/RPS_map.pdf. 
 
      Wind developers (Wind Developer, personal communication, March 25, 2010; 
Association Official, personal communication, August 9, 2011, Wind Developer, 
personal communication, November 9, 2011) were keen to point out that RPSs have the 
positive externality of mitigating market volatility when wind energy is part of the mix 
(Association Official, personal communication, November 3, 2010): 
Wind is an inexhaustible energy source and it is free from fuel price volatility, 
which can contribute to the nation’s energy security.  Because of fuel price 
uncertainty, electricity supply portfolios need to be diversified.  Wind power can 
help diversify electricity supply portfolios, which can then lead to relatively more 
stable energy prices, which benefits ratepayers in the long run (Loomis & Carter, 
2011, p. 10). 
 
The volatility of the energy markets plus the financial crisis of the late 2000s has made 
investors skittish of investing in capital-intensive energy projects left to strictly market 
forces.  Most new wind energy generating facilities are addressing concerns about the 
volatility of the market and injecting stability by securing power-purchase agreements 
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(PPAs) before build out begins, which is increasingly becoming the standard practice of 
wind and solar energy companies.  This then reduces risks for businesses investing in 
wind energy generation. A state association spokesperson for the wind energy industry 
noted: 
A PPA is a great hedge for investors in a volatile energy market.  It used to  
be that coal was the cheapest energy source, and now it’s natural gas thanks  
to new fracking technologies.  But both of those energy sources will grow volatile 
again.  A PPA locks in a guaranteed source of revenue for 10 to 20  
years (Association Official, personal communication, November 3, 2010). 
 
Wind energy becomes a hedge for investors who want a stable return on investment and 
utilities wanting to be able to project costs into the distant future. 
      Further incentivization is done by the federal government to encourage capital 
flow from investors, while driving the wholesale cost of wind energy down to make it 
attractive to price conscious consumers and competitive with traditional sources of 
energy.  The federal government has created a number of incentives that encourages 
further growth in the wind energy industry by complementing cost-competitiveness.  This 
is done primarily through the MACRS and PTC. 
      The MACRS is a subsidy in that it allows the wind firms to accelerate 
depreciation, allowing wind companies to write off more from their tax burden sooner 
than other types of energy generators and business: 
Qualifying components of a wind farm are eligible for greatly accelerated 
depreciation deductions, typically over a five-year period based on the double 
declining balance method of depreciation (Stoel Rives, 2010, p. 78). 
 
The MACRS is one manner by which wind companies can retain their taxed earnings to 
either pass on cost-savings to the consumer, provide a greater return on investment to the 
financiers or invest in infrastructure. 
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       The most important tool at the disposal of wind energy developers is the PTC.  
The PTC is intended to drive the purchase cost of wind energy down through a tax credit 
–or tax reduction (Association Official, personal communication, November 3, 2010; 
Association Official, personal communication, August 9, 2011).  “The federal renewable 
energy production tax credit is an inflation-adjusted per-kWh credit that is applied to the 
output of a qualifying facility during the first ten years of operation” (Loomis & Carter, 
2011, p. 9). 
      The tax credit (which is $.022 per kilo Watt hour) serves two purposes.  First, it 
lowers the cost of energy to the wholesale purchaser.  Second, it creates an incentive for 
investors to infuse a project with capital; if the investor –who happens to be Goldman 
Sachs in the case of Horizon- has a large tax liability, that tax debt is reduced through 
investing in wind energy generation via this tax credit.  The rapid rate of development 
into new locales is heavily dependent upon the continuation of the PTC federal subsidy.   
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Table 5.  Types of direct employment from project development and construction 
Utility and Power Engineers Truck Drivers 
Geophysical/Structural Engineers Tower Erection Crews 
Site/Civil Engineers Crane Operators 
Concrete-Pouring Companies Backhoe Operators 
Wind Energy Project Developers Interconnection Labor 
Developer’s Construction Management Earthmovers 
Clerical and Bookkeeping Support Excavation Service Labor 
Developer’s Legal Team Electricians 
Road Builders/Contractors Wind Farm Operators 
Site Safety Coordinator Site Administrators 
Environmental and Permitting Specialists Maintenance Mechanics 
Microelectronic/Computer Programmers Field Technicians 
Operations and Maintenance Personnel Construction Crews 
 
Source: Loomis & Carter, 2011 
 
The American Wind Energy Association (AWEA) is mobilizing industry and 
environmental interests to lobby for an extension of the PTC beyond its expiration at the 
end of 2012.  As Figure 8 illustrates, growth in wind energy is heavily dependent upon 
the PTC; wind energy faces persistent boom and bust, up and down cycles when 
developers cannot rely on consistent public policy propping up the growth of the sector.  
Communities dependent upon manufacturing facilities and building tradespeople who 
install the infrastructure will be hardest hit in the years in which the subsidy lapses.  This 
certainly provides political leverage to the wind energy industry to harness for 
advantageous public policy.  Indeed the wind energy industry enjoys the support of red 
and blue state politicians who view the sector as a net plus for job creation. 
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Figure 8. Historic impact of PTC expiration on annual wind installation
Source: American Wind Energy Association, 2012b. 
 
    Local level wind energy regulations and incentives also contribute to the 
environment that promotes or discourages wind energy development.  Illinois provides 
two programs utilized by wind energy developers to reduce developer costs and 
encourage investment by wind energy firms in the state.  This is done primarily through 
two programs: Illinois Enterprise Zone, and the High Impact Business designation.  
Illinois’s Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity describes the Enterprise 
zone as such: 
The Illinois Enterprise Zone Act was signed into law December 7, 1982.  The 
purpose of the Act is to stimulate economic growth and neighborhood 
revitalization in economically depressed areas of the state.  Businesses located (or 
those that choose to locate) in a designated enterprise zone can become eligible to 
obtain special state and local tax incentives, regulatory relief, and improved 
governmental services, thus providing an economic stimulus to an area that would 
otherwise be neglected. 
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Businesses located or expanding in an Illinois enterprise zone may be eligible for 
the following incentives: an exemption on the retailers’ occupation tax paid on 
building materials, an investment tax credit of .5 percent of qualified property, 
and an enterprise zone jobs tax credit for each job created in the zone for which a 
certified dislocated worker or economically disadvantaged individual is hired. 
Additional exemptions, such as an expanded state sales tax exemption on 
purchases of personal property used or consumed in the manufacturing process or 
in the operation of a pollution control facility and an exemption on the state utility 
tax for electricity, natural gas and the Illinois Commerce Commission’s 
administrative charge and telecommunication excise tax are available for 
companies that make the minimum statutory investment that either creates or 
retains the necessary number of jobs (“Department of Commerce,” n.d.a). 
 
      Horizon lobbied and received the enterprise zone exemption.  Horizon used this 
designation to waive its sales tax obligation, which incentivized the firm to purchase a 
large share of its building materials from within the state, the argument of proponents 
being that such a capital intensive project would create a number of economic 
opportunities for local merchants (McLean’s wind farm sector has been a major boom for 
a gravel pit located in nearby Pontiac which provided hundreds of tons of gravel for the 
concrete foundations for the turbines (Dodds, L.K., personal communication, February 
18, 2011; Loomis & Carter, 2011)).  Horizon qualified for the Enterprise Zone 
designation even though the location of the wind farms is in rural agricultural areas that 
were not economically depressed.  This is a common application of the Enterprise Zone 
that benefits wind energy developers, which speaks to the growing clout of the industry 
(Regulatory Official, personal communication, October 25, 2010). 
      More recently, Illinois has added another stackable tax credit/exemption with its 
High Impact Business (HIB) designation:  
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The HIB program is designed to encourage large-scale economic development 
activities, by providing tax incentives (similar to those offered within an 
enterprise zone) to companies that propose to make a substantial capital 
investment in operations and will create or retain above average number of jobs. 
Businesses may qualify for: investment tax credits, a state sales tax exemption on 
building materials, an exemption from state sales tax on utilities, a state sales tax 
exemption on purchases of personal property used or consumed in the 
manufacturing process or in the operation of a pollution control facility. The 
project must involve a minimum of $12 million investment causing the creation of 
500 full-time jobs or an investment of $30 million causing the retention of 1500 
full-time jobs. The investment must take place at a designated location in Illinois 
outside of an Enterprise Zone.  The program has been expanded to include 
qualified new electric generating facility, production operations at a new coal 
mine or, a new or upgraded transmission facility that supports the creation of 150 
Illinois coal-mining jobs, or a newly constructed gasification facility as a 
"Coal/Energy High Impact Businesses". 
 
A qualifying High Impact Business may be eligible to receive the following: sales 
tax exemption on building materials, an investment tax credit, an exemption from 
state gas and electric tax, and a state sales tax exemption on personal property 
used or consumed in the manufacturing process or in the operation of a pollution 
control facility (“Department of Commerce,” n.d.b). 
 
Horizon’s first two wind farms did not qualify for this program since construction began 
in 2007: 
In 2009, the program was further expanded to include wind energy facilities. The 
designation as a Wind Energy/High Impact Business is contingent on the business 
constructing a new electric generation facility or expanding an existing wind 
power facility.  “New wind power facility” means a newly constructed electric 
generation facility, or a newly constructed expansion of an existing electric 
generation facility, placed in service on or after July 1, 2009, that generates 
electricity using wind energy devices.  “New wind energy device” means any 
device, with a nameplate capacity of at least 0.5 megawatts, that is used in the 
process of converting kinetic energy from the wind to generate electricity. 
 
Beyond the more formal subsidies offered by the government, Horizon received an 
additional grant from the state of Illinois for $2.2 million after the project had been 
finalized and financed (Coulter, 2006).  The grant was more of a gift from the state than 
an incentive grant.  Perhaps Horizon’s capacity to pull down further “incentives” after 
they had committed to construction has to do with the affinity of growth machine 
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coalitions; the wind industry has a lot of support from stalwarts in the business 
community, such as the Chamber of Commerce (Association Official, personal 
communication, November 3, 2010). 
      Illinois-based wind energy developers get access to federal, state, and local 
subsidies.  Taken together, these incentives: 
1) create market demand for wind through mandates as well as market demand 
through; 
2) artificially reduce costs to the wholesale purchaser; 
3) reduce the tax burden of the wind farm and it’s investors, thereby increasing 
margins which; 
4) increase the return on investment; 
5) entice large infusions of capital from major firms; 
6) create a hedge against volatile energy markets, while creating a sure-bet 
investment, and finally; 
7) increase the growth rate of the wind energy industry and its economic impact. 
 
      There is a great deal of opposition to wind energy subsidy from given political 
and economic ideological perspectives, often coming from established oil and coal  
lobbies.  The narrative focuses on the privileging of wind and other renewables above  
and beyond “the establishment”: 
Tea Party groups and others, including The Heartland Institute and Americans for 
Prosperity, note the tax credits exist only to favor renewable energy over more 
traditional sources of power generation and are thus an obvious government 
manipulation of the market (Glans, 2012). 
 
If the argument is about subsidizing an energy source that is more expensive than other 
existing options, then yes, wind energy at spot market rates usually will cost more than 
other forms of energy generation, particularly coal and natural gas (though PPAs help to 
control volatility and costs, making wholesale prices more competitive, predictable, and 
attractive).  This is not necessarily because wind is inherently more expensive nor is it 
necessarily privileged relative to “establishment” energy regimes.  One must consider the 
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decades of subsidy that went into building legacy electrical generators such as coal and 
nuclear (and nuclear’s government-provided insurance), not to mention the subsidization 
of rail transportation infrastructure which externalizes a portion of the cost of coal 
distribution (Carson, 2010) (coal companies account for almost half of all freight rail 
traffic in the USA (Stagl, 2012)).  Also, there are various externalities related to coal 
(health concerns from air and water pollution, and environmental degradation from 
mountaintop removal as well as ash-waste ponds) that are rarely if ever factored into the 
real cost of coal.  Opponents of the “establishment” energy regime claim that federal 
subsidy estimates adds up to over $50 billion annually, eclipsing the annual subsidy 
allocated to wind, solar, and other renewables (“Oil Change International,” n.d.); it seems 
as though the organized opposition to renewables has more to do with protecting legacy 
energy industries from new competitors than fiscally responsible public energy policy. 
      There do exist some legitimate concerns about how wind energy is subsidized.  
Wind energy development is pitched to a community as a net benefit.  Yet many of the 
local subsidies (enterprise zones, MACRS) are aimed at reducing the wind farm’s tax 
liability.  These profit maximization techniques are in direct conflict with the wind 
developer’s claims of net community benefit; if given the opportunity, the developer will 
trim as much of it’s overhead as possible.  Accelerated depreciation reduces the tax 
burden at just the time that the wind farm is paying down its debts, thus having greater 
capacity to financially benefit a community.  But contracts with communities don’t 
address profit-sharing, so the potential is lost.  Plus, subsidies such as the enterprise zone, 
while marginal to the developer, is another missed opportunity for the local governments 
to benefit from wind farm tax revenue.  In the case of Horizon, these two subsidies in 
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Illinois seem to have done little to incentivize wind farm development and instead 
allowed Horizon’s financiers to reduce the total expenditures that many other businesses 
tasked with paying to local taxing bodies.  While this may not be the case in other wind 
energy development scenarios, one can observe that issues of fairness and equity 
certainly exist and promise to add to tensions with other local taxpayers who feel left out.   
      Accessing the markets, accessing the grid.  A wind firm will need to access the 
electric grid, which is the mechanism by which electricity generators access the market.  
This situation runs parallel or adjacent to other relevant socio-economic processes 
(securing capital, seeking tax benefits, and community organizing).  The grid is itself a 
national construct, a common resource regime financed by a mix of private and public 
dollars, governed by a complex array of property arrangements.  A grid, a commons, 
requires monitoring of quantity of electricity transmitted from a number of actors, since 
there is no way to isolate where an end-user’s electricity originated from (one may think 
of it as water; once it’s pooled together in a reservoir, the end user cannot request specific 
point of origin).24   
      All new energy generators in the region must establish a grid node by lining up a 
queue position through the Midwest Independent Systems Operators (MISO) to connect 
to the electric grid.  The MISO is one of the nation’s ISOs that regulates access to their 
designated regional grid.  The MISO serves as gatekeeper, a monitor of the grid, as well 
as arbiter of disputes.  The remaining regulatory responsibilities, like retail sales, are left 
to state regulatory utility commissions unless it is interstate, then it falls under North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC).  MISO is a creature of FERC, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24     Once electricity is dispatched to the grid, it becomes part of an indistinguishable mix. There are seemingly common 
misconceptions amongst consumers related to how the grid itself delivers energy to the end-user.  The electricity delivered to one’s 
home comes from a mix of sources that cannot be isolated (one electric co-operative CEO noted: “There isn’t such a thing as brown or 
green electrons.  They’re all electrons”  (Co-operative Official, personal communication, May 23, 2012)).  
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Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.  FERC is a major regulator of the grid, 
moderating interstate commerce of electricity. 
The Federal Power Commission (FPC) was created in 1920 under the Federal 
Water Power Act for the purpose of regulating construction and operation of 
nonfederal hydroelectric projects.  In 1977, when the U.S. Department of Energy 
was created, the FPC became the Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC) 
(“Oil Change International,” n.d.). 
 
The Department of Energy (“Department of Energy," n.d.) describes the system as such: !
There are many individuals involved in running the grid. There are generator 
operators and transmission owners. But from a system perspective, one of the 
most critical entities is the independent system operator or regional transmission 
organizations (ISOs and RTOs). They monitor system loads and voltage profiles; 
operate transmission facilities and direct generation; define operating limits and 
develop contingency plans; and implement emergency procedures. 
Reliability coordinators also play an essential role. For instance, NERC (North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation) develops and enforces reliability 
standards; monitors the bulk power system; assesses future adequacy; audits 
owners, operators, and users for preparedness; and educates and trains industry 
personnel. 
 
      Horizon applied for access to the transmission line from MISO (MISO takes these 
queue requests on a first come, first served basis).  The transmission line most accessible 
to Horizon in McLean is owned by ComEd.  Legally ComEd is not in the business of 
approving or denying access to their transmission line; the MISO plays the role of arbiter.  
ComEd’s transmission subsidiary collects rents in a non-discriminatory manner on the 
usage and maintenance of the available capacity.  Horizon, in initiating request to access 
a transmission node, agrees to enter into a number of engineering studies to make sure the 
grid can handle the increased capacity.  The studies divulge the capacity of the 
transmission line at that node, and the necessary upgrade needs for connectivity.  Once an 
interconnection agreement is finalized, Horizon is assessed a transmission access fee  (the 
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cost to ComEd to maintain the line,25 and MISO to regulate the energy coming from 
Horizon over the grid)  
      Smooth sailing locally, bumps in the road nationally.  To finalize the project, 
Horizon had to go through the formal permitting process with McLean County’s 
Department of Building and Zoning and their board, secured a PPA with an energy 
distributor (“Exelon purchases power,” 2008), then purchased the infrastructure to begin 
build out of the farm (Ford, 2006b).  Horizon, like every other investor-owned wind firm 
prospecting for ideal development, had all of the requisites necessary to chase the 
investment capital (provided by their tax equity partner Goldman Sachs).  By 2006, 
Horizon had made substantial investments and progress.  Millions had been spent, the 
community tentatively organized, and national, regional and state actors approved of the 
wind energy generator’s access to the grid. 
      Illinois law requires a number of public hearings four to six months before 
permits are issued to allow for public input.  The McLean County board has end authority 
over whether or not to approve or deny the zoning permits, but the zoning board overseas 
a state mandated, formal process in which they host public hearings, take public 
testimony, and forward recommendations to the county board (Local Official, personal 
communication, December 13, 2010); the zoning board is seen as the official public 
representation and expert in best practices and government regulation, hence their 
authority.  The venues chosen for public hearings are geared toward ease of access, and 
to meet attendance estimates.  In the case of Twin Groves, McLean’s County Zoning 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25     ComEd’s transmission towers were built to accommodate the projected electricity flows.  The addition of the wind farms in 
McLean has added so much unexpected new energy to the lines that it has caused the lines to heat up and sag.  ComEd has had to raise 
the height of the towers (Association Official, personal communication, November 11, 2011), part of the unforeseen costs of 
maintaining transmission infrastructure. 
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Board of Appeals held twenty public forums at ten locations (such as the Bloomington 
Center for the Performing Arts).   
      During such public hearing a number of issues arise. The zoning board may take 
public comments and spin them into a prerequisite for the wind firm to agree to in order 
to secure the zoning board’s endorsement.  But the developers also use these hearing to 
better assess how to build community buy-in.   
      The wind developers at Horizon go into a community with a number of company 
approved “gifts” they may contribute to the host community if prompted in order to allay 
concerns and gain broad based popular support.  One Horizon developer noted they were 
approved to offer a fund in which they share a portion of their revenues with the 
community for economic development purposes (Wind Developer, personal 
communication, November 8, 2011).  In McLean’s case, Horizon offered to create an 
escrow account to cover the costs of decommissioning the wind farm in the distant future, 
but did not provide for a community development fund since such a request was not 
made. 
      Horizon had sought building permits extending a total of five years beyond 
McLean’s standard two-year window.  This is to account for hiccups along the way (cost 
increases and access to capital supply, expiration or extension of federal and state 
subsidies, and allowable time to make a case with the local landowners and community 
members) (Ford, 2010).  Horizon was wise to make such a move as a number of 
problems arose before and during the construction process (Miller, 2006c).   
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• The Central Illinois Regional Airport (CIRA) was concerned about the how the 
flashing red strobe lights would interfere with pilots arriving and departing from 
the airport.  Horizon appeased the CIRA management’s concerns of interference 
with takeoffs and landings, radar, and even local crop-dusting operations (Riopell, 
2009; Shults, 2006).  Horizon built the wind farms an amenable distance away 
from the Airport, and agreed to coordinate the strobes so they all flashed at the 
same time, thereby limiting disorienting distractions and immediate dangers to 
pilots. 
• “The U.S. Department of Defense and the Federal Aviation Administration issued 
stop work orders to several wind farms around the country,” including Horizon’s 
project in McLean, “worried the massive turbines could interfere with military 
radar and national security” (Miller, 2006a).  The two Illinois Senators stepped in 
to remove this barrier to development (“Durbin, Obama criticize wind farm 
orders,” 2006). 
• The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers investigated Horizon and a number of other 
wind farms under construction to guarantee the projects weren’t harming wetlands 
(Miller, 2006b).  During the investigation, Horizon was limited in what they could 
do on site until the study was complete.  Horizon was cleared to fully reengage 
with the McLean wind farms a few months later. 
Despite the stops and starts, Horizon was on a path toward completing their Twin  
Groves wind farm projects by 2008. 
      Build out: planting turbines, producing commodities.  The phase of wind 
energy development in which impact is most obvious is the construction phase.  Table 5 
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lays out the range of technicians and laborers employed for constructing a wind farm.  
Massive pieces of capital infrastructure are produced and shipped across road and rail.  
Cranes and trucks (semis, cement mixers, pickups, and gravel) dotted the landscape and 
crowded roadways.  Restaurants and hotels were packed with an influx of temporary 
trade workers.  Horizon did actively attempt to hire as many relevant laborers as possible 
from the central Illinois region.  But in the end, many laborers came from a construction 
firm out of Terre Haute, Indiana specializing in wind farm construction.  So while money 
was spent locally, many of these laborers spent a sizable portion of their income outside 
of central Illinois, in their home communities. 
      The labor-power and equipment necessary to construct wind farms is significant, 
requiring coordination from a number of indirect actors.  Public safety officials got 
involved to assure safe transit.  Public works agencies assessed the capacity of the roads 
to bear the weight of the infrastructure.  Many of the leases are on agricultural property 
accessible only via township roads, known for being paved with an annual application of 
gravel and road-oil.  Horizon worked with elected local township officials and agreed to 
not only repair the roads they damage, but to upgrade those frequently used for the wind 
farm.  A local school administrator (School Official, personal communication, November 
11, 2001) noted that the township roads are in some of the best shape he had ever seen 
(one can easily see the improved roadways touched by Horizon, many of which appear to 
be of higher quality than state highways).  Said a local farmer: “the turbines created nice 
access to the farm fields.  They built nice roads!” (Business Executive, personal 
communication, December 1, 2011).  This certainly engenders goodwill amongst local 
officials responsible for the roadways and the farmers who use them on a regular basis. 
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      Access to the building site requires not only the landowner’s approval, but also 
the approval for right-of-way access across adjoining neighboring properties.  Cranes and 
other pieces of construction equipment are massive, needing to maneuver across large 
tracts of land.  “Good neighbor agreements,” secured access to adjacent land (such 
agreements in McLean were priced at $1500 per year, though Horizon sets the prices on a 
community by community basis, meaning Horizon is flexible on what they may pay 
(Wind Developer, personal communication, November 8, 2011)). 
      We know that as a wind energy company speculates on a given area, the process 
of development is long and arduous.  Wind energy developers seek enabling forces early 
and often.  In this way, wind energy companies interface with the local communities, but 
specifically the formal local branches of government as well as the landowners.  In total, 
Horizon would spend over five years preparing the project.  Build-out drew in hundreds 
of temporary laborers.  Mobilization required the organizing of key landowners, state and 
regional regulators, and the final cost added up to more than $500 million dollars.  But by 
2008, Horizon had completed the build out of 240 wind turbines capable of generating 
396 megawatts of electricity at peak capacity.   
Harvesting The Wind: The Development Implications of an Operational Wind 
Farm  
 
      While the wind farm itself cost half a billion dollars, local labor accounted for an 
estimated $50 million (Loomis & Carter, 2011, p. 23).  Keep in mind that this labor force 
is fleeting, lasting only the duration of construction.  Clearly an immense amount of 
financing and human capital is infused into the project during the planning and 
construction processes.  Throughout the process, the developers interact with a number of 
community groups in what appears to be a more or less predictable manner (Figure 6). 
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      An operational wind farm by many accounts is an anti-climactic experience.  
Scholarly or journalistic accounts of wind farms and their longitudinal operational 
impacts are lacking and would be useful.  McLean was left with a relatively docile set of 
240 immovable turbines.  
      Interviews conducted during the study of Horizon revealed that many of the 
public officials who participated in the wind energy development process were by and 
large relatively dismissive of the wind farm having any deep community impact.  A local 
economist with the McLean’s economic development arm, when asked about the long-
term impacts of the wind farm, responded: “It’s really a rural development-type thing.  It 
doesn’t do much.  It’s a temporary shot in the arm.  Just another industry coming to the 
area.”  A local farmer hosting a wind farm said: “It’s a non-event” (Business Executive, 
personal communication, December 1, 2011).  
      There was no substantive discussion of wind energy development reducing 
chronic social problems or benefitting the marginalized within McLean.  Criminal 
activity, minority populations, the poor, youth and elderly were never mentioned with 
relation to the wind farm unless prompted.  Even then, interview participants noted local 
civil society groups such as the United Way, MarkFirst, Project OZ, and Sweet Home 
Ministries as the groups most appropriate to address such issues.  An economist from the 
Economic Development Council noted: 
There is an issue locally with poverty.  But because of the countywide wealth, 
McLean qualifies for very little from the state (we are a $9 billion economy).  
Since we don’t get the basics available to other counties, it makes poverty worse 
(Local Official, personal communication, September 5, 2011). 
 
      Horizon developers had no involvement with those groups (Wind Developer, 
personal communication, November 9, 2011).  This begs the question of boosterism, or 
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why are people so supportive of wind energy development?  But even beyond Horizon, it 
seems as though the development emphasis in McLean has more to do with growing their 
way out of various social ills through market development than intentional community 
development aimed at addressing these heady topics.  The mindset is summed up as 
“some development is better than no development.”  Though some measure of local 
economic impact certainly helps to make the case for IOU wind energy development. 
      Tax revenue was frequently mentioned as a major benefit to the area.  The wind 
farm has financially benefitted a number of taxing districts within McLean (fire 
protection, public library, townships, community college, parks, and county).  Altogether, 
McLean’s wind farms –not just Horizon- have created a taxable $600 million property 
base generating over $4 million in annual tax revenue that previously did not exist 
(School Official, personal communication, November 11, 2001).  The local Economic 
Development Council was able to create a microenterprise Loan Fund from extra county 
tax revenue generated.       
      The wind farm subsumed a large share of the area property tax burden, thereby 
lowering existing resident’s total tax bill.  Tax rates did decrease for residents in these 
areas and the estimated assessed evaluation26 of the property hosting the Horizon wind 
farms increased dramatically (from $60 million in 2008, to $105 million in 2010); wind 
turbines seem to either do nothing to property values or increase their worth despite what 
some opponents claim (Carter, 2011).  That means the wind farms have added fiscal 
value, and have taken on a greater share of the community’s tax burden, no doubt a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26     The Fair Market Value per turbine in the area was assessed as $360,000 per MW, per turbine.  The formula then is $360,000 * 
1.65 * 240 = Fair Market Value of $142,560,000 (1.65 represents the MW capacity of each turbines, and 240 represent n or the total 
number of turbines).  Each 1.65MW turbine was assessed at a value of $594,000, or in other words was taxed as if it were a house 
with a valuation of $594,000.  Each turbine also gets an annual depreciation of 4 percent over 25 years, which is plied toward reducing 
the wind company’s tax liability.  This means the value of the turbines will reduce as well (School Official, personal communication, 
November 11, 2001). 
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benefit to property owners (though the benefits to renters and non property owners must 
be marginal, and the urban taxing districts benefit not at all) and local governments. 
      Representatives of educational institutions are major boosters of wind farms 
(Coulter, 2009).  Indeed, educational institutions in McLean may be the biggest 
beneficiaries of the passive wind energy development.   
      Illinois State University (ISU) has cultivated a strong relationship with Horizon 
due in part to the close ties of one of ISU’s prominent professors to the wind energy 
industry.  The professor was able to translate his political capital with the Department of 
Energy to start the Center for Renewables via a large seed grant supported by Horizon.  
The Center not only serves the purpose of working with the industry, but also of 
educating the general public on matters pertaining to wind and solar energy (Association 
Official, personal communication, November 3, 2010).  The website for the Center 
claims three major functional areas: 
• To enhance the renewable energy major at Illinois State University. 
• To serve the Illinois renewable energy community by providing information to 
the public. 
• To encourage applied research concerning renewable energy at Illinois State 
University and through collaborations with other universities (“Center for 
Renewable,” n.d.). 
The Center does this by organizing thematic conferences, taking policymakers to wind 
and solar production facilities, and producing reports and research.  The Center also 
collaborates with Western Illinois University’s Illinois Institute for Rural Affairs in 
building a wind energy curriculum for teachers across the state, setting up weather 
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stations to assess the viability of a wind turbine, locate grants for renewable energy 
development, and to help site a potential turbines on the ground of K-12 schools.  The 
area’s community college, Heartland, started and runs a turbine tech program with the 
intent of creating “green jobs.”  Heartland has teamed up with the local building trades 
groups to enhance the regions workforce capacity for wind energy development. 
      Higher education institutions receive a bulk of their government funding from 
state sources.  Local K-12 institutions, funded largely by property taxes, stand to benefit 
most from wind energy development.  And nowhere is that truer than in the case of the 
rural Ridgeview CUSD #19. 
      An administrator for Ridgeview was emphatic about the material benefits of the 
wind farm.  A former school board member claimed this district received the lion’s share 
of the benefits from the wind farm.  Indeed, no other government institution received as 
large of an increase in revenue than Ridgeview.  A study by the Center for Renewables 
(Loomis & Aldeman, 2011) found Ridgeview received an $800,000 bump in total annual 
property revenue despite a decrease of $754,779 in state aid for the three years prior to 
2011 (p. 16). 
Horizon [EDP] has been great to work with.  Athletics are big in these rural 
districts.  We have been able to expand our educational programming and keep 
athletics.  For a rural school district, we’re doing better than a lot of the others 
(School Official, personal communication, November 11, 2001). 
 
      These passive development outcomes are a result of existing local structures that 
seek to benefit from certain market activity.  The mere existence of the wind farms has 
stimulated local public entrepreneurship and strengthened the existing local institutions.  
Higher education facilities are taking advantage of having accessible facilities nearby 
through the creation of new programs.  Government taxing bodies are best positioned to 
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take advantage of Horizon’s presence in the area.  Officials with these local taxing bodies 
are pleased with the influx of additional revenue, particular during an economic downturn 
that has dinged the revenue of their counterparts that are not playing host to such 
infrastructure.  Fire districts aren’t downsizing, and the township roads are in the best 
shape they have ever been.  Plus, the Ridgeview school district is expanding rural 
education when national trends are encouraging austerity and consolidation.  However, 
the direct impacts of Horizon’s activities on local community governance are less clear as 
examined in the following section. 
      Direct, active involvement.  Horizon, like many other wind energy firms, is 
transnational in nature.  These companies develop partnerships with other major 
corporations for financially beneficial relationships.  These relations come about due in 
part to federal and state subsidies that incentivize such partnerships.  But interactions do 
go beyond this to other groups within the local community.      
      A pattern culled from the interviews with community members is the seeming 
disappointment in economic outcomes, particularly with regard to employment.  Many of 
the interview participants noted that job creation was much lower than anticipated, and a 
few cautioned that other communities should be made aware of that fact.  During the 
fieldwork for this study in McLean in 2011, Horizon went from two developers to only 
one on staff who divides his time between emergent projects in Ohio, Indiana, and 
Illinois.  Horizon indirectly employs a local workforce, contracting out through General 
Electric to provide maintenance services.  According to the developer, they typically have 
13 General Electric workers on contract. 
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      Horizon’s active involvement in the local community life is non-existent outside 
of furthering wind energy development interests.  Horizon is typical of wind energy firms 
that are capital intensive and profit oriented.  They seek out communities in order to 
extract value for their investors.  Wind energy firms are positioned best to “sell” their 
project on a fiscal basis.  The ability to talk dollars and cents and rapid introduction of 
capital infusion means their value proposition synchronizes well with communities 
playing host to a growth machine coalition.  And that makes sense when one considers 
Horizon and the other actors in McLean. 
      McLean exhibits many of the characteristics of a growth-machine oriented 
community.  Governance regimes appear to be well established.  The Chamber of 
Commerce, Economic Development Council, planning commission, Farm Bureau, and 
city and county governments were oft cited as the enabling and disabling forces within 
the community.  These institutions are all inclined to support economic development 
endeavors with little regard to the social dimension so long as lucrative property 
development and fiscal streams seem a likely outcome.  Development is geared toward 
material aspects of life.  Jobs were persistently noted as important policy outcomes, and 
none of the discussions brought up a desire to empower the marginalized or even go so 
far as to mention their existence.   
      Material benefits largely went to landowners with significant plots of land; the 
total annual lease payments amount to over $1 million.  The landowners who are party to 
such lease agreements are more often than not row-crop farmers with well-protected 
territory and significant influence in local institutions.  The wind farms did more to 
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enable this status quo than to open existing social systems or build new institutional 
access points.     
      Surprisingly, the major corporate interests in McLean had little to do with the 
growth machine.  A number of the interviewed residents noted that the corporations and 
associations headquartered in the county were important in terms of contributing to local 
civil society functions.  Companies were known for allowing and encouraging their 
employees to do volunteer work, as well as non-profit or government board work on paid 
company time.  When asked about the type of work, many respondents were vague about 
the emphases, but a lot of their efforts appeared geared toward professional, resume-
building endeavors (volunteering with the local hospitals came up often) in the market 
and to a lesser extent the civil society realm. 
      It was also remarkable that in many of the interviews, when the question was 
asked, “who would I contact to get things done or to block a project?” the responses 
never mentioned the large firms headquartered in the community.  What makes this 
remarkable is that these firms could wield significant local influence if they so desired.  
But it makes sense that they do not, probably because their areas of emphasis are most 
often focused outside of the community on their core competencies at a broader socio-
economic scale.  From this perspective, McLean County becomes just another place to do 
business, not necessarily a community necessitating power contestation.  While some of 
the professional staff from these businesses may be involved in the growth machine 
coalition, the institutions from which these individuals are primarily associated with are 
not positioned to govern locally over community life.  Indeed, should these corporation 
face local conflict, they could either threaten to leave the area along with their economic 
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clout, or “level jump” to change regulations in their favor, a practice more in line with 
corporate institutional logic. 
Considering Horizon’s Institutional Logic 
       The wind farm certainly enhanced the fiscal position of local landowners and 
critical local taxing bodies.  Horizon’s benefits from a select few well-established 
property owners (330 property owners signed leases, good neighbor agreements, and 
easements (Loomis & Carter, 2011, p. 16)) and the local social structure controlled by a 
pro-growth coalition doesn’t mean the development outcomes are negligible or even 
undesirable.  Local taxing bodies, particular K-12 school districts, were major 
beneficiaries, allowing public services to avoid austerity measures during the Great 
Recession (and in most instances, the services were enhanced). 
       Yes, the development of the wind farm is of a more passive variety, stemming 
from the wind farm being embedded within a number of institutional arrangements 
(FERC, MISO, big-finance, etc.) thereby spreading the operational focus thin.  But recall 
that for the wind farm to be marketable, it must connect with the national electric grid.  
The utilization of PPAs as a standard for bringing wind energy to market certainly is a 
benefit to consumers in that it decreases overall price volatility (Association Official, 
personal communication, November 3, 2010).  And one would be remiss not mentioning 
the obvious: wind energy production does not pollute.  For every wind farm, the need to 
utilize carbon-emitting coal-fire power plant is diminished.  Those situated within the 
lower economic strata -the working poor and individuals impacted by environmental 
racism- would no doubt find these incremental material developments to be a positive 
outcome. 
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     Wind energy clearly offers broad socio-ecological benefits beyond greenhouse 
gas reduction.  Horizon’s wind farms in McLean will make it harder for sprawling strip 
malls to develop over dark, fertile soil (no one wants to build parking lots underneath 
wind turbines, especially in the winter when they’re known to fling large icicles).  Wind 
farms may then serve the purpose of fighting urban encroachment while sustaining rural 
landscapes through the formation of green belts.  In this way, wind farms could be used 
as a market-based approach to regulate land use, save green spaces or farmland, and 
contain sprawl.  But for this to occur, development must be intentional.  Local 
policymakers and leaders cannot presume that the mere construction of a wind farms will 
result in a number of positive spin-offs; they have to make it happen by design.  This is a 
lesson learned from the case of McLean and Horizon. 
      Surprisingly, environmental impact was never mentioned as one of the 
development outcomes in interviews despite the environmental angle being at the 
forefront of the wind energy developers’ marketing campaign.  A state regulator summed 
up his take on wind energy simply while rubbing his fingers together: “Money.  This is 
big business.  It ain’t as cuddly as they want you to think it is” (Regulatory Official, 
personal communication, October 25, 2010). 
      The wind farms also brought out a new arena for contestation in the community.  
Opposition, while mentioned only amongst three interview participants, was dismissed as 
misguided and somewhat disruptive: “It’s too bad that wind farms can divide a 
community” (Business Executive, personal communication, December 1, 2011).  Other 
interview participants dismissed opposition figures as inexperienced and out of the local 
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norm: “There really isn’t what you might call an activist type crowd here” (Association 
Official, personal communication, November 11, 2011).   
      The common defense amongst these interview participants was essentially why 
not develop a wind farm?  What’s it matter to them?  But the perception of the opposition 
seems to have been shaped from observations of the one-way relationship between key 
community leaders who supported the project and the Horizon developers.  In an 
interview with a Horizon developer, it was openly noted that the development team 
utilized tactics to identify their support base and subvert opposition: 
Long-time residents typically have no problem with turbines.  Long-standing 
locals are the best… but the new folks are different to work with.  It’s the new 
rural folks, the people who treat the area like bedroom communities that we have 
a problem with (Wind Developer, personal communication, November 8, 2011). 
 
According to the developers, residents who spoke out against the wind farms typically 
were not farmers, owned small 1 to 2 acre parcels, and were not generating revenue from 
their land.  Opposition figures wanted to maintain the rural character of their community, 
to be untouched by the overwhelming visuals of hundreds of spinning turbines (Local 
Official, personal communication, September 5, 2011; Association Official, personal 
communication, November 11, 2011). 
      The Horizon wind developers have done their best to avoid the smaller villages 
where opposition actors were mobilized, and instead directed their attention toward those 
locales with a strong support base.  The opposition saw these approaches as subversive.  
But the opposition narrative was mitigated by the control of key governance institutions 
by wind energy supporters and the opposing community’s lack of longstanding civic 
action and mobilization around big picture issues.  A persistent, successful growth 
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machine coalition can build broad based acquiescence.  Over time, people forget how to 
do opposition. 
      As wind energy infrastructure occupies more and more of the rural landscape, 
groups such as Information is Power will increasingly challenge wind energy 
development through a number of formal procedural mechanisms (Brady-Lunny, 2007).  
The rise of exogenous opposition groups influencing local collective action may actually 
be beneficial to civic life in a place like McLean in that these external groups may 
reorient people as to how to work collectively for mutual ends outside of the dominant 
social system.  An outstanding question is whether or not those groups can convert from 
an oppositional force to one furthering civics and community development.  
      Importantly, the spatial layout of wind energy infrastructure has the potential to 
democratize energy governance.  The sprawling nature of the infrastructure means that 
unlike a centralized coal-fire power plant, a wind farm will interact with far more people 
in its host community, at least in the development stage.  Additionally, consider that the 
deployment of clean, renewable energy is of increasing necessity.  Recent research has 
highlighted the rapidity of global climate change; we have a limited timeframe with 
which to reduce or eliminate greenhouse gas emissions (McKibben, 2007).  But as the 
situation in McLean seems to demonstrate, systemic problems of inequity may be one of 
the biggest impediments for deploying wind energy.  This is where the democratization 
element comes into play.  If people don’t have some sense of ownership over the energy 
development and climate change processes, we can expect a lack of civic engagement or 
outright hostility toward perceived enrichment of a few at the expense of the many. 
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      The Horizon wind farm isn’t so much a mixed bag as it is a continuation and mild 
strengthening of the local status quo.  Horizon is not completely transparent in what they 
can do for a community unless they are asked (and community leaders have to know the 
rights questions to pose in order to uncover this information).  Illinois installed more new 
generation capacity27 than 48 other states in 2011 (Loomis & Carter, 2011) and Horizon 
looks to be a big part of future growth in Illinois (Miller, 2007a; Sapochetti, 2010).  
Considering the amount of subsidies that are injected into investor-owned wind energy 
for private gain, Horizon and other investor-owned generators bear a public responsibility 
to speak openly with their host communities about the range of development services and 
outcomes they could offer; but unless they are prompted, the chances are they will not 
openly divulge such information. 
      It’s questionable whether an investor-owned wind farm, under current multi-level 
government policy arrangements, can really contribute much to a community outside of 
material enhancement.  Granted the material element may be to increase funding to local 
community development groups, but these interests will always be at tension.  
Community development will ideally break dependency, whereas a profit-seeking firm 
will seek to maximize political advantage and value extraction, meaning that deepening 
dependency on the investor-owned firm may be a predetermined design feature that is 
nonetheless detrimental to community governance. 
      There is then a built in, self-replicating dependency mechanism that bolsters the 
importance of large firms like Horizon.  Community reliance on these types of firms 
could be disastrous if national or global markets collapse.  Part of the reason these firms !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27     A wind farm is capable of generating a maximum amount of electricity (capacity) but a number of factors limits the actual output, 
such as the available wind and the market demand.  So while Horizon may say that Twin Groves is capable of generating 396 
megawatts of electric energy, the actual amount generated is highly variable. 
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are able to contribute so much human capital locally is because of the wealth they extract 
from other areas and concentrate back to their central headquarters.  In an era of state 
austerity measures, it is not far-fetched to consider a perfect storm of state failure might 
occur in which promised subsidies are not paid to the wind energy company, thereby 
destroying the firm’s bottom line.  What options does the community have to weather 
such events? 
      It appears that if left to the desires of the wind firm, wind energy developers 
would seek the path of least resistance toward the end goal of a fully operational wind 
farm.  This runs the risk of excluding marginalized segments of the local community, 
driving further divisions into the local social fabric.  What is more is that without the 
active input of the local community, specific concerns may not be addressed and 
accounted for (such as the possible utilization of the wind farm to curtail urban sprawl 
onto local farmland).  The community simply must be involved in conceptualizing long 
term ramifications, and participating in the planned build out in order to maximize the 
“public good” created by a new wind farm. 
     Uncertainties remain about how to influence development outcomes from wind 
energy.  There are dependency pitfalls that arise when community stakeholders lean on 
federal and state policymakers to create criteria for the wind energy companies to receive 
various subsidies.  Perhaps opposition or social justice groups at the community level 
could mobilize to better guarantee host communities are not exploited and receive a just 
share of newly created value. 
      Attention now turns toward the co-operative business model of wind energy 
ownership. 
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Chapter Five: Case Study - The Co-operative-Owned Wind Farm 
 
      The wind energy industry is predominantly investor-owned.  As of 2013, there are 
only a handful of public or community-owned wind farms, and only two co-operatively-
owned utility-scale wind farms.  These wind farms are relatively isolated, with the lack of 
linkages making it difficult for actors to pool resources and replicate such an ownership 
model.  That means policymakers at the local, state, and national levels have relatively 
few examples with which to assess the optimal institutional arrangements possible to 
maximize community development outcomes from public investment in wind energy.  
The efficacy of public ownership models of ownership is difficult to ascertain at this 
juncture. 
      Since wind farms are heavily government subsidized, an argument could be made 
that a responsibility exists for those wind energy firms benefitting from the subsidy to 
contribute back to the public good.  What could –or should- be expected of a wind firm, 
particularly in terms of how the organizational structure affects its interaction with its 
host community?  Would it be desirable with respect to implications for community 
development for the community to have a greater ownership stake in the wind farm? 
      These questions are what make PrairieWinds ND 1 Inc. in Ward County, North 
Dakota of particular interest. The arrangement serves as an outlier because PrairieWinds, 
a subsidiary of Basin Electric Power Co-operative (Basin) that was opened in 2009, is the 
nation’s first utility-scale co-operative wind farm.28  The question posed in Chapter One, 
“what happens to a community playing host to the nation’s only co-operatively-owned 
wind farm?“ is of interest because of the institutional design of co-operatives.  The 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28     Since the completion of PrairieWinds ND 1 Inc in 2009, the parent co-operative, Basin, has opened the nation’s second co-
operative wind farm in South Dakota. 
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defining feature of the co-operative institution is that a co-operative is “an autonomous 
association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and 
cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled 
enterprise” (“Co-operative identity,” n.d.).  Chapter Two (p. 33 & 34) addressed the 
institutional logical rationale for the efficacy of the structure of the co-operative as a 
community development institution: 
Taken together, the features of a co-operative foster civic interaction by providing 
a venue for assembly, creating new reasons for otherwise disconnected, 
segmented populations to come together, which then facilitates the building of 
norms, trust, and relationships (Putnam, 2000; Small, 2009; Tolbert, Irwin, Lyson, 
& Nucci, 2002).  The co-operative business model then serves a pedagogical and 
cultural reproduction function by instilling self-governing, democratic values into 
its membership and partner organizations through practice, operations, and 
trainings.  The underlying Co-operative Principles and values lay the foundation 
for organizations with a strong social-tilt to use market-like features (i.e. revenue 
streams from services rendered) to sustain prolonged struggle against the 
fluctuations in resources that other organizations (such as non-profits) most 
acutely face from state and market forces (Brennan, 2010, p. 2; Mooney, 2004). 
 
The co-operative business model, on paper, parallels Elinor Ostrom’s prescriptive 
Design Principles for enduring sustained collective action through robust 
institutional arrangements (Poteete, et al., 2010, pp. 100-101). In this manner, co-
operatives should mitigate disempowerment, alienation, and dependency-building 
mechanisms of monocentric systems and enhance the potential for the 
development of polycentric self-sustaining, self-governing institutions with a 
community development bend.  
 
      Any utility-scale wind farm such as PrairieWinds will be a major, capital-
intensive project; it may temporarily draw in hundreds of workers, cost hundreds of 
millions of dollars, and change the face of the rural landscape (Horizon fits that mold in 
Chapter Four).  Any type of utility-scale wind energy development might appear to cause 
a great deal of transformation within a host community.  But the governance structure of 
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Basin that owns PrairieWinds, government and market incentives, and the socio-
ecological features of Ward County, North Dakota all interact to influence the 
development outcomes of the wind energy development project. 
      This chapter contextualizes the case: Ward County, North Dakota, and the 
PrairieWinds wind farm.  While Chapter Four centered on understanding how the IOU 
wind farm Horizon Energy operated within the electric energy system and its 
implications for the community in Illinois, the co-operative is the institution of interest in 
Chapter Five and must occasionally be contrasted with IOUs.  This is because of the 
dominance of IOU actors in shaping the market and regulatory apparatuses to their 
advantage.  In other words, electric co-operatives operate within an IOU system, and 
must be understood from that vantage point. 
      The chapter then addresses the development processes and governance initiatives 
that made the wind farm a reality.  The chapter provides an analysis of development 
implications and concludes with a discussion of the research findings.   
Ward County, North Dakota: Robust Organizations within a Boomtown 
 
      At the time of the fieldwork in 2011, two things stood out about Ward County 
where the wind farm is located: it had been an oil boomtown since the mid-2000s and it 
was flood-ravaged in 2011. A lifelong resident described the county before it became a 
boomtown: “The community before the oil boom was more stable, it’s focus was more 
rural, more on agriculture. Ag-related processing (a mill for pasta, another place for 
beans, lentils) really drove the area” (Local Resident, personal communication, 
December 8, 2011).  Another lifelong local resident notes the rural proximity of Ward 
County: “The County is very rural and urban at the same time and touches the Mandan, 
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Hidatsa and Arikara Nation on its Southwest border.  It had always been a good place to 
live, start a family, and have a career”  (Local Resident, personal communication, August 
8, 2011).  Other interview participants noted the isolation and stability built in a sense of 
strong local and state identity.  Steady economic growth meant that people could count 
on an ag-driven economy that provided for individuals and their families.   
      Enduring civic cultures coupled with the brutal seasonal swings in the weather 
instill a sense of collective responsibility amongst North Dakotans.  One prominent 
statewide economic development professional stated that: 
 If you’re pulled over the side of the road, I guarantee that the first person  
who comes up on you is going to pull over and help you.  No one wants to be left 
to fend for themselves when they’re stuck in a ditch during the North Dakota 
winter29 (Local Resident, personal communication, August 8, 2011). 
 
The same economic developer spoke to this in his own experience with flooding in  
 
nearby Bismarck: 
 
The river was coming up over the bank right toward our house.  We busted our 
tails to put up a makeshift levy.  But –and this speaks to the character of the 
people in these parts- some of our neighbors showed up with a semi full of city 
sand and a backhoe, without being asked!  He saved us hours, maybe days of 
work.  And he refused to be paid!  He just wanted to help out his neighbors.  But 
that’s not all.  The Bobcat Company lent out tractors and loaders to use to fight 
the floods… for free.  What other state do you know that has that sort of social 
capital? 
 
      When looking for the loci of activity in Ward County (population of 61,675), one 
necessarily turns toward the county seat, Minot, the largest city in Ward and fourth 
largest in North Dakota at 40,888 total (“Minot Area Chamber of Commerce,” n.d.) (the 
Mayor believes Minot’s population has exceeded 50,000 since the 2010 Census 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29     My own car broke down on an isolated road outside of Bismarck, North Dakota.  This researcher can report that, anecdotally and 
thankfully from his own experience, there is an element of truth to this statement. 
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(Zimbelman, 2013)).  Minot is where people meet many of their day-to-day needs, 
serving as a central hub of vital collective pursuits.   
      The last few years have situated much of North Dakota –and particularly Ward 
County– firmly within a swirling vortex of global forces (Schramm, 2012).  Agricultural 
markets and federal subsidies are enriching local farmers who are adapting to new crops 
(corn is replacing lentils and sunflowers in some areas) and farming practices.  The 
energy boom has brought in a great deal of in-migration and economic development.  
U.S. foreign policy has spurred growth in the local Air Force Base’s facilities and 
personnel.  Long-term residents expressed concern and anxiety that things are changing 
in ways that will forever reshape the uniqueness North Dakotan culture (Local Resident, 
personal communication, November 1, 2010; Local Resident, personal communication, 
December 8, 2011). 
      The Minot Air Force Base (MAFB) has done its part for economic development.  
The Department of Defense (DoD) allocates resources spent locally by servicewomen 
and men, as well as the support personnel necessary to run the facilities that traditionally 
served as the home of a B-52 bomber.  In a sign of the times, MAFB is one of the 
command centers for the DoD’s unmanned drone warfare program.  As drone warfare 
expands, so too will the personnel at military bases like MAFB.  Expansion of DoD 
resources at the MAFB would normally be a noteworthy story on its own.  However, the 
shale oil boom over the Bakken and Three Forks deposits creates a lot of white noise 
while turning the volume down on everything else. 
      The Bakken and Three Forks oil deposits are thought to join up with lower 
Canada, and reach through northwestern North Dakota, into parts of Montana.  
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Development of these resources seems to be taken for granted, along with a change in 
local culture, as expressed by a local laborer: “North Dakota will become the next Texas.  
We have so many energy reserves that it will reshape this state.”  He then went on to 
caution: “And I don’t know if it’s for the better” (Co-operative Official, personal 
communication, December 8, 2011). 
      The boom touches virtually all of the communities within close proximity to the 
oil deposits.  According to the Minot Area Development Corporation (MADC), 
exploitation of the shale has turned North Dakota in a net energy producer, sending 75 
percent of energy reserves out of state (“Minot Area Development Corporation,” n.d.).  
The rush for shale-enriched land by companies such as Chesapeake Energy, Haliburton 
and Marathon has brought in a great deal of investment, heavy equipment, and migrant 
laborers.  While the oil deposits mostly surround Ward County, Minot’s position as a 
regional hub makes it an attractive area for oil-related business activity, as well as 
housing and recreation for the labor force. 
      A persistent narrative running through the interviews was the extent to which key 
leaders in the region were ill prepared for the boom.  The sheer volume of migrant labor 
and heavy equipment has taken a toll on the region’s infrastructure and service industries.  
Sewer and water lines are increasingly stressed.  Montrail Williams, a rural electric co-
operative servicing surrounding counties, is stringing up three miles of electric line daily 
to meet the needs of the energy companies (Schramm, 2010).  The country roads, 
originally built to handle the occasional piece of farm machinery, are now dealing with 
an endless barrage of semi-trucks.  “The driving is difficult. Some days just trying to get 
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off the bypass seems impossible” (Local Resident, personal communication, December 8, 
2011).  A local community leader noted: 
The country roads went from asphalt to mud.  The truckers are driving their 
payloads long distances at 15-25 miles an hours because the asphalt isn’t there 
anymore.  But that’s just the thing.  It doesn’t matter if the roads are paved or not.  
Nothing’s going to stop them from transporting the oil.  It’s literally 24-7, rain, 
snow, or shine (School Official, personal communication, August 16, 2011). 
 
The area is underequipped to deal with the rapid increase in trucking.  Truck stops are at 
capacity.  The bathroom facilities and staffing aren’t adequate; there are stories of 
truckers being handed buckets to use as makeshift toilets while overnighting.  Even the 
harsh winters seem to be no match for the oil boom: “During the snows, people stayed in 
more. Outdoor type things were at a standstill. With the boom, people will be more 
involved outdoors during the wintertime” (Local Resident, personal communication, 
August 10, 2011). 
      Auto repairs shops are beyond capacity to meet the needs of locals.  The 
mechanics are servicing not only longstanding residents, but also the rigs and pickups 
used for working on the shale.  The result is that regional auto mechanics are servicing 
Ward County as well. “If I need a car repair, it’s just easier to pay to have it hauled 80 
miles away to Bismarck.  I’m not gonna wait weeks to be able to drive again.  You need a 
car in these parts” (Local Resident, personal communication, December 8, 2011). 
      Nationally, anti-fracking tales are being told through widely distributed 
documentaries like Gasland, as well as highly organized environmental campaigns.  But 
the companies operating in North Dakota have gone relatively undisturbed in their 
business operations.  It was only recently that the oil companies were restricted by state 
governments in what fluids there were able to use for fracking, but that was not born out 
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of opposition so much as a proactive initiative by the oil companies to shield themselves 
from future litigation (“Proposed oil and gas rule changes now final,” 2012).   
      Perhaps the economic impacts of the oil boom have mitigated potential fallout 
from the pitfalls of the boom. The influx of external investment from the oil and gas 
industries has brought with it an employment boom that seems to have shielded North 
Dakota from the Great Recession.  Table 6. Minot, ND economic indicators drives home 
the extreme economic impact the oil boom has had on the community.
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Table 6. (continued) 
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      The high rates of employment do have downsides for economies reliant on a wage 
labor force.  The oil boom has resulted in a massive labor shortage throughout the region 
despite the rapid in-migration of laborers.  Service and support job openings are plentiful.  
These laborers are in need of basic services, stimulating a boom in retail industries such 
as grocery and restaurants.  Businesses are finding that the regional labor force is in 
demand, meaning workers can job-hop, increasing workforce turnover (Business Owner, 
personal communication, August 16, 2011).  In the midst of this uncertainty, business 
owners of traditionally low-wage jobs are offering pay rates upward of $15/hour, signing 
bonuses, and above standard benefits packages (which include health care and vacation 
time) no matter the prospective employee’s level of education or experience. 
 It used to be that the jobs I would offer in manufacturing were the ones  
people wanted.  Now I have to compete with the McDonalds on wages and  
benefits.  I just don’t see how we’re going to adjust to this mess.  It’s a real  
strain on my resources (Business Owner, personal communication, August 16, 
2011). 
 
Many fast food restaurants are so understaffed that they have closed down their indoor 
seating and only service drive up.  A chain housewares retailer, “Menards, is a 
madhouse” (Co-operative Official, personal communication, December 8, 2011).  Even 
Wal-Mart has to adapt, pulling pallets of product onto the sales floor instead of putting 
items on the shelf due to heavy sales volume and limited staff. 
      The energy companies have set up temporary labor or “man” camps for their 
employees.  The in-migration has resulted in a regional housing shortage. Laborers 
willing to pay for housing outside of the camps have occupied virtually all of the existing 
hotel rooms in the region, necessitating a growth in hotel construction (ten hotels are 
being built as of the time of this research (Co-operative Official, personal 
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communication, August 15, 2011)).  But many of these laborers are men, mostly young 
and single, working overtime with excellent pay packages; they can afford to pay inflated 
prices for the enhanced amenities incurred from living in the city.   
      Speculation on development property is occurring as the willingness of 
prospective tenants to pay inflated rents increases (School Official, personal 
communication, August 16, 2011; Local Resident, personal communication, December 8, 
2011).  Increasingly, out of town investors are seeking to profit from this. Interstate 
landlords are purchasing local apartment complexes, and converting hotels to long-term, 
temporary-stay facilities.  The result?  Rent and property values  are skyrocketing.  A 
recent journalistic account finds rents on par with New York City rates (Johnson, 2012).  
The willingness to pay a premium for standard housing in Minot is driving up the cost of 
the entire housing stock, inflicting pain on the pocketbook of long-term local residents as 
cost-of-living has increased.   
The people who are local are having big problems with landlords who are  
jacking up rental prices.  The homelessness is a different problem.  But people 
who have good jobs are unable to get a place. One-bedroom apartments are going  
for around $1200 a month (Co-operative Official, personal communication, 
December 8, 2011). 
 
The local resident had an example of an apartment complex that was purchased from an 
out of town corporation.   The corporation sent a notice to current occupants that the rents 
would triple.  He went on to wonder: “…what happens when this boom is over, and the 
locals have been forced to move out?"  Retirees and other individuals on fixed incomes 
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living in rental properties are being squeezed out of the housing market, and increased 
wages earned are sapped to cover additional cost-of-living expenses.30 
      Rapid in-migration is beginning to build mistrust, another indication that the 
community is going through growing pains:  
The influx of people has pushed an increase in police calls and things like that. 
People are concerned about it, and you hear rumors about things that happen in 
the parking lot of Wal-Mart, but the police department downplays it. 
 
While crime trends are difficult to find, one website notes a significant uptick in violent 
assaults in Minot.  More recently, the state’s Attorney General released a report which 
concluded increases in crime rates were negligible (Preskey, 2012).  However, enhanced 
fear of outsiders and the perceived increased potential for random criminal victimization 
will make collective action more difficult due to diminishing trust.  This is troubling for a 
community enduring rapid transformation; stable, long term planning will be critical to 
insure a smooth, stable transition. 
       The spring of 2011 saw record rainfalls hindering local crop planting.  The record 
rainfall continued to pour over already saturated ground, causing the regionally-oriented 
Sauris River to rise over it banks.  Initially, a few critical interstate highways were closed 
down due to flooding’s effect on structural integrity and transit safety.  But the rains kept 
coming.  Large-scale flooding hit the region.  The record flooding of the Souris River 
“left about 11,000 people -- more than a quarter of Minot's population -- effectively 
homeless” through the destruction of over 4000 housing units (Bailey, 2011).  The 
flooding had compounded the chaos in Ward County: “There isn't any place to stay in 
Minot with 10,000 people displaced by flooding and with the oil workers occupying !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30     One must note that the phenomena of increasing rural property values are not restricted solely to Ward County, North Dakota or 
other regions experiencing a rush on oil and natural gas assets.  Rural regions with rich agriculture are also impacted by speculation on 
property due to the increasing growth in commodity agriculture and biofuel development. 
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every hotel room in town” (Local Resident, personal communication, November 1, 
2010).  The oil reserves driving the boom had always been located outside of the flood 
zone.  The flooding left the energy boom to continue unabated, which only compounded 
the necessity of accessible housing for newly homeless residents.  A housing report 
before the flooding estimated that Minot would need some 5000 new homes by 2023 
(Ondracek, 2011).  Now Minot would need to replace 4000 homes from its existing 
housing stock, a virtual overnight doubling in demand.  The flood had also hit the region 
surrounding Minot, compounding resource shortages. 
In Burlington, a town of about 1,000 people a few miles upstream on the 
confluence of the Souris and Des Lacs rivers, city officials abandoned 
sandbagging as hopeless and sent people to Minot to help out. About a third of the 
town's 320 houses are expected to be lost (Kolpack, 2011). 
 
The flooding of the region’s Amtrak rail line further constrained newly homeless 
residents without reliable personal transportation from leaving the area (“Minot recovery 
information,” n.d., KFYR-TV, 2011). 
      The disaster recovery process further complicated the housing shortage.  Many of 
the properties damaged within the Souris River flood zone are in a holding pattern.  
Minot city officials must decide if the area is safe for continued residential zoning, or if 
the properties should be converted into a green zone or park to mitigate the impacts of 
future flooding on residential housing stocks. “Minot is trying to come up with a plan for 
flood protection which involves property buyouts. People are not rebuilding their homes 
until they find out what happens” (Co-operative Official, personal communication, 
August 15, 2011).  Since the close of the fieldwork phase of this research, Minot has 
implemented a voluntary property buyout plan, utilizing over $60 million of state 
government monies. 
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      The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is actively involved, 
funneling critical federal resources locally setting up temporary housing units.  However, 
these housing units went severely underused.  A significant number of local residents felt 
uncomfortable moving into government provided housing and instead moved in with 
friends and relatives (Co-operative Official, personal communication, August 15, 2011; 
Local Resident, personal communication, December 8, 2011).  It wasn’t an uncommon 
site to see tents pitched in the yards, sheds, and garages of Ward County residents 
occupied by flood victims.   
      Disaster recovery efforts have further escalated the demand for laborers in the 
building trades.  Yet tradespeople are increasingly difficult to come by.  Their skills are 
needed to not only rebuild Minot, but to service the oil boom (Minot’s city government 
has issued building permits for projects valued at $100 million in 2010, $200 million in 
2011, and $300 million in 2012, a rapid growth in built capital) (Zimbelman, 2013).  The 
stock of credentialed tradespeople is being stretched to its absolute capacity in North 
Dakota, unintentionally made worse by the state’s licensing requirements.  Even in times 
of crisis, out-of-state tradespeople must still go through North Dakota’s credentialing 
process in order to legally practice their craft within the state.  The pressure on the state 
has sped up the licensing process for out-of-state contractors.  Hundreds of contractors 
are coming into the area to help rebuild (the city had licensed over 650 new contractors 
since January 2012 alone); 
“To help put that number in perspective, the normal amount of electrical 
contractors in Minot is believed to be about 30. There are 170 now. The number 
of licensed plumbing firms has increased from 11 to 55, excavators from 10 to 
105” (Fundingsland, 2012). 
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Even if new contractors make it to the region, they are finding living accommodations to 
be virtually non-existent; many are camping or sleeping in their work trucks (Local 
Resident, personal communication, December 8, 2011).  
      The energy boom has not approached a predictable, stable equilibrium.  One in 
three businesses are hiring, and it is estimated 1500 laborers are needed for 2013 alone 
(Strasburg, 2012).  Industry executives, laborers, and support teams will continue settling 
in the region.  There is explicit concern that Ward County will look significantly different 
within the span of a few years.  According to a prominent Red Cross volunteer, about 80 
percent of flooded residents were without flood insurance (Local Resident, personal 
communication, August 10, 2011).  One interview participant claimed this was a result of 
local realtors guaranteeing prospective homeowners in the flood plain that the river’s 
three dams would forever guard against potential flooding (School Official, personal 
communication, August 16, 2011).  What will happen to those who lost everything?  Can 
the actors in the region adjust and return to a level or normalcy? 
      The city’s resources are stretched thin.  The oil money has generated tax revenue 
for state coffers with incidental revenue (sales and property taxes) captured by the local 
governments.  North Dakota is one of the few states to have the good fortune of a budget 
surplus during the recession in the late 2000s.  But the national wave of newly elected 
austerity-oriented politicians elected to state governments has complicated the 
distribution of resources to the disaster area (the state is in tax-cutting, not tax-spending, 
mode (Local Resident, personal communication, August 8, 2011)).    
      The character of the community will no doubt change rapidly in the near- term.  
The boomtown atmosphere, the escalating economic tensions on the long-term residents, 
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and rapid in-migration are forces chipping away at the community’s foundation.  
According to a number of interview participants, these changes are prompting a number 
of long-time local residents to leave as they seek out more stable communities. 
The entire makeup of the area I grew up looks different. It's changed everything.  
The community isn't the community I remember.  We don't even want to go into 
Minot anymore. It's just a different place.  The character of the area has changed a 
lot (Local Resident, personal communication, December 8, 2011). 
 
      Local policymakers are now being forced to deal with all of the issues of a 
boomtown and disaster zone concurrently and with little preparation.31  Interview 
participants expressed a desire for stability.  People are vulnerable and desperate to see an 
end to the crisis atmosphere.  This seems to have cemented the economic planners and 
policymakers as a de facto force in community vision and economic development.  They 
have the resources, time, and community support as knowledge leaders entrusted with 
steering Ward County through these crises.  In this environmental, co-optation and 
capture by a select few is certainly a real possibility.   
      Nested within this swirling vortex of socio-ecological forces –before the floods- a 
major $240 million investment in wind energy infrastructure was made by the nation’s 
largest generation and transmission (G&T) electric co-operative, Basin.  Typically, such a 
large investment ("Department of Commerce," 2009) in localized infrastructure would be 
a noteworthy event in a relatively isolated county the size of Ward.  Proponents of co-
operative development point to claims of enhanced community outcomes.  Yet prominent 
local residents seemed somewhat dismissive of the substantive development outcomes of 
co-operative development.   Considering the major socio-ecological forces, what are the 
implications of the co-operative institutional design of the wind farm for the local !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31     The crisis atmosphere made it difficult to interface with key public officials for the purposes of administering interviews. 
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community?  How did this rare, co-operative wind farm come to be?  Are the perceptions 
of co-operative development consistent with findings from on the ground fieldwork? 
Basin Electric Power Co-operative: A Legacy of “Giant Power” 
 
      The standard IOU is profit-oriented, with the goal of maximizing and returning 
value to the shareholder.  (S)he who has the most voting shares in an IOU more than 
likely can command the greatest voice.  A co-operative, unlike IOUs, are almost always 
operated by those who use them: the consumers or member-owners.  Shares of stock do 
not dictate influence over the governing process as each single member is granted the 
same statutory rights of governance (the mantra amongst many co-operatives actors is 
one member, one vote).   
      From their very inception electric co-operatives designed member-owner 
governance into the model, providing venues for member-owner input and participation.  
The 900+ electric co-operatives are mostly electrical distributors, meaning they’re 
servicing their member-owners within their community; in this manner, the co-operative 
is spatially accessible (comparatively, many IOUs encompass patchwork tracts of land 
over regional service territories).  Surplus resources (profit, labor, or otherwise) could 
then be harnessed by the co-operative member-ownership for critical public 
entrepreneurial endeavors.   
      Despite the seemingly populist elements of electric co-operative governance, 
electric co-operatives didn’t come about solely as a result of a social movement dedicated 
to community ownership of electric systems.  In fact, the existence of electric co-
operatives is more a result community-based collective action to address the failure of 
IOU market actors to meet the electrification needs of rural locales than with political 
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opposition to the status quo of IOUs.  This community-need orientation has deep cultural 
implications within the electric co-operative community that will be addressed later. 
      While many electric co-operatives are relatively small in comparison to typical 
IOUs, there exists an anomaly amongst electric co-operatives playing a major role in the 
lives of many North Dakotans.  Nestled within the state capital of Bismarck, some 80 
miles south of Ward County, is the headquarters of the nation’s largest electric co-
operative, Basin.  Basin is a vertically integrated power generator and transmitter (one 
executive likes to say “Basin goes from mine, mouth to meter” (Association Official, 
personal communication, August 9, 2011)).  Basin covers nine states, stretching from the 
Canadian and Mexican borders, and “owns 2,165 miles and maintains 2,250 miles of 
high-voltage transmission” (“Basin Electric,” n.d.b) through joint pacts and ownership” 
(“Basin Electric Power Cooperative," n.d.a). 
Basin Electric operates four baseload coal-fired power plants, and three gas 
combustion sites (9 turbines), two natural gas turbine units, and a two-unit, oil-
fired plant as peaking units. Basin Electric owns, but does not operate, 40-MW of 
a natural gas/oil-fired combustion turbine, also used as a peaking unit. In Basin 
Electric's renewable energy portfolio, we currently own and operate wind turbines 
near Chamberlain, SD, White, SD, and Minot, ND (“Basin Electric,” n.d.b). 
 
While the scale of Basin is staggering, it’s the ownership and governance of the 
institution that makes it noteworthy. 
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Figure 9. Basin’s governance structure 
 
Source: http://www.basinelectric.com/About_Us/Corporate/Governance_Model/. 
 
      Basin is what is known in the electric co-operative sector as a G&T.  Basin is a 
third-tier co-operative owned by other smaller second tier co-operatives (also G&T’s), 
and first-tier distribution co-operatives.  These first-tier co-operatives initially joined 
together to form regionally based G&Ts (second tier co-operatives).  These G&Ts 
eventually joined together to form Basin (see Figure 9).  Under Basin, these networked 
co-operatives pool together to aggregate their resources to own and operate capital-
intensive transmission infrastructure, build electric generation capacity, and increase their 
wholesale market power through bulk purchasing and coordinated bargaining.  Basin 
generates over $1 billion annually in revenue, operating on an at-cost, not for profit basis.  
“Profits” are either retained for research and development, as self-insurance, or 
distributed back to member-owners as capital credits (co-operatives in other industrial 
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sectors refer to this line on the balance sheet as dividends, patronage, or capital credits).  
Basin then provides a number of services for the entirety of their co-operative ownership 
outside of just generating and transmitting electricity (monitoring, coordinating energy 
supply, marketing, and as we will see, community and economic development functions) 
(Co-operative Executive, personal communication, October 26, 2010).   
      Distribution co-operatives-  not the G&T- are tasked to directly interact with the 
member-owners (the consumers) through the procurement and provision of electric 
energy to end consumers.  Those households, business and entities that receive electricity 
from the distribution co-operative are considered member-owners.  These member-
owners then have a right to run for positions on the board of their particular co-operative 
and cast votes when called for.  Electric co-operatives are then representatively governed 
by an elected few from the ranks of the member-ownership.  These distribution co-
operatives may purchase their energy from investor-owned generators, or ideally own a 
part of a G&T like Basin that procures energy on behalf of those distribution co-
operatives. 
      Basin is much different from McLean County’s Horizon.  Investor-owned wind 
generators like Horizon are heavily regulated and specialize in a singular aspect of the 
electric energy market: wholesale power.  The wholesale power is sold via market 
mechanisms with little to no interaction with consumers and their community (market 
logic dictates extreme specialization).  Basin, representing the vision of a more complete 
co-operative electric energy system, is relatively unregulated by government actors and 
has the intent to operate a complete electric grid.  The historical trajectories that brought 
distribution co-operatives to existence have shaped the manner with which electric co-
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operatives join together to provide scale and agility in the broader energy marketplace of 
which electric co-operatives seem inextricably embedded.  The market-based core of 
electric co-operatives also influences and clashes with the organizational value 
proposition, and in part determines how the co-operative interacts within the local 
community. 
      Market failure, community gain.  Electric co-operatives are typically referred to 
as rural electric co-operatives.  This is in part tied to the origins and identity of the sector.   
     During the Great Depression, only 10 percent of rural America was wired for 
electricity.  The public policy, which breathed life into the electric co-operative sector, 
was intended to modernize the American rural countryside.  During the Presidential 
Administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR), absolute rural electrification was 
viewed as a major complement to New Deal reforms intended to rectify the economy 
during the depths of the Great Depression.  It was believed that if rural America were 
modernized through electrification, innovation and industrialization would advance 
rapidly, helping to lift the national economy via the utilization of electrified energy, 
which would enhance rural public entrepreneurship (Davis, 1986, pp. 491-492).  The 
problem was that the IOUs, which were best equipped to implement these policy goals, 
didn’t want to participate (“Basin Electric,” n.d.f).  It therefore becomes critical to 
understand how it was that the non-participation of the IOUs propelled the federal 
government to create an alternative to the dominance of the for-profit electric utilities.   
      The IOUs had worked from their inception aggressively to secure their position as 
the sole local and regional monopoly providers of electricity by codifying their practices 
under the guise of government regulatory oversight.  This then gave the appearance of a 
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publicly accepted “regulatory compact,” which was in reality political gamesmanship.  
Samuel Insull, an electric utility executive presenting at a conference of IOUs,  
suggested that competition was not in their best interest, and that the companies  
should together promote the idea of state regulation of utilities in return for the 
granting of monopoly service territories.  Insull felt that this would ensure rapid 
industry growth with minimum duplication of physical plant (Lowery, 2010, p. 5). 
 
While the intervention of the government into the electric power industry might seem like  
 
a cessation of power, it was a high-stakes game of chess meant to cement market  
 
dominance.  Again, Lowery: 
 
Investor-owned companies were able to establish virtual control over state  
regulators; and with the guaranteed income of protected monopoly service, they 
proceeded to build major enterprises through the use of holding companies (p. 6). 
 
      The bargain the IOUs made with the government paid off handsomely.  IOUs 
were rewarded with monopoly service territories and locked in a cycle of guaranteed 
margins and profit maximization.  Urban-dwellers could benefit from all the services and 
conveniences electric energy had to offer, and the IOUs could focus on the dense, 
profitable cities, turning their backs on the development of the low-density countryside 
which would significantly reduce their return on investment.  The political calculations of 
the IOUs would end up creating the political backlash and determination necessary to 
initiate government policies addressing major urban and rural development deficits and, 
ironically enough, creating a populist challenge to the investor-ownership model of 
public utilities. 
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      Mobilizing community and government resource to industrialize rural 
America.  The federal government policy advancing public ownership of electric systems 
was founded against the backdrop of government support for utility monopolies, 
corporate influence over the political process, and wealth divides between urban and rural 
populations.  The FDR Administration sought a utilitarian approach to bridge the urban-
rural divide in industrialization: subsidization of the existing IOUs into the rural 
countryside.  But the IOUs were averse to contributing to FDR’s New Deal policy of 
absolute rural electrification, seeing the inevitability of reduced margins from the 
diversification of service territory and wary of further government reach into their affairs.  
Indeed, an early report by the IOUs to the FDR Administration sought a “no pain, all 
gain” policy in return for their participation (Lowery, 2010).  This rejection of REA 
incentives by IOUs and lack of corporate buy-in propelled the FDR Administration to 
create infrastructural and capital investment capacity necessary to encourage publicly 
owned electric utilities to emerge and account for market failure. 
      The concept of publicly owned electricity grew out of recognition that the 
monopoly utilities were not only falling short on their social compact, but also stymying 
the potential of national electrification.  The broader concept grew out of a synthesis of 
social movements, economic stimulus policies, and prescriptions to pragmatically address 
core rural needs. 
      Electric co-operatives in particular had existed in the U.S. since the late 1800’s.  
President Theodore Roosevelt noted the value of co-operative entrepreneurship 1909: 
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The co-operative plan is the best plan of organization wherever men have the 
right spirit to carry it out.  Under this plan any business undertaking is managed 
by a committee; every man has one vote and only one vote; and everyone gets 
profits according to what he sells or buys or supplies.  It develops individual 
responsibility and has a moral as well as financial value over any other plan 
(Lowery, 2010, p. 6). 
 
Despite the explicit acknowledgement of the capacity of co-operatives to build 
community, electric co-operatives wouldn’t emerge as a significant organizational force 
until the 1930’s due in part to the necessary alignment of socio-economic forces and the 
backing of the federal government. 
      Actors within the Progressive Movement had for years advocated for the 
grassroots ownership of electric systems.  The Public Ownership League influenced a 
number of core policy solutions adopted by prominent legal figures, its influence being 
quite profound in electrified energy.  The 1920’s saw Pennsylvania’s Governor Gifford 
Pinchot advocate for “Giant Power,” whereby power generation and transmission would 
be centralized at the mouth of coal mines, and “transported” over vast expanses of 
transmissions lines, everywhere (this is also called the spoke and wheel system, in which 
a central generator would spider transmission lines outward for great distances, looking 
much like a spoke and wheel on a bicycle).  This challenged the decentralized, regionally 
oriented, monopoly hold of energy generators that stymied access to the infrastructure 
needed to produce and transmit electricity outside of metropolitan areas (Hughes, 1976).  
The expressed purpose would not be for profit, but for the public good (“University of 
Wisconsin Center for Cooperatives,” n.d.). 
      A number of policies were implemented in order encourage the growth of electric 
utilities into the countryside.  Those oriented toward public ownership were incentivized 
much the same as IOUs not necessarily due to their at-cost, member-service orientation 
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but for the mere fact they were able to meet the goals of rural electrification.  Economic 
efficacy was the driving rationale behind government policy, not so much social change.  
By the time of the FDR Administration, public power had grown from an idea to a reality 
(Greer, 2008).     
      Expanding government finance access beyond IOUs to co-operatives enabled 
public power, and through major public works projects.  Preference power, the policy 
giving co-operatives and municipal utilities privileged access to electricity produced from 
a handful of these public works projects.  One prominent preference power public works 
project, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), made “Giant Power” a reality through a 
demonstration of a proof of concept.  Communities looking to start electric co-operatives 
could count on a ready source of affordable energy to distribute throughout the rural 
countryside.  
      The U.S. government’s electrification policy goal of 100 percent electrification 
was a success.  The combination of readily available low-interest financing from the 
REA, generation and transmission capacity from Giant Power projects, and public 
entrepreneurs in the rural countryside stimulated the growth of the electric co-operative 
sector.  It was estimated that by the 1960’s all corners of the United States were 
electrified either by an IOU, municipal, or a co-operative .  What’s more, the federal 
monies provided to the co-operative sector were paid back with interest, accruing a net 
profit to the federal government (National Rural Electric Co-operative Association, 2011) 
(the model would serve as a justification for the rural co-operative telecom movement as 
well).  Just as government power was used to stabilize investor-owned electric utilities, 
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the New Deal era of government saw a pendulum swing toward empowering public 
ownership options. 
      The emergence of Basin.  A small portion of the American countryside was 
electrified at the outset of the Great Depression.  The Great Plains region was particularly 
neglected, with only 3.5 percent of the region being electrified (“Basin Electric,” n.d.f).  
Power plants handled local to regional baseloads and would need significant capital 
outlays to supply the demands of residents in the rural regions through new system build 
outs.  The small scale and decentralized nature of the existing electric power plants meant 
that even if the Great Plains were to get wired, utilities faced an obstacle in procuring 
affordable electricity and transmitting it across vast expanses of land. 
      Initially, distribution co-operatives were able to count on the expansion of the 
federal government’s “Giant Power” policy, allowing the movement to flourish: 
The construction of Missouri River Dams to make electricity and control flooding 
was promoted for years by President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) and studied by 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, but it took the flood of 1943 (estimated 
damage: $26 million) to convince Congress to take action and build the dams. 
With the exception of Fort Peck (a Depression Era project), the Missouri River 
dams were built in the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s and were the main source of 
power for regional distribution cooperatives (“Basin Electric,” n.d.d). 
 
However, federal policymakers made it clear that it was only a matter of time before the 
federal government would wind down its involvement in the expansion of preference 
power capacity. 
      The distribution co-operatives needed a way to transmit the electricity over great 
distances while keeping consumer costs down absent of Giant Power initiatives.  In order 
to do this, distribution co-operatives pooled resources to form a variety of G&T’s in the 
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region, each G&T being owned by the member-co-operative organizations.  This allowed 
distribution co-operatives to purchase large quantities of electricity at wholesale.   
      A select group of G&T’s began constructing additional electric generation 
capacity to break their complete dependency on federally owned electric generators.  
These G&T’s coordinated and managed the expansion of the co-operative-owned electric 
grid infrastructure.  But the capital intensiveness of such projects was cost-prohibitive to 
a number of the smaller G&T’s who were left to wholesale power purchasing agreements 
with IOUs as opposed to the expansion of their own generation capacity (“Basin 
Electric,” n.d.d, “Basin Electric,” n.d.f). 
      The breadth of co-operative and government collaboration began to draw down 
by the 1950’s.  The G&T’s of the Great Plains went through a major strategic shift during 
this era.  Leland Olds, a visionary in the evolution of the U.S. electric co-operative sector, 
and the Federal Power Commissioner under the Administration of FDR 
…spoke publicly to cooperatives about abandoning the idea of building smaller 
generation facilities to provide power for individual G&Ts, and endorse the 
construction of a large or "super G&T." This super G&T could build huge, coal-
fired power plants that would provide power for an entire region of the country 
(“Basin Electric,” n.d.d). 
 
The idea was a co-operative implementation of the federal government’s “Giant Power” 
policy.  The purpose was for the electric co-operative system to reach such a scale that 
allowed co-operatives to participate in the vertical integration of industrial segments that 
fed into the electric grid.  Once this scale is reached, co-operatives might become 
systematically interdependent on themselves instead of the federal government while 
better controlling for market-based volatility (Hughes, 1976).  The idea took hold: 
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Responding to Leland Olds' vision of a regional power supplier, East River 
Electric and ten other power supply systems created the Giant Power Cooperative 
on Oct. 4, 1960 - the precursor to Basin Electric. Giant Power Cooperative 
developed a 10-year plan (1965 - 1975) for securing power supply. The plan 
identified two possible sites for construction of a power plant: Garrison, North 
Dakota and Vermillion, South Dakota (“Basin Electric,” n.d.d). 
 
      The governance structure of such a co-operative could have been a messy affair 
should the plan called for the consolidation of individual G&T’s into a larger, singular 
super co-operative.  Organizational sovereignty could have been sacrificed for the 
seeming elegance of unified administration via consolidation.  Instead, the prospective 
member-owners of the new super G&T crafted a less disruptive solution that allowed 
individual co-operatives to continue to exist, giving that local member-base a more 
democratically accessible, representative super co-operative.  The existing G&T’s and 
distribution co-operatives would remain, and the super G&T - Basin - would be layered 
on top of that system (Figure 9).  In this manner, co-operative management and boards 
expressed a desire to maintain overlapping responsibilities, a decidedly “uncorporate” 
decision in its seeming inefficiency (whereby efficiency is measured merely by the 
singular bottom line of profit or cost reduction in the case of government regulated 
utilities).   
      Electric co-operative and vertical integration within the Great Plains electric  
 
grid.  The planning, build-out, and operation of Basin’s first power plant serves as a  
 
remarkable example of how individuals can work collectively across multiple scales to  
 
steward complex projects themselves (first and second tier electric co-operatives, as well  
 
as integrating into government and IOU owned electric grids).  The story of Basin’s first  
 
power plant is demonstrative of the public entrepreneurial capability of individuals  
 
outside of the perceived expert classes: 
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[Basin], after securing the financing for a power plant, the focus became finding 
an adequate site to build a power plant. Adequate water supply was needed, using 
existing federal power lines instead of building a lot of new transmission, and 
securing low-cost fuel were important factors in determining the plant's site. 
North Dakota received immediate consideration because of its abundant lignite 
coal and the mine-mouth-to meter capability. "Minemouth-to-meter" means that 
all elements for producing baseload electricity are in one place: the water, the coal 
and WAPA's transmission system. Only 12 miles of transmission had to be built 
to connect LOS to the Federal power grid (“Basin Electric,” n.d.e). 
 
Actors with Basin harnessed a complex socio-technological system (comprised of 
systems at multiple scales) in order meet a single goal: provide stable, affordable 
electricity for their member-owners. 
      The level of sophisticated planning has continued to evolve.  Basin would build-
out additional coal-fire power plants, peaking32 facilities and transmission infrastructure.  
The organizational emphasis on vertical integration resulted in a complete electric energy 
system for Great Plains residents.  The website of Basin explains their operational model 
as followed: “Basin Electric is a generation and transmission co-operative with a three-
tier delivery system: We sell wholesale power to our Class A members and others.”  
Class A members are comprised of G&T electric co-operatives. 
The Class A members sell power to their distribution cooperatives (Basin Electric 
classifies distribution cooperatives as Class "C" members) who, in turn, sell 
power to retail customers.  There are also special membership categories entitled 
Class B and Class D members (“Basin Electric,” n.d.c). 
 
      Basin’s member-ownership is its customer base (however, when surplus energy is 
produced, Basin will sell it on the spot market, broadening to potential customer pool to 
other wholesale buyers while increasing marginal returns).  Figure 10. Basin Electric 
member system maps Basin’s service territory.  Basin’s 135 member-owner co-operatives 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32     Peaking plants are power plants meant to rapidly deploy energy to the grid when standard base load electricity levels are not 
meeting projected demand. 
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are divided into districts by regional orientation, with each district receiving a seat on the 
Basin’s board of directors.  The governing board structure (Figure 9) assigns specific 
regions to specific seats on the Basin board. 
Figure 10. Basin Electric member system
 
Source: http://www.basinelectric.com/About_Us/Members/Map/index.html. 
 
      Enhancing the capacity for collective action.  The emergence and 
organizational robustness of Basin demonstrates the immense capacity of individuals to 
work collectively to meet common ends.  More to the point, these ends (a unified, 
commonly-owned electric energy transmission system) are extremely complicated: 
electricity governance intersects with market and state regulatory forces; energy 
investment often capital-intensive, demanding rigorous project planning and 
implementation; and when all is said and done, basic operational functionality is a 
technically laborious endeavor all on its own.   
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      Key leadership expressed a need (rural electrification), and mobilized essential 
constituencies to procure the necessary resources.  Those constituencies came from rural 
and agricultural sectors (the Farm Bureaus played a major role in parlaying their political 
capital (Local Official, personal communication, July 6, 2012)) to pressure the federal 
government for the capital necessary to kick-start the electric co-operative sector.   
      This process took decades, and was probably assisted by the political perfect 
storm of the Great Depression and New Deal era politics that brought the will necessary 
to make the vision a reality.  Relying on the government or other centralized political 
forces may be time-consuming, cumbersome, and in the end relatively risky.  That’s not 
the point.  The point here is that communities of individuals, even marginalized 
communities, have great capacity to perform critical, complicated development 
initiatives.  And further to the point there exist a number of paths communities may take 
to achieve remarkable development feats.  In this vein, stymying public entrepreneurship 
to benefit a few to the detriment of the many should not be viewed as optimal public 
policy. 
      That said, any institution will have its shortcomings; even well meaning 
institutional design may result in a destructive enterprise.  Institutions crafted and shaped 
by fallible human beings.  Robust institutional design accounts and mitigates for such 
fallibility (free-riding, corrosive actors, and institutional capture to name a few such 
dilemmas).  Electric co-operatives are just as susceptible to these dilemmas as any other 
institutional form. 
      The member-orientation of Basin –and electric co-operatives in general- translates 
to a relatively conservative, risk adverse entrepreneurial culture (Finzel & Kildegaard, 
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2013).  Capital works projects are planned years if not decades in advance, with the fate 
of the co-operative’s member-ownership at stake.  The meticulous, methodical nature of 
electric co-operatives is set against a core premise that has been with the sector since its 
inception: “our mission is to provide the highest quality electricity at the lowest price” 
(Local Resident, personal communication, August 8, 2011).  That cost-based emphasis 
means that some electric co-operatives miss the proverbial forest for the trees.  When a 
sudden shift in public political sentiment or ecological change occurs, electric co-
operatives tend to be reactionary.  On issues such as climate change, air and water 
pollution, and responsible operational governance, the sector has endured harsh scrutiny 
from consumer, environmental, and demutualization advocates (Regulatory Official, 
personal communication, September 9, 2010).  Addressing external pressure (be it from 
government or media) is often assessed from a narrow financialized perspective, and seen 
as a regulatory threat directed at self-governance and institutional sovereignty.  One CEO 
of an Illinois G&T co-operative summed it up this sentiment: “co-ops could rather do it 
on their own than be government regulated” (Co-operative Executive, personal 
communication, October 26, 2010). 
      Further compounding the dilemmas that electric co-operatives face is the so-
called “favorable” tax status, derived in part from the not-for-profit, member-owner 
orientation.  Co-operatives are often conferred this status because they are service over 
profit oriented.  IOUs point to this tax advantage as an unfair policy privilege.  But the 
exclusion of co-operatives from various tax liabilities means co-operatives are also 
excluded from a substantial government policy portfolio based on offsetting tax liability.  
Electric co-operatives have little federal tax liability, essentially isolating the entire sector 
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from accessing advantages available to IOUs alone.  Consider that virtually any project 
requiring financing for an electric utility will be relatively significant.  As noted in 
Chapter Four, IOUs may then leverage the federal tax benefit to procure capital 
investment with large financial firms as a lending incentive (if you lend to us, not only 
will you get a favorable rate, but you can also offset your taxes).  A Basin official 
summed up the implications: “what co-ops gain in tax exemptions, they lose in 
government subsidy” (Association Official, personal communication, August 17, 2011).  
Indeed, reputable research from the Congressional Research Service has found that the 
government gives greater support to the IOUs than the co-operatives (Co-operative 
Association Official, personal communication, September 8, 2010). 
      Electric co-operatives want to be seen as different and unique, but they are 
embedded in a system that is inordinately influenced by the investor-owned utilities.  
This makes co-operatives more beholden to government policy developed by powerful, 
for-profit interests, thereby weakening their value proposition potential.  If electric co-
operatives had sought simple solutions to complex problems, path dependency would 
dictate that the profit motive would have implanted itself into the system to entice the 
necessary investment capital.  Lending costs would have skyrocketed, workforce 
development would have been cut, and the cost to rural consumers would not be on parity 
with their urban counterparts (Co-operative Association Official, personal 
communication, September 8, 2010).  And while electric co-operatives have mostly 
fended off these opposing forces, the sector must guard against the potential for the 
institutional logics of IOUs from taking home. 
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      Co-operative advocates in government, as well as institutional actors, have 
mobilized a great deal of resources to address both the conservative culture and structural 
impediments.  The pragmatic design surrounding these resources that have arisen over 
the course of the 20th century have attempted to strike a balance between respecting the 
core co-operative values (that may be partially to blame for the system’s conservative, 
reactionary tact) while promoting responsible entrepreneurship against a hostile policy 
and market environment. 
      Key actors in the electric co-operative sector have intentionally embedded the 
system in a number of networks that helps to provide the capital necessary for growth, 
while also guaranteeing varying levels of best practices are followed.  Virtually all of 
these networks regulate electric co-operatives on the basis of participation, the idea 
being: if don’t want to be regulated, then you don’t have to work with us (Co-operative 
Association Official, personal communication, September 8, 2010).  Regulation is 
basically voluntary.  Both the federal government and co-operative organizations play 
overlapping, redundant roles in this, layering a number of governance mechanisms that 
build monitoring and robustness into the sector. 
      The USDA’s RUS has for decades existed as an enabling force for growing the 
electric co-operative system, providing critical loans during the sector’s early years.  
Taking out a loan with the RUS requires reporting on key performance indicators as part 
of the loan terms.  This soft regulatory mechanism is particularly useful in those instances 
when electric co-operatives seek loans to stem budget shortfalls due to poor management 
practices.  A Basin executive thought this to be a positive feature of the RUS: “RUS is 
like a mother.  They make sure you don’t go too deep” (Association Official, personal 
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communication, August 9, 2011).  Another major electric co-operative lender, CoBank, a 
co-operative bank that provides loans for utility and agricultural co-operatives, has also 
used the model of soft regulation developed by the RUS.  This model of soft regulation 
continues to be an important feature of the electric co-operative system to this day.   
      There are a number of other actors within the system who have this “parental” 
role.  But the component of interest to this research is where the key actors within the 
electric co-operative system have been instrumental in intentionally developing system-
wide robustness for their member organizations.  Had electric co-operatives remained 
reliant solely on bank or government lending, they would have been at a severe 
disadvantage in comparison to their IOU counterparts.  Influential lenders like the RUS 
and CoBank aren’t tied specifically to the electric co-operative system; they also lend to 
other sectors, and –the RUS in particular- are more prone to shift with the prevailing 
political winds.  A number of electric co-operatives, in need of a lender tied closer to 
their unique needs and separated from the political fluctuations of the RUS, founded the 
National Rural Utilities Cooperative Finance Corporation (NRUCF) in the late 1960’s 
(“National Rural Utilities,” n.d.b).  NRUCF has positioned itself to take the reigns from 
government lending and enhance the electric co-operative system’s ability to meet its 
own capital investment needs. 
      Investing in infrastructure is not the only means by which electric co-operatives 
flourish.  Actors within the system have worked to enhance support services for the 
electric co-operative sector, to guarantee constant workforce development, strong 
member-owner engagement, and institutional innovation through specialized service 
providers.  The electric co-operative organizations are quite aggressive at purposefully 
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designing redundant mechanisms throughout the system that build-in robustness amongst 
the organizational membership.   
      The National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA) – the premier 
electric co-operative federation - is clearly the leader in this arena, providing government 
relations, member-services and promoting standards and best practices by which all of 
the member-co-operatives adhere to.  The NRECA is able to pool their member-co-
operative’s employee benefits monies to provide benefits competitive with the corporate 
and municipal sectors (“National Rural Utilities,” n.d.a).  NRECA has also created 
healthy retirement programs in which their member-co-operatives may opt into on behalf 
of their operational staff.  Electric co-operatives are then able to participate in a 
networked system that builds in the capacity necessary to compete with the larger private 
sector firms for qualified specialized employees.  
      The NRECA, keen to leverage collective messaging and public outreach, started 
Touchstone Energy, the premier marketing arm for electric co-operatives which  
…provides innovative resources and the strength of a national network to co-ops, 
helping them enhance their unique relationships with their local member-owners. 
More than 710 Touchstone Energy cooperatives in 46 states deliver energy and 
energy solutions to more than 27 million members every day. Touchstone 
Energy helps its cooperatives communicate the cooperative difference to 
business and residential member-owners, large and small, all across the 
country. 
 
Touchstone Energy, as noted on the NRECA website 
 
(http://www.nreca.coop/programs/touchstone/Pages/default.aspx), reinforces the  
 
necessity of value beyond profit alone: 
 
Four values are the foundation of every Touchstone Energy co-op's service to its 
members. These values represent the cooperative difference and how Touchstone 
Energy cooperatives connect with and earn the trust of millions of people, every 
day. 
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The values proposition (innovation, accountability, integrity, and commitment to 
community) reinforces those previously mentioned Principles perceived as central to the 
effectiveness of the co-operative model. 
      The NRECA also worked with a number of their G&T member-co-operatives to 
create an energy wholesaler, the Alliance for Cooperative Energy Services Power 
Marketing (APM).  According to the APM website: 
Since its formation in February 1999, APM has become a nationally recognized 
wholesale energy trading and risk management firm that has maintained its client-
oriented focus of providing quality service.  Today, APM is one of the largest 
physical electricity traders in the nation (“ACES,” n.d.). 
 
Not only does APM purchase wholesale power on behalf of its member-owner 
organizations, but it also seeks to enhance the capabilities of the staff of those 
organizations to better interact in the energy marketplace, particular with regards to risk 
management, a critical skill for co-operatives at the mercy of a volatile energy market.  
The capabilities enhancement is yet another example of how co-operative support 
systems build robustness. 
      One of the criticisms of the electric co-operative sector has been the inordinate 
role that coal plays in the overall energy generation portfolio.  Some circles have called 
for the corporatization (or demutualization) of those electric co-operatives slow to adapt 
(Cooper, 2008).  Yet that prescription does not account for the structural deficits facing 
co-operatives in comparison to their IOU counterparts.  The long-term reliance on coal 
has created a number of structural deficits.  This has furthered dependency on coal as a 
predominant energy source complicated the capability of electric co-operatives to 
develop renewable energy projects.  NRECA was involved in the creation of another 
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association, intended to fill a systemic need to grow the share of renewables in the 
portfolio of the electric co-operative sector: the National Renewables Cooperative 
Organization (NRCO).  The NRCO fills the renewable energy development gaps of many 
co-operatives by specializing in the arena, relieving individual electric co-operatives of 
the burden of spreading scarce resources thin to explore new, costly ventures. 
      Virtually all of these affiliated organizations require adherence to set standards, as 
well as reporting on those ends.  The electric co-operative sector is working actively on 
optimal fiscal governance, marketing, and community relations, enhancing the diversity 
of their energy source portfolio, and maintaining a significant market presence.  This is a 
critical, self-regulatory mechanism of electric co-operatives by their peers, encouraging 
entrepreneurship and innovation at multiple scales of the system itself.  Systems-level 
entrepreneurship has been a critical element of the success of the electric co-operative 
system.  Indeed, as discussed throughout this chapter, electric co-operatives don’t have 
the luxury of not being entrepreneurial.  Fostering a strong culture of best practices 
(healthy governance, appropriate margins, and member democratic participation) is 
essential for the electric co-operative system to break its historic dependencies and 
address substantive criticism.   
      Path dependency, specifically with regards to government privileging of IOUs for 
service territory and access to capital, has hampered overall adaptive capacity.  Many 
electric co-operatives waited decades before building counter or alternative organizations 
meant to enhance the system.  While actors with the electric co-operative system are on a 
purposive path to building those necessary self-
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time for electric co-operatives to operate on a level playing field with their IOU 
counterparts. 
       Considering the structural impediments to electric co-operative development of 
renewable energy generation, as well as the conservative institutional culture of electric 
co-operatives, what factors propelled Basin to construct the nation’s first co-operative-
owned wind farm?  Were pressure groups in part behind the endeavor?  Did competitive 
activity by the IOUs play a role?  Did the electric co-operative support system facilitate 
this project? 
Sowing the Seeds for the Nation’s First Co-operative Wind Farm: Collective Action 
and the Importance of Leadership in the Electric Co-operative System 
 
      Basin –and electric co-operatives in general- are rarely forced into new projects or 
initiatives by government mandates like the RPS.  Electric co-operatives covet their 
culture of self-regulation.  They are engaged in influencing government public policy, 
playing the role of the fierce opposition to virtually all mandatory regulation on the 
electric co-operative sector (Regulatory Official, personal communication, September 7, 
2010).  As mentioned in the previous section, this tactic does have systemic 
disadvantages that in the end may do more to harm the sector than benefit it due to the 
opening left to competing institutional models of electric energy governance (namely the 
IOUs) to game the system.  Government-driven market incentives rarely influence 
electric co-operatives for the simple reason that such incentives are most often directed at 
market or profit-oriented firms.  Electric co-operatives have a difficult time conveying to 
government policymakers both the necessity of the tax exemption and the importance of 
putting electric co-operatives on parity with IOUs. 
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      Individuals in the electric co-operative sector persistently note that their 
organizations are member-oriented, and that members dictate change.  However the 
change typically comes through the formal channels of representative democracy (i.e. via 
elected members and executive staff), and rarely through direct democratic mechanisms, 
particularly at the annual membership meetings.  Indeed, some public advocacy groups 
have chastised what they characterize as the undemocratic nature of specific electric co-
operatives.  The research in this area is seemingly non-existent.  But there is anecdotal 
evidence that electric co-operative actors do pay close attention to a number of other 
signals that indicate a desire for change amongst the owner-membership.  One such 
signal that carries weight is the observed patterns of state regulation -pending or 
otherwise- on their IOU counterparts.  The phenomenon of state-level RPS is particularly 
relevant to this case study.   
      Basin and co-operative wind energy development.  Seven of the nine states 
Basin and its member-co-operatives operate within have an RPS, of which five are 
mandatory for IOUs, though not applicable to electric co-operatives.  Electric co-
operative representatives from these states felt pressured to add renewable energy to their 
portfolio in an effort to at least keep up with their IOU counterparts (Association Official, 
personal communication, August 9, 2011).  The Minnesota member-co-operatives, for 
example, were under intense pressure as the state’s largest IOU, Xcel, is mandated to 
have 30 percent of its energy sourced through renewables (“DSIRE,” 2012).  Allowing 
IOUs, who already carry a great deal of political clout, to gain a greater foothold in 
favorable public relations from marketing their substantial investment in renewables 
could reinforce certain public perceptions of electric co-operative as out-of-touch or 
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dependent on dirty technologies (Association Official, personal communication, August 
19, 2011).  The member-co-operatives of Basin are very aware of the potential for public 
relations disaster, and have taken steps to address this dilemma. 
      Basin’s co-operative-ownership convened a meeting in 2005 in part to discuss 
increased ownership in renewable energy generation ("Basin Electric," 2009).  The 
agenda item was a reaction to the growing list of state mandates.  After decades of 
existence, the percent of coal and natural gas comprising Basin’s energy generation 
portfolio exceeded 70 percent (“Basin Electric," n.d.a).  Without wind energy generators, 
the only option left to Basin’s co-operative-ownership wanting to purchase wind energy 
would be to purchase it either on the spot market (which is very expensive) or via a PPA 
(long term contractual obligation) with an IOU.  This meant that money from the co-
operative system would go into the accounts of the investor-owned system.  The whole 
purpose of a super G&T like Basin is to create and sustain a vertically integrated electric 
co-operative system; every time a distribution co-operative does business outside of that 
network, the integrity of the co-operative system is slowly undermined in some manner 
while conversely reinforcing the IOU model.  Basin’s co-operative-owners resolved via 
the formal governing processes that Basin is to build and own new generation capacity to 
voluntarily meet state standards and stay on parity with their IOU counterparts. 
      Overcoming structural barriers to co-operative wind energy.  Basin was 
formally obligated by its co-operative-ownership via directive by the board to build, own 
and operate Basin-owned wind energy generators.  The task of creating a financially 
viable wind farm was complicated by federal government tax incentive structures.  As 
noted earlier, entities chartered as not-for-profit or as co-operatives don’t qualify for a 
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broad array of state and federal incentives due to their lack of “tax appetite” or tax 
liability.  However, unlike many other electric co-operatives, Basin had its own assets to 
leverage to take advantage of federal subsidies, putting them on par with their IOU 
counterparts. 
      Basin’s “asset,” the Dakota Gasification Company is a for-profit subsidiary 
owned and operated by Basin.  Originally owned by the Department of Energy as part of 
a settled foreclosure from a private firm, Dakota Gasification was purchased by Basin in 
1988 for $85 million, significantly under market value.  The facility produces natural gas 
from coal, serving as both a peaking plant to ensure grid reliability, and as a hedge 
against volatile natural gas prices (Bettenhausen, 2011).  The coal is sourced from a 
nearby mine owned by Basin, which allows the electric co-operative to produce natural 
gas at fixed cost. 
      Dakota Gasification has been extremely aggressive in capital investments directed 
at controlling input costs and driving down their overall production costs (the plant is one 
of the few facilities globally that captures CO2 emissions, which is then sold to Canadian 
firms who use the waste product to extract oil from the Alberta tar sands).  This forward 
thinking has allowed the synthfuels facility to produce healthy margins in an otherwise 
volatile natural gas marketplace.  Dakota Gasification remains structured as for-profit, so 
as to have a tax appetite. This allows the facility to utilize a number of tax advantages 
reserved for coal-to-natural gas and carbon sequestration innovation.  The result is an end 
product with remarkable price stability; in bust times, gas prices come below market 
costs, and in boom times the profit margins are exceptional.  The facility has served three 
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advantageous purposes for Basin as they began the development phase of their new wind 
farm.   
      First, the facility serves a backup power role to back up the wind farm whenever 
the turbines fail to generate per forecasts.  The peaking role provides additional system 
reliability.  Plus the infrastructure can withstand sporadic utilization: 
The existing conventional plants provide system reliability, and there is no cost 
associated with additional backup for system reliability.  The only incremental 
costs are those associated with minute-to-minute and day-to-day operation, 
generally referred to as ancillary services costs (Demeo, 2003). 
 
The utilization of natural gas generation and outdated power plants is a standard practice 
used by energy generators to leverage low-margin, older generation facilities for systemic 
redundancy. 
      Second, Basin has a co-operative institutional responsibility to provide wind 
energy at rates competitive with their IOU counterparts.  Basin engineers and planners 
are keen to point out that when it comes to any major capital investment, they explore all 
available options, including the purchase of profit-oriented firms.  The government 
incentives available for co-operatives to develop wind energy are not on parity with what 
is available to IOUs.  Since end-consumer cost was of utmost concern, Basin was able to 
use their experience running a for-profit subsidiary, Dakota Gasification, and to structure 
their wind farm as an IOU.  The only way for Basin to take advantage of government 
subsidies was to exhibit a tax liability.  The obvious choice was for Basin to structure 
PrairieWinds as a for-profit, limited liability corporation.  Basin would be the sole owner 
of the wind farm, but the subsidiary is structured as a profit-generating investment for tax 
purposes.  When asked how this would impact the integrity of the co-operative model, a 
Basin official noted: 
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 Oh, there’s no concern there, whatsoever.  It’s all managed under the same  
governance structure, which is a co-op.  Everything housed under it has to  
follow those guidelines.  The co-op will always have the final say. 
 
The wind farm would have to adhere to Basin’s standards.  And those standards dictate 
that all services underneath Basin’s operational umbrella are owned in common by the 
co-operative-membership.  This arrangement provides Basin with all of the advantages of 
a firm with a tax liability while remaining nested and governed within a co-operative 
organization. 
      Third, Basin was also able to take the taxable earnings generated by Dakota 
Gasification (hundreds of millions) and invest it in PrairieWinds.  The PTC allowed 
Basin to maintain a sizeable share of their taxable earnings and direct the retained capital 
as an investment in the wind farm.  The PTC, coupled with the MACRS, significantly 
drove down costs, attracted capital from within Basin’s subsidiary, lowered their tax 
burden, and enabled Basin to justify the construction of the nation’s first co-operative 
wind farm (Association Official, personal communication, August 9, 2011). 
      Federated governance, trust, and the principle of subsidiarity.  Operating a 
super co-operative like Basin could feasibly result in organizational crisis due to a 
number of collective action dilemmas.  Basin is comprised of over 135 member-co-
operatives, any one of which could act in accordance with its own organizational interest.  
The siting of transmission lines and generators is placed-based, meaning a host 
community will reap some level of benefit with regards to jobs, leases, and property tax 
revenues (and incur some conflict from various local opposition groups).  Member-co-
operatives, acting individually or in coalitions, could organize to wield inordinate 
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influence over any number of Basin’s operational decisions.  Yet it seems as though 
conflict is non-existent or at least went undetected to this researcher. 
      It would be a misrepresentation of the electric co-operative system to claim 
electric co-operatives operate within a hierarchy; that would imply domineering actors 
with authority over other co-operatives. Directives come about via collective action 
practices that have evolved and adapted over decades.  Polycentric governance is an 
appropriate label.  Each organization has a structured governance system, designating 
clear roles and responsibilities, while attempting to maximize the various specializations 
inherent in a given co-operative.  Member-co-operatives remain interdependent, yet 
sufficiently autonomous.   
      Basin is capable of providing a gamut of services to the broader co-operative 
system.  But Basin runs most efficiently when they can contract specific services out to a 
member-co-operative, thereby reducing redundant service provision.  The entire co-
operative system benefits when each co-operative is collaborative on one hand, but is also 
individually entrepreneurial on the other.  Basin could harm innovation if they were to 
get overly involved in their member-co-operative’s functions.  This principle of 
subsidiarity is critical for optimal operations within the electric co-operative system in 
that the practice promotes polycentric approaches (what one co-operative creates, literally 
hundreds could learn from).  The polycentric approach respects autonomy of the 
member-co-operatives, and reinforces self-governing capacities by internalization of 
entrepreneurship.    
      Basin is tasked with providing wholesale energy on behalf of the co-operative-
ownership, and has cultivated decades of trust by amiably meeting those ends.  The past 
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experience of a past North Dakota electric co-operative association official dictates that 
Basin will do its best to ensure various beneficial development externalities are spread 
throughout its member-co-operative system and their communities.  Broadly speaking, 
electric co-operatives have cultivated a culture respecting operational specialization and 
service territory (another emanation of the conservative, risk adverse culture stemming 
from longstanding, traditional practices).  Prior experience and positive outcomes means 
that Basin member-co-operatives have vested a great deal of trust in their super G&T to 
meet organizational needs. 
     An institutional logic seems to have developed around electric co-operatives 
where at-cost energy production is the primary operational mission driving outcomes, 
furthering adherence to bureaucratic and operational efficiency.  This core mission helps 
electric co-operatives to focus intently on optimizing core competencies.  “The highest 
quality at the lowest cost” is the oft-repeated mantra observed across a number of electric 
co-operative interviews.  While this mantra was repeated by many of the electric co-
operative representatives at a number of levels (distribution, generation and transmission, 
super G&T co-operatives, and associations), the variation of interpretation depends on 
the level or specialization of the electric co-operative.  Those electric co-operatives closer 
to a place-based service territory - distribution co-operatives - see providing cheap 
electricity, along with community and economic development services, as the cost of 
meeting the needs of their member-owners (individuals, families and businesses within 
their service territory).  This contrasts with those co-operatives operating within a larger 
scale and different service orientation -such as Basin- who view cost from a much 
narrower vantage point; producing energy and marketing services to their owner-co-
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operatives.  This is due to Basin’s specialized responsibility of providing competitively 
priced wholesale services to electric co-operative institutions.  Basin member-co-
operatives add value to the commodity and distribute the procured goods to their 
member-owners within a given service territory. 
      Co-operatives serve their members, not a bank or shareholders.  Basin services 
direct organizational needs of representatives of groupings of electric co-operatives, 
spatially situated across vast terrains.  Basin’s field of membership is the electric co-
operatives themselves.  Basin’s primary concern is to then meet the needs of their co-
operative-owners, not necessarily the local communities within its service territory. It is 
then incumbent upon the intervening owner-co-operatives to transmit and transform those 
assets.  The individual co-operatives then are tasked to package and distribute these assets 
within the identified value proposition of their member-ownership. 
      This dynamic helps to explain the differing emphases of the co-operative 
organizations nested within a shared, coordinated systems: the emphases need not be 
contentious.  In actuality, the design of the system and rules in use –particularly the 
principle of subsidiarity- seems to enhance the development functions of electric 
distribution co-operatives.  Basin-owned projects such as PrairieWinds are designed to 
capture as much value as possible for the member-co-operatives, while limiting risks, 
externalities, and reducing wholesale costs of electricity.  The owner-co-operatives are 
able to receive those optimized services by letting Basin laser-in on Basin’s core 
competencies.  Basin in essence is a capacity-builder, providing assets that enable their 
member-co-operatives.  If Basin is driven to spread development benefits widely, they 
must have a process justifying where to expend resources and address why one member-
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co-operative benefits above another.  What led Basin to site PrairieWinds in the backyard 
of one of their member-co-operatives, Verendrye Electric Co-operative (VEC)? 
With Nine States, 135 Member Co-operatives, and One New Wind Farm, Why 
Minot North Dakota? 
 
      Basin officials noted (Association Official, personal communication, August 9, 
2011) that North Dakota’s enabling policy environment makes the state a friendly place 
to develop wind.  State policy, expressed by the North Dakota Industrial Commission 
(NDIC), views North Dakota energy reserves as a source of economic development.  
NDIC’s aggressive internal goals “of increasing North Dakota’s installed capacity of 
wind generation to 5,000 megawatts by 2020” ("North Dakota Transmission Authority," 
2009, p. 2) and various tax incentive mechanisms means the state is fully behind 
increasing the means of resource extraction and export.  NDIC is also actively involved 
in extracting the region’s oil and wind resources for export.  The signal of political will 
and desire to see such projects proliferate within the state has played a role in limiting 
public opposition while gaining the attention of global energy development firms. 
      A Basin official, when asked why Ward County, North Dakota was chosen as the 
host community of PrairieWinds, noted that the biophysical attributes of the area played 
as role.  North Dakota is resource-rich territory for wind energy: the land is flat and 
expansive (Association Official, personal communication, August 9, 2011).  Ward 
County’s elevation is the highest in North Dakota contributing to a robust wind regime 
(North Dakota is ranked as the state with the most capacity for producing wind energy 
("American Wind Energy Association," 2012a)).  Cultivation of Ward County’s wind 
regime could be readily harvested and transmitted over Basin’s nearby transmission lines, 
limiting extensive infrastructural investment.  It also didn’t hurt that Ward County is a 
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little over an hour’s drive from the Basin headquarters in Bismarck, North Dakota, so the 
wind farm would be within quick driving proximity of key staff.  But perhaps the most 
important factor has to do with the perceived strength of public entrepreneurship by one 
of Basin’s member-co-operatives. 
      The story of PrairieWinds is really the story of a co-operative partnership: Basin 
and VEC.  Organizational leadership and entrepreneurship were cited as key factors in 
siting PrairieWinds in Ward County.  Basin officials knew they could count on the 
leadership of VEC for a myriad of challenges that might arise.  Indeed, a number of state 
and local official who are heavily involved in electric co-operatives claimed VEC to be 
one of the most progressive, entrepreneurial electric co-operatives in the nation (one 
prominent co-operative developer suggests VEC is “the most progressive electric co-
operative in the U.S.”).33 
      VEC has a champion-type leader as their general manager (GM). He is held in 
high esteem by his peers: “VEC’s General Manager was easily one of the key factors in 
choosing Minot.  He kept pushing that member service territory is where the wind 
infrastructure should go to capture and maximize the economic benefits for co-op 
members” (Association Official, personal communication, August 9, 2011).  VEC’s GM 
is a second generation electric co-operative GM, his father having preceded him (and 
served as one of the original founders of the co-operative).  The GM noted: “Co-ops tend 
to stay in the family.  It’s in the blood.”  No doubt this long-term exposure to electric co-
operatives has helped this GM see the potential capabilities of electric co-operatives.  
Having grown up in a household supported by career in the sector, VEC’s GM possesses 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33     VEC partners with the U.S. Department of Energy on Smart Grid technologies, and participates in a pioneering hydrogen-fuel 
program.   
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a great deal of historical and logistical knowledge.  VEC is then more likely to try new 
initiatives that might otherwise dissuade the newer, more cautious electric co-operative 
leaders. 
      A third critical factor for Basin decision to build in Ward County was a wind farm 
proof of concept, carried out by VEC.  Basin speculated in the 90’s that wind would 
become a necessary part of their generating portfolio and wanted to be prepared to act 
when their member-co-operatives demanded it of them.  VEC has an aggressive track 
record of being an early adopter of new technologies.  As wind energy became a likely 
Basin venture (thanks in part to favorable cost projections), VEC’s GM set staff to assess 
Ward County’s wind regime, recruiting the use of MET towers in the early 2000’s to 
measure the local wind regime.  The positive results allowed Basin to justify the 
construction a pilot project (the Minot Wind Project’s two turbines).  VEC not only 
procured a PPA on behalf of Basin (the MAFB became the sole long-term purchaser of 
the wind power), but also agreed to maintain the turbines (Co-operative Official, personal 
communication, August 15, 2011), alleviating excess burden from Basin.  Once 
constructed, the two turbines operated with no identifiable controversy, created a curious 
site on the landscape, and provided lease and property tax revenue in a “dying” rural 
township and school district (the initial two test turbines raised significant revenue: 1st 
year at $50,000; 2nd year at $120,000; 3rd year at $400,000). 
      Developing the nation’s first utility-scale co-operative wind farm.  VEC plied 
their deep political and social capital within the community toward the initial project, and 
the wind energy development paid dividends (no doubt, the involvement of the MAFB 
added an element of legitimacy to the project as well, engaging a number of tangible and 
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symbolic trust and reciprocity elements).  The initial success of the Minot Wind Project 
cultivated a community perception that wind energy development would be a net gain 
(Local Resident, personal communication, December 8, 2011).  Prior success then 
allowed VEC to take on riskier projects with their member-ownership’s consent. 
      Once Ward County became the obvious location for Basin’s utility-scale wind 
farm, the adherence to the principle of subsidiarity played a critical role for the 
advancement of PrairieWind.  Basin partnered with VEC and capitalized on VEC’s social 
and political capital to prosper efforts toward the realization of the PrairieWinds project.  
In fact, Basin stepped back and let the GM –an actor with a great deal of local knowledge 
and community trust- perform a large amount of the community organizing work.  Basin 
came to Ward County when VEC’s GM needed additional support (typically in a 
supplementary or contract-related manner, and never for damage control purposes).   
      A constant throughout the interviews was the lack of expressed concern by actors 
within the two co-operative organizations that the efforts in Ward County would be 
perceived as a solely VEC or Basin project.  The subsidiarity principle, as practiced by 
these two institutions, means that -amongst the pool of participants interviewed in this 
research- Basin and VEC are often perceived by local residents as virtually the same 
entity.  A Ward County resident noted, “Basin is as well liked as VEC” (School Official, 
personal communication, August 16, 2011).  Both co-operative actors built trust and 
operated with the perception of integrity, mutually reinforcing public perception of the 
two co-operatives. 
      Going into the project, VEC’s GM did indeed capitalize on the earlier success of 
the Minot Wind Project.  The proposed addition of 70 turbines (115.5 megawatt) 
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promised to exponentially enhance prior outcomes.  Community meetings were 
organized by VEC to spread awareness and built consent around the development of the 
wind farms.  The meetings were often held at the local school that stood to benefit the 
most from the tax revenue from the new wind farm, serving as symbolic reinforcement of 
“things to come.” 
      VEC went about a strategy intended to further build trust and create buy-in.  A 
VEC executive expressed a central rationale for the adherence to transparency: “There are 
a number of fly by night operations muddying the picture.  We didn’t want to 
misrepresent the project or get people’s hopes up” (Association Official, personal 
communication, August 17, 2011).  The GM set up landowner meetings, making 
connections with local regulatory officials to speed the process along.  Basin, directed by 
VEC’s GM, built even greater linkages amongst the stakeholders of the project, meeting 
privately and publicly with local landowners, township and city officials. 
      Early on, VEC reached out to local hunting, wildlife and environmental interests, 
relegated largely to birders, hunters, and Sierra Club members.  The GM was aggressive 
in preempting local protestation (no organized opposition was documented in this field 
research).  One local birder explained succinctly how the GM earned his trust: “The co-
op management lives here, so they care more about the community” (Local Resident, 
personal communication, August 10, 2011). 
      While no names were offered up, a few interviewees claimed that a number of 
locals didn’t want the turbines.  The claims from two interviewees were that a lot of the 
property applicable to wind energy development is absentee-owned farmland.  The 
farming interests are not necessarily in alignment with the interests of residential 
!!
! 163!
landowners within the vicinity of the development.  Farmland owners viewed wind as yet 
another source of revenue from the land.  The explicit negative feedback from the 
interviewees was constrained largely to aesthetic issues.  One local farmer hosting two 
PrairieWinds turbines on his farmland noted that with regards to the changing landscape, 
the formerly endless blue sky is now dotted with turbines “but you get used to it.” 
      An executive from VEC noted that one of the leading farmer proponents who 
leases land for two Basin turbines is now regretting his decision.  The executive 
suggested that farmer’s voice be incorporated in this research.  When this particular 
farmer was asked about his regrets; he stated, “oh, I wouldn’t go that far.  If I had to do it 
all over again, I probably would.”  When this anecdote was relayed back to the VEC 
executive, his response was “well, what the Hell?  I suppose he just doesn’t want to start 
any trouble.  Well, ok…” The farmer did sign a contract with a trusted local leader.  
Perhaps the farmer didn’t want to be seen as feeling betrayed or lacking trust, particular 
after the public efforts put forward by the co-operatives to secure his buy-in. 
      Basin officials frequently hosted public educational events on potential legal and 
technical issues.  Basin exhibited remarkable openness with regards to community 
dialogue, getting in front of controversial issues related to wind energy development 
(turbine noise, shadow flicker, electro-magnetism, etc.); anecdotally, this researcher had 
not observed such dialogue in analyses of four other IOU wind energy development 
projects.  The two co-operatives used these presentations for informal assurances that 
were parlayed them into formal assurances and agreements.  A Basin official noted: 
“Have you seen how much up front money we spend on impact assessments?! Well over 
$1 million” (Association Official, personal communication, August 17, 2011). 
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      Basin and VEC officials would often contrast their practices to those of the IOUs 
speculating on wind energy development in the region.  Basin officials were quick to 
compare how the speculators treated local landowners (Association Official, personal 
communication, August 17, 2011).  Basin officials were proud to note they paid 
prospective lessors $10 an acre for a three year speculative lease, plus a thousand dollar 
stipend for a lawyer to review the lease terms.  VEC would encourage the landowning 
lessors to work together, pool their money, and hire a shared legal team.  In comparison, 
the IOUs were known for 10 to 20 year-long speculative lease terms at $1 a year with no 
legal stipend. 
      Basin –and VEC- had complete buy-in from their identified landowner base.  
Basin was keen to accommodate, working intently with local landowners as to where to 
locate the roads and access points.  The co-operatives noted the importance of limiting 
the disturbance to local landowners, expressing extreme caution has been extended 
toward the maintenance and upkeep of turbine access roads and security gates.  Even 
then, the best-laid plans don’t always work out accordingly.  A Basin executive: 
 You know, we sat down with all of these guys and ran a number of scenarios as  
to where to situate the access roads (we did not want to interfere with the crop  
harvest).  Now we have a couple of these guys who call us up and moan about 
how the access roads are a pain for their harvesters to get around.  I mean, they 
told us to build the road in the same spot they’re now in a fit about!  Thankfully, I 
can point to the minutes of these meeting and locate where they told us to build a 
given road (Association Official, personal communication, August 17, 2011). 
 
      The early preparatory work paid off.  Basin performed the due diligence, and 
lined up the access agreements to the grid, procured investment monies from their 
subsidiary Dakota Gasification, and set VEC to work on cultivating the host community.  
VEC made quick work of local government regulators, and rapidly built up the 
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community trust and landowner buy-in necessary to deploy the infrastructure.  The long-
running cultivation of the community by VEC meant that from start to finish 
PrairieWinds took eight months to complete, whereas Horizon in McLean County, 
Illinois took years.  Long-term trust building, and strong relationships made for rapid 
deployment of the $250 million project ("Basin Electric," 2009).  
Direct Development Outcomes of PrairieWinds 
      Measuring the long-term development outcomes of any wind farm is difficult to 
do; there is no coordinated effort to track the longitudinal outcomes on local 
communities.  PrairieWinds is no different.  That said, interviews uncovered five areas of 
development the PrairieWinds project has contributed to:  a short burst of local economic 
stimulus, price stability for VEC’s member-owners, lease agreements, jobs, and the area 
property tax base. 
      PrairieWinds, like other wind farms, appears to have a significant upfront impact 
during the construction phase.  The wind farm represents a $250 million investment in a 
relatively small area.  Building-tradespeople came from all over North Dakota and 
surrounding states.  Hotels were booked up, and eateries were at capacity.  As time 
elapses, and PrairieWinds shifted to an operational wind farm, the direct outcomes 
became further muted.  The grandeur of the oil boom has quickly diminished the 
perceived impacts of PrairieWinds; to many in the community, it was just another energy 
project.  Local taxing entities and a select few property-owners benefit the most from 
new revenue streams via lease agreements, and a handful of jobs are created. 
      VEC’s local member-owners benefit financially, though only marginally.  
PrairieWinds produces electricity at a very stable, competitive rate thanks in part to the 
!!
! 166!
PTC and a secured PPA.  Like many co-operatives, VEC returns excess margins or 
“capital credits” to their member-owners as opposed to distributing the profits to outside 
investors ("Recognize any names," 2009, p. 7).  As consumers, the member-owners are 
further shielded from volatile electricity prices, and their co-operative network become 
more independent from external rent-seeking actors. 
      The landowners receive a guarantee of $4000 per turbine per year.  These leases 
are secured by Basin for 40 years.  Note that the duration of the lease agreements are 
longer than McLean’s Horizon wind farms, and the lease agreements are significantly 
less.  Additionally, Basin did not offer good neighbor agreement like Horizon.  This is 
because Basin was not seeking acquiescence nor attempting to maximize profit, so much 
as keeping their overhead costs low: “Remember, the IOU’s owners are the shareholders, 
not the consumers.  The co-op’s concern is also for their owners, who are the consumers.  
Our goal is high quality at the lowest price for everyone” (Association Official, personal 
communication, August 17, 2011). 
      Basin executives are quick to point out that a co-operative-owned wind farm will 
have lower lease rates but a higher number of employees (PrairieWinds directly created 8 
new jobs to maintain the turbines).  A corporate wind farm will attempt to keep labor 
costs and total employment down yet pay higher value leases to gain acquiescence. In 
order to do this, these IOUs will contract out to firms that specialize in maintaining wind 
farms.  To maximize profits, these firms operate with a barebones staff and constrain 
services (Wind Developer, personal communication, November 8, 2011).  So, up front, 
the co-operative wind farm does provide more direct employment from the co-op itself, 
but pays out less in lease agreements over longer periods of time.  The co-operative’s 
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emphasis here is on optimizing operating costs to lower overhead while enhancing 
service and decreasing retail costs to the co-operative’s member-ownership. 
      Local government also benefited from the development of PrairieWinds, with 
Ward County receiving a modest increase in revenue.  The rural township hosting 
PrairieWinds captured a great deal of new tax revenue as well as new infrastructure built 
by Basin.  But it was a local school that benefitted most.   
      The South Prairie Public School District used to be considered Ward County’s 
“poor” K-8th grade school district (the principal insisted this label stuck for over 50 
years).  The District was experiencing a steady reduction in rural residents and a parallel 
decrease in property tax revenue.  But the oil boom and the construction of PrairieWinds 
has changed all of that.  The one-building school now has an enhanced stream of revenue 
from PrairieWinds (and the new residential properties being built to house in-migrants).  
The District recently completed over $5 million in new renovations.  The School’s 
principal was emphatic that the wind farm has been a substantial net benefit to his 
District. 
      PrairieWinds has certainly contributed to the material betterment of actors within 
Ward County.  There are new jobs, new sources of income for landowners, and 
significantly increased revenue streams for local government agencies.  But looking at a 
co-operative’s impact based solely on financial measures obscures the organizational 
outcomes.  The standardized financialization of performance indicators does a disservice 
to understanding the complex patterns of activity performed by a co-operative (Borzaga 
& Galera, 2012).  This is where the incorporation of actor voices from the field matters.  
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Through these methods of inquiry, a number of noteworthy co-operative development 
activities were uncovered. 
      Indirect development outcomes: Enhancing the capacity of electric co-
operatives to build community.  North Dakota has a legacy of aggressive co-operative 
development.  During one particularly aggressive era of development led by the North 
Dakota Association of Electric Co-operatives (in the late 80’s and early 90’s), a number 
of successful co-operatives stimulated significant economic growth.  (One of those 
successful co-operatives, Dakota Growers Pasta, would eventually be privatized by their 
producer-owner farmers for over $240 million.)  This era of rapid growth in co-operatives 
was dubbed “Coop Fever” and received the Associated Press Story of the Year in 1991 
(Patrie, 1998).   
      The legacy of co-operative entrepreneurship appears culturally important.  Stable, 
long-lasting co-operatives in North Dakota seem oriented toward more than just 
maximization of the bottom line: prominent North Dakotan co-operatives have a broader 
community orientation.  Basin and VEC are two leading organizations with these regards.   
      PrairieWinds is directly owned by Basin.  But VEC –via the principle of 
subsidiarity- represents and is empowered by Basin within Ward.  VEC knows their 
community far better than Basin, and Basin would therefore rather VEC performs 
community and economic development on their behalf.  For the purposes of analyses, it’s 
important to realize that Basin builds capacity for VEC, and VEC converts that capacity 
into development and mobilization within their community.  Institutional logic and 
practice matters. 
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      These electric co-operatives are mature, and always adapting.  PrairieWinds -or 
any other major development initiative for that matter- did not necessarily stimulate new 
development endeavors so much as enhance the capacity of VEC’s culture of community 
engagement.  The GM sees VEC as more than just an electric utility, and PrairieWinds 
enriches that value proposition.   
      The VEC distribution co-operative is widely respected within Ward County, 
throughout the region, and by its peers in the electric co-operative sector as one of the 
most progressive electric co-operatives in the nation (Co-operative Association Official, 
personal communication, September 8, 2010; Local Resident, personal communication, 
August 8, 2011).  The obvious reason why an electric co-operative like VEC garners such 
deep respect is due to the level of tangible, material development performed.   
      Were it not for VEC dynamism, the PrairieWinds wind farm may have been 
constructed elsewhere.  VEC has been an aggressive early adopter of renewable energy 
and next generation electric energy technology.  VEC has partnered with the U.S. 
Department of Energy on a hydrogen energy vehicle project, as well as Smart Grid 
technologies allowing them to provide enhanced cost-savings to their member-owners 
through remote management of water heaters.  VEC’s entrepreneurship puts them on the 
forefront for testing and deploying new technologies from Basin and DoE. 
      Interviews and interactions with the GM exhibited a broad ranging perspective of 
the operational and community development activities a co-operative is capable of 
performing.  VEC’s GM’s entrepreneurial acumen is recognized amongst colleagues 
(Association Official, personal communication, August 9, 2011); VEC is seemingly 
always looking toward new endeavors, and engaged in organizational development of its 
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staff and member-ownership.  Organizational leadership plied to a vision for the 
community is a critical component to the development impacts of PrairieWinds and VEC.  
One part of that vision is the growth of new organizations to meet local needs. 
      The state’s largest telephone co-operative, SRT, was founded in the 1950’s by the 
board of VEC (“History,” n.d.).  As alluded to earlier, VEC was actively involved in the 
“Coop Fever” era, helping new co-operatives form around the state via financial and 
technical assistance.  VEC, using its extensive network to procure resources, worked in 
nearby Berthold, North Dakota to procure USDA Rural Development grant funds 
($300,000) to help build a new child care center ("USDA Rural Development," 2012).  
VEC also worked with regional co-operatives to help fund the Quentin Burdick Center 
for Co-operative Studies at North Dakota State University (Co-operative Official, 
personal communication, August 15, 2011), which focuses largely on agricultural issues 
over co-operative issues.   
      VEC’s influence is also felt directly in local civic activities.  Organizationally, 
VEC engages and encourages its labor force to participate in local civic groups; VEC 
employees are reimbursed for their membership fees in local organizations.  Civic 
engagement endeavors also extends to the member-ownership. 
      VEC makes a good-faith effort to involve their member-ownership in 
participating in co-operative governance; transparency is critical.  The website and new 
member-ownership orientation material comes with an Owner Guide, detailing how 
member-owners can get engaged (Borzaga & Galera, 2012).  In recent years, VEC has 
gone so far as to create a Member Advisory Committee, open to the public.  The purpose 
of the committee is to build new venues to engage the member-owners in an iterative 
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dialogue that builds organizational policy.  The Committee began with 12 participants in 
2007, and has recently grown to over 80 active participants, a number of which have 
since run for and won positions on the board.  As a final note, VEC’s annual general 
membership meeting pulls 3500 people from their base of 8800 households.  When the 
GM was asked how he achieves significant turnout, his response was simple: “A carnival 
and raffle for TVs and such.  We make it a fun, family affair.  That gets them out every 
time” (Co-operative Official, personal communication, August 15, 2011). 
      These features of VEC are important.  Observations of VEC demonstrate the 
organization’s development potential.  The co-operative is directly engaging their 
member-ownership –and by extension the community- in tangible civic endeavors.  The 
Member Advisory Committee not only fosters a “farm team” for new board members, but 
also elevates the member-ownership into the decision-making apparatus of the co-
operative.  Whereas an IOU treats their consumers as passive, VEC is cultivating actors 
in governance, entrepreneurship, and development.  Or to put it another way: Democracy.  
“Learning to craft rules that attract and encourage individuals who share norms of 
reciprocity and trustworthiness, or who learn them over time, is a fundamental skill 
needed in all democratic societies” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 133).  VEC serves as a stabilizing 
force for community governance.  Community wealth and decision making authority is 
rooted locally.  This is of critical importance for a community enduring a series of 
disruptive events (the energy boom, the flood, in-migration, etc.).  
      What the co-operative is doing appears on its face to be the necessary requisites 
for building civic actors and enhancing community governance.  But just how 
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empowered are the newly initiated to contribute significantly to the local social system?  
Is structural change possible?  Or might another impediment be at play? 
      Co-opting governance: What role has the growth machine?  Social systems 
are complicated.  There is no doubt that VEC is building the capacity of actors in their 
community work collectively.  But VEC is nested in a number of networks.  And those 
networks determine the types of resources available, as well as the constraints and 
capabilities of VEC and those that VEC seeks to empower.  But might VEC limit the 
extent to which the organization would support substantive, and possibly necessary, 
social structural change?  
Figure 11.  Ward County local level actors with wind energy developers 
 
 
 
      If the two case studies in this research are any indication, the vital, local groups 
VEC and Basin interfaced with may be part and parcel of the standard wind energy 
development processes.  These are the key actors (Figure 11) which regulate and interact 
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with a wind farm once construction is completed and the wind farm is operational.  The 
issue here is two-fold.  First, the actors in this network represent the textbook growth 
machine coalition, individuals with strong incentives to prosper economic growth.  
Property-owners and local business owners are in growth mode, seeking to capitalize on 
the oil boom and other development endeavors.  The agricultural community sees 
farmland as a revenue-generating commodity.  The local governmental bodies have a 
revenue incentive to see more property development (property tax revenue), so their 
values are also in line with these groups.   
      All interview participants in these groups noted that the Minot Area Development 
Corporation (MADC) is the prime mover of development endeavors in Minot.  MADC 
appears to be a bridging or brokering organization, connecting the growth machine 
interests to critical resources.  Indeed, the MADC board is comprised of government, 
agricultural, financial, commercial, property, and energy interests, including the GM of 
VEC.  Interview participants widely viewed MADC as an aggressive force for local 
prosperity, noting their central role in driving the oil boom (“Minot Area Development 
Corporation,” n.d.a).  But one local had strong misgivings about the direction of the 
community under the vision of MADC: “It’s mad.  People don’t see that they are digging 
their own graves.  They are selling this community to extractive industries that could give 
a damn about our livelihoods.  The chickens are going to come home to roost” (Local 
Resident, personal communication, August 8, 2011). 
      Second, many of the organizations in the community’s growth machine network 
have representative figures serving on VEC’s board of directors (“Verendrye Electric 
Cooperative,” n.d.).  Some of these directors have multiple growth machine connections.  
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Six of the nine directors have agricultural interests, two of which are involved in 
government, and one in homebuilding.   
      The underlying logic of the growth machine perspective is that the logic of actors 
within these groups tilts toward a profit orientation through capture of the instruments of 
governance.  It would seem to be evident that prominent local organizations interacting 
with the development and operation of PrairieWinds and VEC are indeed governed by 
these interests.  As one farmer noted about the wind farm: “The wind isn’t for ND.  It’s 
for export” (Local Farmer, personal communication, August 14, 2011). 
      The VEC is stewarded by a number of actors (the staff, the GM, the board, and 
the member-owners) representing any number of interests.  What if the growth machine 
plays in an inordinate role in stewarding the direction of Verendryre?  There is no doubt 
that as the oil boom continues unabated; the growth machine coalition seems to gain 
greater control over stewarding local resources.  Growth machine organizations such as 
MADC and the Chamber of Commerce are leading.  The policies the growth machine 
coalition is pushing seems geared toward growth and bureaucratic efficiency.  The 
principal of the South Prairie Public School District noted that despite his district’s recent 
resurgence and robustness, the business logic of centralizing governance permeating the 
town has resulted in a call for the consolidation of school districts.  Out of town firms are 
being courted to develop and purchase local property.  The School District is being 
pressured to entice an Oregon property development with interest in developing 500 
housing units within its tax jurisdiction (“the development will bring in property tax 
revenue, but they want us to accommodate some of the wishes of the developer” (School 
Official, personal communication, August 16, 2011)).  Localized ownership of business 
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and property diminishing, albeit with the support of the growth machine coalition.  This 
means governance is shifting toward larger, private corporations operating from a great 
distance away. 
     There exists a sense that external actors are playing a more prominent role in local 
governance.  This role is encouraged by the growth machine coalition.  How do actors in 
the growth machine see the role of VEC?  Do they view it as just another generator of 
revenue for local property owners and developers?  And is the growth machine 
compromising or coopting the integrity of the VEC by using it as an enabling conduit? 
      VEC’s integrity was recently put to the test.   
      The Mouse River Flood of 2011.  The Mouse River Flood of the summer of 
2011 was a major blow to Ward County.  The flooding displaced over 10,000 people, 
with over 4000 housing units being destroyed.  Some of the businesses that benefitted 
most from the economic boom were reluctant to assist in disaster mitigation and 
recovery.   
      For-profit businesses were criticized for being stingy (Co-operative Official, 
personal communication, August 15, 2011).  After some level of shaming, the local Wal-
Mart eventually contributed over $100,000 in food aid (Local Resident, personal 
communication, August 10, 2011).  Public officials reached out to the energy companies, 
asking them to contribute their labor force and heavy machinery toward mitigating the 
flood damage.  A local city official recounted how the oil companies refused to divert 
their operational staff to securing the dykes, and instead cut a check for a million dollars.  
The problem was that the money could only go so far since the oil companies were 
already using the stock of heavy machinery available in the region.  The local school 
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official interviewed conveyed the thoughts of one oil exec who felt disgusted that his 
company thought they could buy their way out of local community obligations during the 
flood (School Official, personal communication, August 16, 2011). 
      VEC was a leader before, during, and after the flood.  As the floodwaters began to 
rise, VEC set forth a number of directives.  VEC announced that once their critical 
facilities were secured, they would divert their heavy machinery and labor force toward 
mitigating the rising floodwaters.  Staff was given paid time to participate in building 
dykes and tossing sand bags despite the impact this would have on their margins (Co-
operative Official, personal communication, August 15, 2011).  The co-operative also 
wanted to send a clear message to its member-owners that they –the member-owners- 
would not be held liable for flood-related damage to VEC’s infrastructure: 
The co-op has told consumer-members that late fees, facility charges,  
disconnection and reconnection fees related to the flooding would be waived, said 
Rafferty. “We know that recovering from this flood is going to take a while and 
we want to help our members through these difficult times (Holly, 2011). 
 
 VEC practiced frequent, open channels of communication to the broader community in 
order to send clear signals as to the services they would be offering, and the 
responsibilities they would be taking on. 
      Once it became apparent that the floodwaters would breach the dykes, VEC began 
to set its sites on planning for recovery once the waters receded.  VEC and Basin were 
instrumental in setting the philanthropic standard for disaster recovery in the area.  VEC 
and Basin offered critical resources for those displaced by the flood.  Basin voluntarily 
offered a plot of land to FEMA for temporary housing facilities, and VEC wired the 
encampment at their own cost.   
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      VEC was able to marshal its extensive network of co-operatives to assist with 
disaster recovery in Minot (Holly, 2012).  CoBank, the SRT telecom co-operative and 
VEC together pooled contributions totaling over $50,000 to the Red Cross (Cunningham, 
2011).  VEC reached out to their national electric co-operative network to pull down 
hundreds of thousands of dollars from other electric co-operatives for recovery efforts 
("Verendrye to waive charges for accounts without power," 2011).   When four of their 
employees lost their homes, VEC’s board of directors approved a 50/50 match program 
to help, raising over $12,000 in assistance.   
     It is estimated that the flooding has resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars of 
damage (“Federal infrastructure aid,” 2012).  It will take years before Minot stabilizes, 
particularly with the escalating oil boom.  Nonetheless, local officials made it clear that 
VEC, in partnership with Basin, set the gold standard by which volunteer and 
philanthropic recovery endeavors adhered.  This despite total flood costs to VEC adding 
up to over $2.4 million (though VEC may quality to have upwards of 90 percent of their 
costs covered by FEMA)). 
Conclusion 
      The operational features of VEC during the floods may serve as an extreme 
example of how a firm exhibiting a not-for-profit, member-owned governance structure 
functions when individuals within its service territory need help the most.  The GM and 
the staff are persistently involved in maintaining and enhancing the community 
interactive features of the co-operative.  Such persistent engagement reinforces broad 
levels of trust, a feeling of connectivity, and the capability to reach out to the member-
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owners and get them involved when critical issues arise.  As the flood highlights, VEC is 
then able to harness social capital in a way that promote stability and a sense of security. 
      Did the construction of PrairieWinds wind farm help develop Ward County’s 
community structure?  Not explicitly.  Could the VEC and Basin have done what it has 
(building local civics and entrepreneurship while leading the community during a 
disaster) without the wind farm?  Chances are, yes.   
      This is really more of a longitudinal question; the wind farm is both a hedge and 
an investment.  Regulation and climate change may threaten the carbon-based electric 
generators used by Basin.  Early adoption may help Basin and its member-co-operatives 
adapt to the future, smoothing any rough transitions and allowing member-co-operatives 
like VEC to continue with its public entrepreneurship.  Plus, by embedding electric 
generation capacity within Basin’s nested system of owner-co-operatives, the wind farms 
roots the community wealth, preventing capital flight.  
      Basin, VEC, and the material well being of the community are enhanced.  
      Locally, the construction of the wind farm did enhance the capacity of VEC.  But 
did it also strengthen the socio-economic grip of the growth machine?  One must look at 
the trajectory that has placed electric co-operatives on their current path. 
      The policy of universal national electrification has been a formal policy of the 
U.S. government since the 1930’s.  The kick-start granted to electric co-operatives by the 
government came about due to the unwillingness of the IOUs to participate in meeting 
the federal government’s desired policy outcome.  Electric co-operatives started out, by 
necessity, as agents of change and contestation against the IOUs in the governmental 
policy arena, but their service territories were by IOUs once established.  Electric co-
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operatives, by the very act of their formation, did engage in development activities at 
least until they became virtually permanent community staples.   
      As time has gone on and as residents have been born and raised with “always on” 
electricity, the electric co-operatives are being pressured into demonstrating a diverse 
value proposition beyond providing electricity (Co-operative Association Official, 
personal communication, September 8, 2010).  New in-migrants not necessarily familiar 
with the co-operative model take their electricity for granted (“I’ve always had it, so I 
never thought about it” (Local Official, personal communication, July 6, 2012)).  Electric 
co-operatives are increasingly having a difficult time defining themselves separately of 
the IOUs; distinguishing themselves on economic terms alone (higher pay to staff, lower 
executive compensation, and competitive rates) is increasingly a failing proposition.  This 
means that the integrity of the model is not being promoted as an incubator of civic 
engagement, entrepreneurship, and development, a critically important point for co-
operative practitioners to be cognizant of. 
      Unlike a solely market-based system, the co-operative system incorporates the 
voices of individuals in communities generating, transmitting, and consuming energy 
from co-operatives.  Presumably, better decisions would be made with regards to siting of 
infrastructure, compensation for the consumption of resources (land, air and water), and 
end-consumer costs.  But the strategic community development orientation of an electric 
co-operative can be diverted when influential actors –such as a growth machine- capture 
the firm.  This is where visionary leadership appears to matter. 
      The Ward County growth machine coalition does not seem to be controlling the 
direction of VEC, so much as it is being harnessed by the GM to maintain and elevate a 
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local civic culture.  It would not be accurate to say that VEC is actively changing the 
community social structure, ala the development orientation of the community interaction 
field approach.  But the engagement of member-owners in the Member Advisory 
Committee and the building of new organizations are important.  VEC is not developing 
community so much as building community capacity.  It’s an organization, which the 
mechanisms of governance remains rooted locally, waiting to be harnessed for 
community development.  That is a powerful mechanism that is not part and parcel of the 
IOU model of governance, and -as the GM of VEC demonstrates- leadership is a critical 
component for the maximization of those assets for community ends. 
      The polycentric nature of the electric co-operative system and VEC’s active 
participation is also critically important.  VEC is quite engaged in influencing the public 
policy of their federated organizations, such as NRECA.  Currently, VEC’s GM is 
attempting to influence other co-operatives to participate actively in local community 
capacity building (the NRECA-sponsored committee is called  “The 21st Century 
Committee”).  This is the importance of polycentric governance and knowledge 
transmission; VEC, one of over 900 electric co-operatives, can experiment, take risks, 
and share its success (or failures) with other electric co-operatives, thereby stimulating 
new initiatives strengthening the overall co-operative system. 
      That said, a number of concerns related to the integrity of the co-operative model 
and its community orientation remain.  For example, the electric co-operatives within the 
vicinity of the Bakken are enabling the ongoing shale oil development (Basin Electrical 
Newscenter, 2012). 
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Basin Electric has a lot of work to do around Mountrail-Williams Electric’s 
service territory to help meet the load growth, including building the Pioneer 
Generation Station, obtaining easements for the Antelope Valley Station-to-Neset 
345-kilovolt transmission line, and planning substation and microwave 
communication site additions. 
 
The unconditional support of the growth may actually be harmful to the member-
ownership of the electric co-operative member-ownership.  Local public services, 
particularly government services, are struggling to keep pace with need.  There is a 
critical shortage of housing, and local residents are expressing feelings of alienation.  The 
electric co-operative could serve as a balance and apply pressure to the oil firms 
contribute to enhanced community wellbeing.  But perhaps this is extending the 
responsibilities of co-operatives such as VEC beyond what is reasonable.  The point is 
that –depending on the leadership and the demands of the member-owners- VEC and 
other co-operatives could take on such a role; it is vitally important for co-operative 
stakeholders to understand the capabilities of a co-operative to enhance the livelihoods of 
those the institution is tasked to serve. 
      Regardless, it is clear that VEC and Basin are outliers not only in the wind energy 
sector, but also amongst their colleagues in the electric co-operative system.  It is 
important to understand the development differentials that may arise when diverse 
institutional models participate in the governance over critical collective resources.  The 
dissertation now turns toward a comparative analyses of the two cases, and explores 
factors that set the co-operative model apart from the investor-owned model. !
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Chapter Six: A Comparative Analysis of Two Wind Farm Ownership Models !
       The use of case studies and fieldwork is meant to explore and uncover unique 
attributes that may be obscured in large N studies.  The two case studies here reveal a 
number of discernable patterns inherent in wind energy development processes, patterns 
that would have likely been overlooked in a large N study. These patterns are influenced 
by structural attributes, government policy, market demand, public opinion, and unique 
local community dynamics (issues of human behavior, broadly speaking). 
      The two case studies have helped to better contextualize the extent to which 
government policy influences the diffusion of diversified models of wind energy 
ownership throughout the nation.  It is clear that the Obama Administration’s all-of-the-
above energy policy is not as all-inclusive as it is made out to be.  The government policy 
has resulted in the privileging of elite actors that then fails to enhance community agency 
of those communities playing host the wind energy firms.   
      Despite the imbalance in how diverse institutional models are treated under 
government policy, the case studies reveal wind energy development projects have 
tangible impacts on their host communities, though perhaps not in ways that might be 
presumed.  While both models convey benefits, there exists a variance in impact that 
appears to correspond to the model of ownership.  Yet development variances stemming 
from ownership models are somewhat nuanced until an institutional analysis pulls back 
the layers obscuring finely textured details of interest (illustrated in Table 7).  One-on-
one interactions in the field helped to advance understanding of these variances.
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      While the ownership model does seem to influence outcomes, there are some 
findings from analysis of the two types of ownership that appear to be somewhat standard 
features of wind energy development (to be discussed in Section Two).  This has to do 
not wholly with the instinctual behavioral tendencies of those controlling the wind farm, 
but partly because of a number of structural issues (discussed primarily in Section 1).  
These structural issues emanate largely from the engineered embeddedness of wind 
energy within the electric energy industry (each turbine is bundled in a group format, 
situated across vast tracts of land to maximize wind energy extraction, distributing the 
electricity generated to a transformer connecting to the electric grid (see Figure 12 below 
for an illustration of the electric grid).  Key actors within the system (such as the FERC 
or ISOs) will craft much of the policy that dictates a great deal of the wind farm’s 
operational features to ensure compatibility with and stability of the grid at large.34  The 
firm’s management and the board determine the remaining operational features.  This is 
where ownership matters, in the stewardship of resources (constant and surplus) 
generated by the firm, as well as the positive externalities of the governance processes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34     The only scenario in which this is likely to change is in the instance of the creation of a decentralized grid structure. 
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Figure 12. Electric grid 
 
 
Source: Email Co-operation Association Official, 2011. 
 
      Electric energy actors are somewhat insulated from local public affairs.  The 
opportunities for public or community governance remain obscured (Florini & Sovacool, 
2009, p. 5240).  The operational and governance complexity of the grid is a further 
barrier for inclusivity and participation by laypersons or public entrepreneurs.  There 
exists a strong bureaucratic administrative element whereby participatory mechanisms 
are discouraged in exchange for expert, specialized leadership.  This is in part due to an 
electric energy industry that is capital intensive, heavily regulated, and requires a broad 
array of professionals in engineering, finance, law, and other relevant fields.  Risk 
aversion, planning, and market projections are integral features of the system.  “A mature 
sociotechnical system is often very conservative and its actors are unwilling to change” 
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(Blomkvist & Larsson, 2013, p. 119).  This has in turn inculcated a culture emphasizing 
raw economic rationality and institutional functionalism as opposed to one explicitly 
concerned with social wellbeing or civic engagement.   
      Discussions with regulatory officials and industry leaders depict a somewhat 
generalizable narrative with regards to the constitutional and collective choice levels of 
analyses.  Monocentric tendencies become a feature, and many actors engaged in electric 
energy demonstrate isomorphic traits in that they increasingly act like each other; the lack!of!differentiation!has!an!observable!effect!of!stifling!innovation.  In this 
narrative, the IOUs have inordinate influence over the entire system, harnessing their 
structural advantage which emanates predominantly through government energy policy –
strengthened by their participation in the electoral politics and political candidates- 
predetermining standards by which capital is accessed, exacerbating structural 
disadvantages felt by the co-operative system. 
      The build out of new renewables and smart grid technologies means that the grid 
will grow even more complex and with that complexity comes even more barriers.  Rural 
communities will increasingly play host to this complex generation infrastructure.  But 
unless government policy changes or the electric co-operative system (arguably the most 
relevant advocate for publicly-owned power) takes a more aggressive stance, 
communities will be in the backseat while IOUs drive the terms and conditions for 
development.  The structural impediments place electric co-operative firms on dis-parity 
with their IOU counterparts, which in turn impact their capacity to deliver upon their 
value-added proposition.  This observation is noteworthy considering that so much of the 
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electric energy sector falls under some form of public ownership.  That said there is much 
the electric co-operatives could do.   
      Regardless of the ownership model, the manner with which the local community 
is engaged with the firm, as well as the actors stewarding the firm’s resources, also has 
implications for the electric energy system itself.  In order to compare the two case 
studies, the remainder of this chapter will be arranged into four sections, three of which 
address the core research questions (identified by section-heading), followed by a 
synthesized discussion.  The discussion further assesses of the implications of this system 
on community development, the policies bolstering the system, and the broader 
implications for public engagement on energy governance. 
How Do the Multi-Layered Governance Systems of the United States Influence 
Local Level Wind Energy Development (government and market policy)? 
 
      The two case studies uncovered a great deal about the complex systems engaged 
in governing wind energy and the electric grid.  Interviews with leaders in the regulatory, 
development, investment, and advocacy fields reveal a number of public and private 
actors, structural impediments resulting in limited wind energy ownership models, and a 
broad array of motivations driving wind energy development.  Governance over wind 
energy occurs at a number of levels through overlapping mechanisms by a broad array of 
actors.  This brought to the fore a number of social dilemmas facing the entire wind 
energy sector, as well as specific issues related to the ownership model of the given firm 
and systems specific to those ownership models. 
      This section will give a brief perspective on the electrical industry with regards to 
the co-operative and IOU sectors.  The perspective will be linked to an analysis of 
government energy and financial policy as it pertains to wind energy development.  The 
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analysis here is critical; major actors in this arena react to government policy.  Though as 
the analyses will reveal, level jumping or the crosscutting across various social processes 
is performed by the IOUs to shape the very system they then react to.  This is not 
performed to intentionally put the co-operative system at a disadvantage so much as to 
guarantee rents for the IOUs (rents in the form of steady subsidy streams, guaranteed tax 
breaks which cut the cost-of-money for loans from major financiers, and substantially 
reduces business risks and guarantees a solid return on investment). 
      The electric system.  A path dependency is built into the overall electric energy 
system from its inception, putting electric co-operatives at a structural disadvantage 
compared to their IOU counterparts.  The IOUs staked claims to high margin, 
metropolitan areas, leaving the rural countryside to fend for itself.  Rural actors mobilized 
to address the electrification deficit.  Despite attempts at systemic vertical integration, 
electric co-operatives consistently concede that retail energy from co-operatives is 
oftentimes more expensive than the for-profit sector for the aforementioned reasons of 
structural disadvantage.  The early development of the electric system has played out in 
such a manner where today the co-operatives are left with low density, high overhead, 
and low margin infrastructure, relative to the more profitable IOUs.  As Table 8 
demonstrates there is far less room for error on the part of electric co-operatives; they 
have fewer endogenous options.  Electric co-operatives are reliant on IOUs and public 
power for over 50 percent of their wholesale energy needs.  A positive internalization on 
the part of electric co-operatives is that they work extremely hard to contain their costs 
(costs going above and beyond basic infrastructure).
Table 8: Electric system
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      Figure 13 depicts the general fixed overhead costs of electric utilities.  IOUs 
achieve greater returns on their fixed cost investment due to the higher density of 
consumers within their service territories.  The electric co-operatives have a long-
standing orientation of operating under significantly smaller margins since they have 
higher overhead and limited means for spreading the cust-burden.  One electric co-
operative official claims that the at-cost orientation of electric co-operatives has made 
them so robust that “if!we![electric!co0operatives]!were!competing!over!the!same!utility!lines,!no!doubt!we!would!beat!‘em!on!price”!(Co-op Association Official, 
personal communication, September 8, 2010). 
Figure 13. Fixed overhead costs 
 
Source: Email Co-operation Association Official, 2011. 
 !
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      Despite the current disparity, it is difficult to say if the electric co-operative 
system could have penetrated this far into the electricity sector were it not for the 
intervention of the U.S. government.  The FDR Administration’s creation of the Rural 
Electrification Administration (REA), the REA’s recalibrated policy treating electric co-
operatives as equal to IOUs with regards to eligibility for government assistance, and the 
REA’s support system professionals, were instrumental in breaking the absolute 
stranglehold of IOUs.  Additionally, the REA drafted a model state law (the Electric Co-
operative Corporation Act) that further assisted state and local efforts to rapidly advance 
the early build out of the electric co-operative system.  This is important in that it has 
helped to create a more competitive environment against the monopolistic tendencies of 
the established IOU system, nurture institutional diversity, and extend electric energy to 
low margin rural regions of the nation.  The electric co-operative system has helped to 
balance the tendencies of the IOU system, thereby contributing a stabilizing effect to the 
electric energy commons. 
      The FDR Administration’s purpose for empowering co-operatives was due in part 
to their core design; the co-operative model is meant to grow, innovate, and catalyze 
approaches for self-help development.  In this manner co-operatives are not wholly 
without their own recourse, as is evident in the case of Basin.  Basin is representative of 
an Ostromian robust resource regime.  The study of Basin –and of its owner-co-operative 
VEC- reveals that co-operatives have created sophisticated federated governance 
systems.  These systems are polycentric (multiple levels of decision-making and 
responsibility), with an emphasis on building entrepreneurial capacities and enhancing 
robustness within the member networks and organizations.  These structures have been 
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formalized through the creation of associations at the state, regional, and national levels.  
The nesting of co-operatives into a larger association of co-operatives allows for dynamic 
economies of scale, and the enhanced provisions of goods and services.  This then 
strengthens the capacity of locally rooted electric co-operatives to concentrate their 
member orientation and Basin to focus its specialized service portfolio. 
      It must be noted again that as covered in Chapter Five the energy sector as a 
whole is heavily subsidized through a number of mechanisms.  A growing body of 
literature has documented the externalized costs of carbon-based fuels on public health 
and the environment.  These energy sources remain heavily subsidized despite their 
profitability (Leber, 2013).  The grid itself is sustained through U.S. Department of 
Energy grants, and managed by federal government corporations and partnerships, 
enabling ongoing development initiatives by the private sector (“Wind Industry Cheers 
Midwest ISO Approval of Multi-Value Projects - News - The Illinois Wind Energy 
Coalition,” n.d.).  The federal assistance to utilities, listed below (Table 9) shows the 
difference in government assistance provided to electric co-operatives and IOUs.  The 
highlighted numbers demonstrate how co-operatives pay interest on their loans, whereas 
IOUs are subsidized, externalizing their “cost-of-money.” 
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Table 9.  Federal assistance to electric utilities 
Investor-Owned Electric Utilities !Number of systems 171!
Investment Tax Credits $3,433,194,000!!
Accelerated Depreciation $90,678,993,000!!
Total retained taxes $94,112,187,000!!
Annual cost to gov't (4.08%) $3,839,777,000!!
Total customers $102,351,000!!
Assistance per customer $38!!
! !
! !Rural Electric Co-operatives5 !Number of systems 632!
Total RUS loans outstanding 12951120000!
Gov’t cost of money less avg. int. 
rate on RUS loans (4.08% - 4.70%) .0.62%!
Annual cost to gov't ($80,297,000)!
Total customers $12,462,000!!
Assistance per customer $0!!
! !
Sources of information and data for Federal Assistance 
to Electric Utilities: 
1Cong. Research Service, “Sale of propane by rural 
electric co-operatives”, Nov. 30, 1999. 
2Cong. Research Service, “Electricity Restructuring 
and Tax-Exempt Bonds: Economic Analysis of 
Legislative Proposals,” Jan. 20, 2000. 
3U.S. Dept. of Energy (DOE/EIA) 2009 data. 
4U.S. Dept. of Energy (DOE/EIA), Financial Statistics 
of Selected Publicly Owned Elec. Utilities 2003 (last 
year available). 
   *522 municipal systems (out of approx. 2,000) 
reported 2003 statistics to DOE (the last year data was 
collected). 
5U.S. Dept. of Agriculture (USDA), 2009 Statistical 
Report, Rural Electric Borrowers, IP 201-1.  February 
2011. 
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Table 9. (continued) 
Congressional Research Service (CRS), The Library of 
Congress, Investor-Owned Electric Utilities versus 
Rural Electric Co-operatives: A Comparison of Tax 
and Financial Subsidies.  November 1982. 
 
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Public 
Utilities:  Disposition of Excess Deferred Taxes.  
September 1991. 
Notes: !1)   Calculations are intended to illustrate only Federal 
subsidies that affect the utilities’ cost of capital and the 
cost to the federal government of providing those 
subsidies. 
2)    IOU data provided by DOE reflect changes from 
the implementation of FASB no. 109.  The analysis 
includes "Accumulated Deferred Investment Tax 
Credits", "Accumulated Deferred Income Taxes", and 
appropriate data included in "Other Regulatory 
Liabilities."  February 2011 !
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A criticism of the long-standing practice of extending electrification through government 
subsidy mechanisms is that it has “baked-in” path dependency via policy inheritance.  A 
report funded by the NRECA concluded: 
“All electric utilities in the United States receive federal assistance, or subsidies.  
This was the conclusion of Nobel Laureate economics professor Lawrence R. 
Klein of the University of Pennsylvania and has been further substantiated by 
numerous studies by federal agencies and others” (Co-op Association Official, 
personal communication, September 8, 2010). 
 
      From an operational perspective, both of these ownership models have diminished 
their structural capability to self-finance capital-intensive projects.  Investor-owned 
corporations are averse to withholding significant capital reserves adequate enough to 
purchase wind farms outright (margins are distributed to shareholders as dividends, and 
to executives as compensation).  Many wind energy firms truly are extensions of venture 
capital firms (Horizon’s primary shareholder is Goldman Sachs), diminishing the sector’s 
overall capacity to use margins for endogenous growth.  Executives are motivated to 
return profits quickly to the investor shareholders, not to grow the total share of 
renewables to conserve the environment. 
      The ownership of a co-operative desires a different return on investment.  Co-
operatives are sensitive to appearances that they are charging their member-owners 
excessive rates to enhance their margins.  Substantive capital reserves may give the 
appearance that member-owners are being overcharged, and the management has ulterior 
motives for the money.  The sensitivity then results in the distribution of margins back to 
the member-owners based on share of patronage in order to demonstrate fiduciary –not 
environmental- stewardship.  Short-term member-owner gratification holds up self-
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financing capacity building as it pertains to environmental stewardship.  The 
ramifications for the electric co-operative system are important. 
      This has the effect of reducing systemic self-governing capacities outside of 
government-refereed action.  Decision-making breaks down, authority becomes 
hierarchical, and “spontaneous” or self-led entrepreneurship is severely diminished 
(Aligica & Tarko, 2011, p. 258).  When the federal government provides substantial 
grants or backs privately funded loans, the government does so with the power of the Full 
Faith and Credit of the U.S.  Reliance on government financial subsidy incentives has in 
turn had an impact on organizational capacity to self-finance critical infrastructural 
investments.  New deployments of innovative technologies are put on hold until 
government policy incentivizes investors by reducing or eliminating risk.  Investing in 
energy development becomes a safe hedge for large financiers looking to guarantee 
return on investment, investment dependent upon government subsidy policy.   
      The total result is an energy sector reliant on large financial partnerships to make 
up for the lack of internally accessible investment capital.  IOUs have a history of strong 
relationships with major financial partners.  The relationship carries over to the 
operational organizational aspects as well.  Horizon developers noted that wind energy 
firms commonly hire individuals from the ranks of the financial sector with experience 
procuring capital for development (Wind Developer, personal communication, November 
9, 2011).  According to an Illinois regulator, this practice is so common that “the folks 
running wind energy companies are the same folks involved in oil, natural gas, and 
banking” (Regulatory Official, personal communication, October 25, 2010). 
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      Government serves the role of greasing the squeaky wheel.  And with 
increasingly gridlocked government there exists a greater likelihood that wind energy 
development will endure a number of shocks, harming the deployment of electric energy 
infrastructure. 
      The wind energy system.  Growing the wind energy sector will continue to 
require significant, prolonged infrastructural investment.  This is due in part to the 
conversion from the traditional grid model, to the “Smart Grid.”  The enhancement of 
energy reliability and independence from non-domestic sources is clearly a federal 
government policy objective.  A U.S. DoE official notes: “We will spend more money 
going from coal to wind.  From wheel-to-spoke to decentralized” (Regulatory Official, 
personal communication, September 7, 2010). 
   But the electric co-operatives are feeling a level of strain with regards to the lack 
of parity in subsidy between the two institutional forms. 
      Electric co-operatives are engaged in wind energy governance, but not as owners; 
their role is primarily as a wholesale consumer through PPAs with IOUs (the IOUs own 
the bulk of the infrastructure).  Referring back to Table 8, IOUs own almost half of all 
distribution lines, control over half of the transmission lines, and market to a significant 
majority of all American consumers.  Quasi-governmental organizations serve as a 
referee of sorts, regulating the initial connection of the wind energy generator to the grid, 
as well as the base load projections needed to meet demands, and as a check against price 
fixing. 
      All of the users of the grid will need to be involved in upgrading the infrastructure 
for wind and other renewables to grow at the pace necessary to mitigate climate change.  
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A leader in the electric co-operative sector (Co-op Association Official, personal 
communication, September 8, 2010) highlights some of the problems of shared 
governance in the sector: “Whose responsibility is it to modify the grid? Who does it fall 
upon to finance this?  If the IOUs aren’t throwing any of their money at it, why should 
co-operatives?”  This quote underlies the difficult discussions the electricity sector is 
currently facing.  The polycentric traits are further undermined due to unclear 
responsibilities and obligations.  The issue of access to infrastructure –or rights- seems 
well established.  But responsibility is not.  The frequently voiced narrative was the 
necessity of a federal government energy policy to grow wind energy and to identify who 
is responsible for procuring the resources necessary in order to avoid a tragedy of the 
commons situation.  Government policy appears to obscure responsibility, and places all 
electric industry actors in a position of policy dependence. 
      Until additional efficiencies deriving from technological innovation and 
economies of scale make wind costs and wholesale prices competitive against subsidized 
hydro-carbons, government energy policy will remain a critically important component 
for deploying wind energy.  Even if the cost of wind energy becomes price competitive, 
state government energy policy will probably be required to coerce utilities to make wind 
a significant share of their energy generation portfolio, lest capital reserves be used 
toward other endeavors. 
      The main point at which state governments get involved in wind energy 
governance, is creating demand by stimulating growth in the sector.  Demand is 
stimulated by state-by-state RPS.  The Illinois RPS mandates that electricity distributors 
procure 25 percent of their electricity from wind resources.  Notably one state’s RPS can 
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stimulate interstate trade in wind energy.  North Dakota’s RPS is toothless in that it is 
voluntary, but favorable North Dakota development policies make the state an attractive 
region for developers to build wind energy generators providing electricity to Minnesota, 
a neighboring state with a mandated wind energy RPS. 
      The institutional analyst must also understand the calculus of the electric utilities 
to better assess why they function in a given way.  Energy generators are not without 
risk: new generators are extremely expensive and always face some level of trade-off 
(wind’s trade-off is in the new intermittency35 and wildlife regulatory issues).  Wind 
energy, like all other forms of electric energy generation, requires enormous capital 
outlays.  Wind, being a free source of fuel, helps to bring about market stability in that 
long-term costs are more easily accounted for than the more volatile coal or natural gas 
(which promises to get more volatile as awareness of the linkages between greenhouse 
gasses and fossil fuels becomes an explicit matter of public policy).  The tradeoff in 
policy is that “early adopter” costs are externalized via government subsidy in an effort to 
kick start the sector.36  And the externalized tradeoff is that long-term government 
subsidy policy enables the development of better technologies and cheaper wind energy 
with reduced environmental impact as broader adoption takes hold.37 
      The most important subsidy mechanism is the Production Tax Credit (PTC).  
Wind energy developers are strongly dependent on the PTC to offset their costs and raise 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35     Critics use the intermittency of wind energy as if to say wind energy is far more unpredictable than other energy sources.  One 
must also consider that if transportation facilities shut down, regulations hamper mining and drilling, or non-renewables become 
scarce, they too are in a sense intermittent.  What makes them stand out from wind is their attributes, which allow them to act like a 
battery during periods of surplus accumulation, to sit in storage, stockpiled until needed.  Wind has yet to enjoy the development of an 
affordable, scalable battery system allowing for the storage of surplus energy stocks to flow into the grid on an as-needed basis.  
36     For a complete list of wind energy subsidies, refer to page 9 of the Climate Policy Initiative’s report “Supporting Renewables 
while Saving Taxpayers Money,” published at http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Supporting-Renewables-
while-Saving-Taxpayers-Money.pdf. 
37     The largest wind energy association, American Wind Energy Association (AWEA), has claimed the subsidy has been a 
resounding success.  AWEA is calling for a phase out of federal subsidies due in part to projections that place wind energy on a 
trajectory to be price-competitive with subsidized fossil fuels in under a decade (Bailey, 2012). 
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investment capital by sheltering an investment partner’s tax liability.  The PTC makes 
wind energy attractive to large financial and corporate firms, particular those looking to 
shelter taxes through the “monetization” of the PTC.  Wind energy IOUs are blurring the 
lines between being an energy generator or a shell company for these financial interests.  
Take for example Horizon, which changed hands a number of times, from their initial 
incorporation status to Invenergy, and finally to EDP Renewables which is primarily 
owned by Goldman Sachs.  The trend looks to continue.  A DOE official noted “it’s 
increasingly becoming common for IOUs to grow wind farms through unregulated 
subsidiaries” (Regulatory Official, personal communication, September 7, 2010).  Critics 
view the PTC as a large handout in that it can offset upwards of half of the total costs of a 
wind farm (Association Official, personal communication, August 9, 2011).  Wind 
energy developers interviewed in this project claimed that financiers can see debt-payoffs 
in as little as three to seven years (Wind Developer, personal communication, March 25, 
2010). 
      The government subsidy directed at wind energy follows a century long pattern of 
government assistance for large-scale energy producers and providers (refer to Chapter 
Four).  With wind, the government subsidy continues to be skewed toward the benefit of 
the IOUs.  Electric!co0operative!representatives!interviewed!in!this!research!were!quick!to!point!out!that!virtually!all!incentives!offered!to!electric!co0operatives!are!almost!always!offered!to!IOUs!years!or!decades!in!advance!of!the!electric!co0operative!sector.!!Such!an!assertion!certainly!merits!further!study.!!Yet co-operatives 
are reacting to wind energy growth and development, but are not “at the table” making 
!!
! 201!
relevant policy; indeed, they seem more interested in preserving their legacy generators 
than expanding into renewables. 
Thriving Despite the Systemic Disadvantage and Increasing Vulnerability !
      Government policy certainly plays a role in growing new wind energy.  But these 
policies provide a device for sheltering taxes by the same financial entities that shook the 
global economy in 2008.  What are the implications of an instable financial institutional 
culture being transmitted to the nascent –and some say necessary- wind energy industry?  
If the buzzwords of energy security and independence are to have meaning, shouldn’t 
policy be aligned toward those institutional arrangements with similar value orientations? 
In this way, we may be privileging the firm most likely to crumble during times of 
systemic disruption.   
      Co-operatives offer a number of advantages with regards to sustainable 
institutional development.  Initial research on this question has shown co-operatives are 
safer investments with lower defaults than their corporate counterparts (Murray, 2011; 
Stringham & Lee, 2011), meaning the longevity is more dependable, critical for long-
term policy planning.  Yet government energy policy has a perverse effect in that it 
privileges for-profit firms through tax offsetting subsidy.  Co-operatives have historically 
been at a disadvantage due to their low tax, not for profit structure tied to their member-
owner governance, rendering them ineligible for those government subsidies.  Co-
operatives have limited options outside of their own sector and occasional access to 
government assistance.  One example is in the critical partnerships a co-operative needs 
with large financiers. 
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      One prominent electric co-operative developer claimed that IOUs exploit the 
subsidy to enhance investor relationships (Co-operative Official, personal 
communication, August 15, 2011).  According to his claim, backed up by a number of 
other officials within the electric co-operative sector, return on investment on IOU 
initiatives yields a range of 9-11percent (the yields are presumably artificially inflated 
due in part to tax savings, subsidies, and over-priced end-consumer utility bills), whereas 
co-operatives yield a return of about 3-5 percent (if this holds true, the co-operatives are 
better able to do more with less overhead).  Co-operatives require patient investment 
capital.  The risk appears too high.  The scenario is then compounded by the fact that 
individual distribution co-operatives are oftentimes too small to entice significant 
investment capital.  This puts them on financial disparity with IOUs (data verifying their 
claim does not appear readily available, but the claim merits further study). 
      Despite their disadvantage, electric co-operative leaders consistently expressed 
their sentiment that government policy was neither out of favoritism nor rejection of the 
co-operative model, but a fundamental misunderstanding of its owner-governance 
structure and the resultant characteristic of how resources are allocated.  The claim is that 
policymakers and financiers have been trained to understand more dominant forms 
(government, corporations, and non-profits).  According to this persistent narrative, 
models like co-operatives are viewed as alternatives, going untaught in major public 
educational institutions.  The confusion results in a general perspective that co-operatives 
are foreign, confusing, and seen as risk-prone due to the member-owner nature.  A co-
operative isn’t always “legible” (Scott, 1999) or understandable to traditional finance.  
The owners of a co-operative (member-owners) are unlike the owners of an IOU 
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(shareholders).  A question often arises as to who is responsible for defaulting on loan 
repayments?  Co-operatives, more so than IOUs, must build strong relationships with 
investment firms, utilize specialized bans (such as the National Co-operative Bank), or 
self-finance.  The illegibility to investment interests, coupled with systemic impediments, 
compounds the limited growth capacity of co-operatively-owned wind. 
      Basin (and other G&T electric co-operatives) is tasked by their owner-co-
operatives with attracting investment capital to assist the systemic growth of their owner-
co-operatives.38  Basin can harness the aggregate system in a manner that one distribution 
co-operative could never do.  Plus, BASIN can better justify withholding margins as 
capital reserves since their core mission is in part to serve the needs of their owner-co-
operatives.  
      BASIN was observed doing two things to counter the structural disadvantage as it 
pertains to wind energy development: 
1. BASIN sidestepped the not for profit “co-operative problem” by incorporating 
their wind farms as a for-profit, investor-owned entity (the sole investor being 
Basin), thereby becoming eligible for government subsidy; 
2. BASIN self-financed from one of its other taxable subsidiaries, thereby negating 
the necessity of interacting with large financiers -typically unable to understand 
the differential features of the co-operative model- in order to procure investment 
capital. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38     NRECA has been a leader in growing access to capital for those distribution co-operatives with resource deficiencies who are not  
members of a G&T (discussed in Chapter Five, pp. 146-151). 
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Basin was then able to exploit all of the same government policy benefits as Horizon and 
other IOUs while growing its service portfolio under the co-operative ownership and 
governance model.   
      Replication of the BASIN approach to developing Prairiewinds by another co-
operative is unlikely.  BASIN is one of two so-called super G&Ts in the U.S.; not many 
electric co-operatives can leverage capital and subsidy in the manner Basin has.  And 
officials within BASIN were keen to note that their corporate subsidiary came about out 
of opportunity and relationships with the DoE, not out of a grand design to optimize 
organizational agility (“the stars aligned for us” (Association Official, personal 
communication, August 9, 2011)). 
      Such a development tactic opens electric co-operatives to attacks on the integrity 
of the model from a number of corners.  The formation of investor-owned subsidiaries 
may give the appearance of money laundering (as one electric co-operative in Atlanta has 
been accused of doing (Cooper, 2008)).  The corporate entity must seek to make a taxable 
monetary profit, which comes from the PPA, owned by BASIN.  Officials with BASIN 
defended this tact, noting that organizational wholesale costs and price to the owner co-
operatives is virtually always the first concern, and that PrairieWinds was developed to 
provide the best cost-competitive wind power possible.  Any profits are returned back to 
BASIN and administered the same way as other marginal returns in the co-operative; 
investing in infrastructure and returning margins to owners.  Furthermore, Basin noted 
that its reports are in the public realm, meaning member-owners can self-monitor. 
      The analyses of BASIN reveal an organizational culture where G&Ts attempt to 
control many exigencies.  The electric co-operative system as a whole is culturally 
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oriented toward vertical integration, in order to maximize control for member benefit 
(Co-operative Association Official, personal communication, September 8, 2010).  This 
is particularly true when variables may interfere with their capacity to meet the service 
demands of their member-owners, or reliance on other types of firms makes G&Ts more 
susceptible to price volatility.   
      Nonetheless, it stands that BASIN and VEC have to work within rules that from a 
development perspective are designed to accommodate IOUs.  Invariably, many electric 
co-operatives must interact with their IOU counterparts, whether it’s to purchase 
wholesale energy, share transmission lines, or vie for service territory.  None of the 
ownership types connecting to the grid can isolate.   
      The origins of the IOU and co-operative systems have placed both on a path 
dependency.  IOUs are widely understood.  The IOUs are better positioned to leverage 
legibility, revenue streams, valuation to procure capital, and quickly expand their 
generation and transmission capacity.  This seems to play a significant role with regards 
to the question “why is there only one co-operatively-owned wind farm”.  Co-operatives 
by and large began disadvantaged: they arose to develop the low-margin service territory 
the IOUs rejected out of profit projections.  Compounding the problem is an energy 
policy acting as a public subsidy for the private sector to invest in and govern over the 
resource rich areas of the grid while leaving co-operatives with sparse, high overhead 
rural regions.  The features of the service territory then exacerbate the government policy 
disadvantage faced by co-operatives.  Concurrent to that, co-operatives have less equity 
due to their decentralized structure.  Plus, instead of dipping into their capital reserves or 
go into debt to build their own wind farm, co-operatives tend to purchase PPAs 
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exclusively through the IOUs (since IOUs are the dominant form of wind energy 
ownership). 
“The main point though is that co-ops don’t really own much wind per se.   They 
have many more PPAs (Power Purchase Agreements) where they’ve committed 
to purchasing the power generated by a wind farm owned and operated by a 
private entity that built it and probably got tax advantages for doing so” (Scott, 
1999). 
 
      Taken as a whole, government energy policy is bent in favor of investor-owned, 
for profit models of wind energy production.  Electric co-operatives taking a reactive 
stance to government policy, fail to differentiate themselves on critical element of the co-
operative model and the potential benefits of co-operatives toward advancing energy 
policy.  Co-operatives then are simply are not at the policymaking table.  The public 
policy then creates a chilling effect, discouraging robust collective action by a majority of 
U.S. energy consumers (the public service paradox, in which consumers are not given 
voice in the provision and procurement of a public good). 
      Taken together, the “baked-in” structural deficits, coupled with IOU-centric 
government energy and fiscal policies, place the electric co-operative sector at a 
disadvantage.  Yet this disadvantage has catalyzed entrepreneurial responses by the 
electric co-operative sector (the formation of G&Ts, purchasing co-operatives, and 
representative associations).  Under current policy arrangements, the IOUs would appear 
to receive an inordinate amount of government privilege, allowing IOU models of 
electric generators to deploy new, renewable energy generators.  Yet there is still time for 
co-operatives to mobilize in an effort to change these ongoing dependencies. 
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How Does Wind Energy Development Influence and Interact With Local 
Community Social Structures (community)?  !
      The previous section addresses the issue of policy, structural pathways, and the 
resultant features of wind energy development.  What are the implications at the local or 
host level?  How are those communities playing host to major pieces of electric company 
infrastructure effected by this policy?  And what might happen to these firms and their 
communities if government support was more evenly allocated, shifted from IOU to co-
op, or removed entirely?  The two case studies revealed a number of common features 
observable of wind energy development within a host community. 
      There are three distinct phases related to the development process of wind energy 
development wherein actors have varying degrees of influence and governance: 1. 
exploration and development; 2. construction, and; 3. operations and maintenance.  A 
wind farm, physically and socially, will have greater opportunity for involvement during 
the development and construction phases when the firm is in need of broad-based 
community buy-in and consent.  But once a wind farm is constructed and operational, 
there is quite little a community can do to alter how the firm distributes newly generated 
wealth or how it otherwise interacts with the community. 
      This section addresses the extent to which the features of wind farms will have 
relatively generalizable interactions at the community level.  This is due in part to the 
aforementioned government regulatory apparati, the rigidity of the market, and the to-be-
addressed organizational design of wind farms (Section Three). 
      As noted previously, a community is a… 
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“…group of people with durable, multiplex and direct relations.  They expect to 
continue to interact for some time to come (so group membership must be fairly 
stable); they interact on several fronts, not in a specialized sphere; and their 
relations are not mediated, in particular by central government agencies.”  
  
Development of community is oriented from the vantage point that… 
“…community members strengthen the community field (Stedman, et al., 2009, p. 
182) when they interact not just within their private-interest social fields (such as 
a small business), but also across linked social fields to distribute benefits 
throughout the community (Wilkinson, 1970, 1972).  The community field itself 
can be identified by how the local population addresses any one of the following 
problems occurring during an action process (405): “problems of awareness, 
organization, decision making, resource mobilization, and resource application” 
(Wilkinson, 1991).”   
 
      There are a number of mechanisms that may be utilized in order strengthen the 
community by way of wind energy development.  Many of the mechanisms have strong 
linkage to the features of a polycentric system, particularly when actors are allowed to 
engaged in the process.  It no doubt takes inventiveness from the firm to ascertain the 
optimal linkages to community governance.  In this, process matters a great deal with 
regards to community development outcomes. 
“How people interact, and how those interactions facilitate transference of trust,  
knowledge, and other resources are crucial to better understanding both the 
impediments to community development, as well as how to better develop the 
community field; the flatter or more accessible the governance institutions, the 
greater the potential for individual and community-wide collective action through 
interaction (more recent work finds the social order itself is maintained when the 
gap in inequality is lessened, for example) (E. Ostrom, 2005).” 
 
Additionally, community inclusivity allows for enhanced information flows toward the 
wind developer so they can better adapt to social dilemmas.  This will be of critical 
importance throughout the remainder of this analysis. 
      Scouting for ideal communities: Prerequisites for wind energy development.  
Both communities in the case studies had ideal wind regimes: contiguous plots of land, 
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ready access to the grid, and robust wind.  The relative rush to develop wind energy in 
Illinois as compared to North Dakota is for a number of reasons.  The existing grid was 
built out to accommodate future growth, making long-term investment in Illinois more 
attractive than sparsely populated states like North Dakota.  For one, McLean County, 
Illinois has access to major transmission lines connecting to Chicago, Indianapolis, and St 
Louis regional energy consumers; developers could readily plugin to the Illinois grid 
(Association Official, personal communication, November 3, 2010).  These dense 
metropolitan populations are more likely to demand greater bulk quantities of renewable 
electricity on normative grounds.  
      North Dakota’s total wind regime is not as attractive in that it’s isolated from 
significant transmission, requiring additional build out of transmission lines, limiting 
access to the broader electricity market.  The grid is constructed to service relatively rural 
regions meaning it will need upgrading if the North Dakota wind were to be used for 
regional energy needs, and the co-operative ownership of the transmission grid means 
that Basin is disincentivized from allowing for-profit firms to gobble up transmission 
capacity (Basin’s orientation is toward its owner-co-operatives, not to help provide 
strategic access to markets for private partners). 
      Once wind energy developers have determined the economic environment to be 
favorable, they begin the search for ideal communities nested within these ideal environs.  
The attributes of a community and key actors are significant determinants in wind energy 
siting.  What set these two communities apart from other communities with similar wind 
regimes and made them ideal for wind energy development was the community reception 
to wind energy development.  The growth machine coalition, with its heavy orientation 
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toward land development (real estate, agriculture, or otherwise), smooths the path 
forward for wind energy developers to make the case for wind energy development.  That 
said, these firms are not unprepared for any potential hiccups along with way. 
      The wind energy development groups are learning a great deal from each other 
about how best to steward the development of new wind farms.  The information 
gleamed in the field is transmitted to associations, shared with colleagues, and shared at 
conferences (the Center for Renewable Energy at Illinois State University in McLean 
County facilitates many of those discussions for Midwest-based developers (University 
Official, personal communication, May 10, 2010)). A dominant theme coming from 
infra-firm sharing of best practices is that the greatest ally of the wind energy developer 
in averting organized opposition is transparency and trust-building (Wind Developer, 
personal communication, November 8, 2011).  
      Wind energy developers are fully aware of the range of options opponents may 
use against them.  Actors living within and outside of the proximity of the turbines have 
any number of reasons to oppose a wind farm, and have a number of venues in the 
government (primarily county zoning boards) and public (such as local media outlets) to 
stop wind energy development.  This study finds that quality of life issues (including 
aesthetics, sense of place and social identity, cultural and rural heritage, property values, 
and public health and safety) and the threat to wildlife conservation efforts were all 
reasons for opposition.  A wind farm changes the skyline of a community for a generation 
or more.  The general public may also have preconceptions as to the public health 
outcomes of wind energy development (turbine shadows, noise output, and harm to 
wildlife).  The wind energy developers are keenly aware of this, and proactively prep to 
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mitigate the numerous levers that may be used to stymie the ambitions of a wind energy 
firm. 
      Wind energy developers work diligently to foster community buy-in, adhering to 
an early-and-often principle of outreach.  Public events are held in symbolically 
significant venues (schools and firehouses for example) advancing the transparency 
principle, fostering greater buy-in through interaction, camaraderie, and trust generation.  
Transparency also applies to upfront discussions of controversies that have traditionally 
been associated with wind energy development.  Additionally, wind energy developers 
go into each situation knowing the significant financial investment will be needed to 
proactively curtail environmental concerns.  The wind energy firms have discovered it is 
best to pay for environmental impact studies up front as insurance against future 
criticism.  While the cost of impact studies (hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars) 
is a sizeable amount of money, it’s a small price for developers to pay in an industry with 
promise of healthy, guaranteed margins (Association Official, personal communication, 
August 17, 2011). 
       A looming problem for wind energy development will be the (McGinnis & Brink, 
2012) inequitable distribution of project burdens and benefits, distrust in the developer’s 
motives, and perceived lack of public participation in the decision-making process.  Thus 
far, there has been little sustained opposition on this front.  Perhaps this is in part how the 
wind energy developers advocate the economic impacts of a wind farm. 
      The developers are very keen to begin the conversation with a discussion of the 
financial returns of prospective wind turbine hosts.  When harnessed, the wind farm can 
now convert a resource that used to merely exist as a lost resource into a harnessed 
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commodity cash crop of sorts, a biofuel.  Buy-in was sought through appeals to 
individualism (you could make a pretty penny if you host one of our turbines!) and 
distributive communitarianism (think of the benefit to the schools, and think of the 
children!).  The appeal to individualism promised a virtually cost-free return on 
investment; the quarter of an acre of land is operated and maintained by the wind firm, 
and checks are sent on a timely basis to the property-owner.  Fairness in contractual 
agreements were hammered home through an open process as well: 
 “You always run into those types that think one neighbor is getting a better deal  
than the next.  You want to nix that up front.  In all of our presentations, we talk 
about the blanket offer for each turbine.  No exceptions.  If it so happens that one 
property owner gets an increase in lease payments, then all property owners get a 
an increase.  This is featured in all of our public meetings” (Wind Developer, 
personal communication, March 25, 2010). 
 
The developers also appeal to communitarian ideals to advance their development ends.  
Common themes: 
• Your neighbors are going to be financially better off.  Property owners will make 
more money on their land, and new, high-paying jobs will be created. 
• Your local government will get a new source of tax revenue (and you will be 
spared local tax increases for the foreseeable future). 
• The under-funded K-12 school system will get a revenue boost, and the local 
children will have a brighter future. 
• Together we (community and our wind farm) are going protect the environment 
and reduce dependence on foreign energy.   !!!!!! The biggest economic impact occurs after community cultivation, during the 
construction phase.  The up front expenditures provide the biggest jolt to a local 
community’s economic base.  The turbines, the community organizing, procurement of 
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land, synchronization of incentives and investment, and link to the grid, and labor costs 
add up to tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars.   
      Millions of dollars are infused primarily into rural taxing bodies, which proves to 
be particular useful to disadvantaged, underfunded rural school systems.  Parents are 
content knowing their children are receiving a competitive education, and school system 
employees are gratified knowing they have enhanced job security: 
“We are focusing heavily on math and science.  Our kids are going to get a top-
notch education on par with what they get in Normal [IL].” 
 !!!!!! But!much!is!hidden!from!the!outward!discussions!of!community!benefit.!
The impacts of a wind farm are, by and large, up front and economic.  Wind energy 
developers don’t shy away from this fact, but they seem to conflate the short-term 
impacts as a long-term economic gain.  Plus, the wind energy developers are never 
wholly transparent; they only convey some of the economics of the wind firm, never 
producing total profit projections.  The public is not included in the governance of wind 
energy in a way that could advance long-term community development; this applies for 
both the co-op and IOU models of ownership. 
      The long-term operations phase, while contributing to the local tax base and land-
lease payments, provides relatively few jobs (though such jobs are typically well-paid).  
Revenue generated from wind and land resources is typically absentee managed, resulting 
in capital flight concentrating wealth elsewhere.  Additionally, longitudinal analyses are 
unavailable since the industry is in its relative infancy; this is problematic for 
communities pressured into making long-term development decisions (land leases 
contracts for turbines can range from 20 to 50 years) based on short-term “return-on-
investment” projections. 
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      The developers are not in the local communities to impact change, per se.  The 
wind energy developers are there to build buy-in in order to deploy an enterprise 
contributing back to core organizational values (profits for IOUs or enhanced services for 
co-operatives).  It falls back upon the actors within the firm to make use of the generated 
resource of the wind farm.  It is doubtful that significant social structural change could 
come from the building of wind farms.  In fact, the wind farms probably did more to 
maintain the local status quo (though to varying degrees) than to challenge it.   
      Referring back to the topic of ideal communities for wind energy development, it 
may not be happenstance that two communities of Ward and McLean exhibit strong 
growth machine characteristics.  A system can be structured in such a manner as to 
prevent individual and collective action for purposes of atomization or centralized power 
(or to subvert stifling social centers by entering into voluntary collective action 
arrangements elsewhere).  Growth machines certainly utilize such practices in order to 
enable economic development initiatives. 
      A rural, agriculturally based growth machine located in a wind-rich community is 
quite attractive for wind energy development interests.  The wind firms in both of these 
communities link to cliques with growth machine attributes.  The economic aspects of 
wind energy development were very attractive to the groups that play a strong role in 
growth machines.  Property owners could lease their land to extract financial value from 
the wind, and the tax burden of property owners would be diminished as wind energy 
occupies a larger share of local tax liability.  Communities with agricultural commodity 
orientations make for an easier “pitch” in that the concept is not foreign to landowners 
who are used to harvesting their land for a living.  
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      When the growth machine coalition help to set out long term arrangements of the 
wind farm, many community benefits are forfeited for the life of the wind farm (30 to 50 
years).  Perhaps this is why many respondents were muted or under-enthusiastic about 
operational impacts.  The school official in McLean County, excited about the financial 
boost to the tax base, noted: “It’s too bad though that we’re probably prepping these kids 
to move out of here, though.  There just ain’t anything to keep them around.”  This 
statement highlights the lack of substantive change that empowers individuals to govern 
themselves within these communities.  Sure, the wind farm provides resources that allows 
for the development of human capital through locally established government 
institutions, but inclusive self-governance and public entrepreneurship take a back seat to 
financial and material focused outcomes of wind energy.  The actors involved in the wind 
energy development process seemed to represent a cross-section of the local status quo 
with regards to age, gender, race, and class; very little seemed to be done with regards to 
diversified engagement. 
      The!potential!benefits!of!public!energy!governance!are!numerous.  If!the!community!is!involved!in!the!governance!process,!they!could!better!utilize!the!wind!farm!for!public!pursuits.!!Outside!of!the!obvious!ramifications!of!distribution!of!resources,!one!must!consider!the!physical!characteristics!of!a!wind!farm.!!Properly!sited,!a!wind!farm!could!be!used!as!a!non0governmental!limit the capacity of a 
community to sprawl, serving a role as a greenbelt and farmland preservation instrument.!
      Public engagement might result in greater community self-awareness.  Perhaps 
the community might change collectively alter its calculus if the actors were aware that 
wind resources are indeed exhaustible.  If private IOUs occupy the land, then the wind 
!!
! 216!
regime cannot be further harnessed with a new community-owned wind farm.  Once a 
wind farm is built and that wind regime is saturated, additional or alternative models 
become impossible.  Communities must be careful to choose whether the ownership 
model introduced locally is the ideal community partner in the decades to come. 
      Wind energy development certainly has an impact on the social structure of the 
host community.  Wind energy development, at this current stage, is more amenable to 
economic development than community development.  It becomes clear that communities 
need to be prepared for wind energy development up front to better negotiate terms.  
Once in operational and construction phase, the community benefit is predetermined.  
Individuals must have the space to be able to work collectively, build new institutions, 
and challenge centralized power by aggregating up the existent social hierarchy or having 
the tools necessary to create their own social structure.  But does the insertion of a given 
type of organizational model impact the type of community development outcome?  
How Does the Ownership Model of the Wind Energy Firm Affect Community 
Development (the firm)?  !
      The question of ownership over the wind farm and ownership’s resultant 
community development impacts requires a peeling back of the layers of governance and 
the influence ownership has over governance mechanisms.  The “peel-back” helps to 
assess not only how the firm is stewarded, but to assess its resulting robustness, and how 
the community is engaged in that process.  Many actors within both types of firms 
perform governance, but rarely do the owners themselves partake in direct governance or 
stewardship outside of the occasional shareholder or member-owner meetings.  McGinnis 
and Brink (2012) elaborate further on the concept of stewardship: 
 
!!
! 217!
“ the term “stewardship” …refer[s] to the practice of managing common 
resources in a way that insures the continued availability of that resource to future 
users. The problem is a classic dilemma: each individual has an interest in 
extracting as many resources as possible, and hoping that someone else will pay 
the costs of replenishment or maintenance. In the absence of effective 
stewardship, the commons will be destroyed” (p. 1). 
 
      The IOUs certainly make greater promises, conveying the benefits to individuals 
and the community in financial terms while avoiding direct discussions of potential 
pitfalls; the IOUs are not as concerned about their role in community stewardship and 
governance as the co-operative firm.  A further point of consideration is that a firm whose 
substantive controlling interest coming from venture capital investors (IOUs) certainly a 
pose risk for long term sustainable operations.  What if the market collapses or the firm 
goes bankrupt?  What reasonably are the chances the IOU will make an effort to 
transition the relationship between the community and the wind farm in a mutually 
beneficial manner?  With that in mind, is the IOU really the optimal steward for a 
community’s wind regime? 
      What is needed is a tool to assess institutional features and how those features 
interact within the institution’s host community.  The Ostrom Design Principles (ODP) 
(refer to Table 2) serves as a useful diagnostic in assessing institutional robustness.  The 
categorization of institutional features provides the institutional analyst with the tools 
necessary to identify shortcomings in institutional design, and that institutions fit with the 
resource it stewards.   
      It should be noted that the ODPs have only recently been extended outside the 
realm of natural resource governance.  Most recently, Ostrom’s colleagues at the 
Bloomington School have applied the ODPs to an examination of the health care 
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commons [Ostrom also has a book on knowledge as a commons].  The application 
beyond natural resource management is justified as such: 
Over several years she [Ostrom] examined case studies of natural resource 
commons which were successfully managed by local users of that commons over 
long periods of time, as well as cases in which these efforts were unsuccessful. 
Community groups exert stewardship by establishing and enforcing their own 
rules concerning how many and what types of resources can be extracted, and 
when, as well as requiring contributions to collective efforts to maintain access to 
those resources. Ostrom (1990) summarizes her findings in an influential list of 
eight “design principles” which are satisfied, in one way or another, in cases of 
sustainable resource management (McGinnis & Brink, 2012, pp. 1-2). 
 
But Ostrom’s work on sustainable resource management had been tightly linked to 
natural resources, and not yet widely applied to standard businesses, or to highly 
technological systems. 
Our initial discussions focused on the serious concern that lessons drawn from the 
study of natural resource management (mostly in the developing world) might not 
even be relevant to the highly technical realm of modern healthcare. Technically 
speaking, Ostrom limited her conclusions to the management of common-pool 
resources, in which individuals extract resources from a common pool for their 
own use. Some commons are better described as public goods, in the sense that 
individuals jointly enjoy the benefits without any threat of exhaustion. Other 
commons are available only to those who pay a membership fee, as is the case for 
country clubs or housing associations.  Health and healthcare policy encompass 
the full array of private, public, and club goods, and only a few aspects fit the 
technical definition of a common pool resource (p. 2).  
 
McGinnis goes on to demonstrate how a complex system (health care) comprised of a 
mix of goods can be conceptualized as a commons. 
Access to emergency room services seems the best fit, since ERs are clearly 
subject to overcrowding and overuse in some circumstances. The patients are 
users of an ER who need to draw upon the skills of the physicians and nurses in 
order to improve their health. There are a limited number of medical personnel 
who can treat a finite number of patients at one time, just as there are a limited 
number of examination areas. If a patient comes to the ER for a non-emergency, 
the doctor who treats that patient is not able to take care of another patient who 
really needs emergency care. 
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Other important aspects of health care, like community health or insurance 
coverage, are more like public or club goods. Fortunately, Ostrom left open the 
possibility that the design principles might also be relevant to the sustainable 
production of public goods, especially at the local level39 (p. 2). 
 
      This research applies the diagnostic “to discover whether and which design 
principles” are being used by the firm and if they are helping to support” the wind regime 
and community field as a robust resource –focusing on two individual organizations from 
within the broader system- much the same as Ostrom’s Bloomington School colleagues 
are plying the ODPs to analyses of the health care system as a commons (pp. 1-3).  The 
diagnostic allows for an analysis of the robustness of the firm, which helps to understand 
in greater depth how the firm interacts with the local community, the institutional logic 
guiding the firm in this process, and categorization of the governance features integral for 
community development.   
      For the purposes of analytical clarity, robustness is defined as “the ability of 
human‐constructed systems to remain functioning even after experiencing an exogenous 
shock” (McGinnis, 2012, p. 9).  Importantly, this allows us to link institutional robustness 
features to economic and social externalities.  The question of “how does the ownership 
model of the wind energy firm affect community development” becomes more prescient.  
A strong institutional analysis linking institutional design and practice is better linked to 
community governance and development processes with these tools (ODPs) in hand. 
      Assessing the design and operational impacts of the wind farm on local level  
 
community development.  Section One accounts for the broader IOU and co-operative  
 
systems and their regulatory environments.  Section Two addresses the generalizable  
 
elements of wind farm and community interaction.  How then do the two case studies  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39     Bold added for emphasis.  
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inform our understanding of the role of ownership over operational wind energy firms  
 
and their interaction with the host community?   
 
      Evidence from fieldwork in the two case studies demonstrates that a co-operative  
wind farm offers a number of advantages not likely to be found with an investor-owned  
wind farm.  These advantages stem largely from participatory governance linked to  
ownership, and the nested systemic governance designs of the co-operative firm that do  
not exist in the IOU model (IOUs are simply not structured in such a manner).  What  
 
follows is a defense of these findings through an institutional analysis of the two wind  
 
farms, via the ODPs (McGinnis, 2012 p. 22). 
      [ODP #1] Clearly defined boundaries & [ODP #7] minimal recognition of  
 
rights to organize (local autonomy). !
ODP #1: 
Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource united from the 
…resource must be clearly defined; [B] The boundaries of the …resource must be 
well defined. 
 
ODP #7: 
 The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by  
external government authorities. 
 
      The boundary of interest here is the community’s wind and governance regime.  
Importantly, how is it that an operational wind farm’s ownership model impacts a 
community’s capability to alter the operation of a wind farm, and how does that wind 
farm reciprocate? 
      A wind farm is, at its simplest, an extractive device.  The infrastructure is sited 
across vast tracts of land (now limited in its utilization), accessing and extracting 
consistent wind resources, converting wind energy to electricity, and transmitting the 
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electricity to the grid in return for monetary reimbursement.  The monetary value is wind 
energy depends on a number of factors (intermittency of wind, market demand, subsidy, 
cost relative to other fuels, and so on), but the fiscal returns of cash flows were not a part 
of the discussion in either community.  Speaking broadly, the community members were 
simply left out of the discussion of potential profit. 
      It makes sense for the IOU wind farm to divert attention from a dialogue of the 
long-term cash flow.  If the IOU can control the information available to the community 
while generating trust amongst key decision makers, the IOU is in a superior position to 
lay out their own terms for development within a host community.  The IOU works 
diligently to disengage potential oppositional issues, trumping up the financial benefits to 
landowners and the infusion of resources to symbolically important taxing bodies.  
Properly performed, acquiring rapid community acquiescence allows wind farm profits to 
be maximized, and revenues to be projected over the lifetime of the wind farm.  This 
makes fully operational wind farms an attractive hedge for large financial interests  
      The IOU seeks to limit broad community participation; community actors must be 
cognizant of this fact.  Education is not an act of empowerment so much as another form 
of marketing or advocacy seeking acquiescence.  Speculative contracts with landowners 
are sought out far in advance of a commitment to build –albeit with a promissory fiscal 
return should the wind farm be built.  Once landowners have approved of a contractual 
agreement on IOU-ordained terms and local government has approved building and 
zoning permits, there is little leverage the community has to enjoin in governance (they 
are not conferred rights since they do not have the privileges of ownership).  The 
processes as utilized by the IOU do not engage community members in operational 
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stewardship of the wind farm.  This can result in unforeseen criticism, and harm the need 
to convert to clean, renewable energy. 
      Take for example the issue of grid connectivity.  According to one of the wind 
energy developers, it is not an uncommon for some actors to demand locally generated 
wind energy be distributed and consumed locally as well (Wind Developer, personal 
communication, November 9, 2011).  Some residents in McLean County were upset that 
the electricity generated from Twin Groves would in essence be exported for use 
elsewhere (Martello, 2009).  The perception was that a wind farm is perfectly capable of 
being used for local energy needs, so why then should Horizon sell the electricity 
elsewhere.  This demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of how energy generators 
on the grid function, and the problems when stakeholders are not included in stewardship; 
confusion or ignorance can lead to allegations of impropriety, and trust diminishes. 
      One can envision scenarios where other, similar conundrums arise.  With enough 
consistent repetitive retelling of such friction going unchecked, these stories could form a 
mythos labeling wind energy development as community exploitation and 
misappropriation.  Rapid, mass-conversion from “dirty,” exhaustible sources of energy to 
clean renewables could be impinged. 
      Co-operatives do better at engagement, distribution of resources, and long-term 
involved in governance.  Basin and VEC avoid this problem by design.  The nested-
systems approach of electric co-operatives means that any electricity produced by Basin 
for distribution by Basin’s member-co-operatives, for the member-co-operative’s 
consumer-ownership.  The boundaries are more logical (the wind energy turbines 
connected to the local transmission lines technically do feed back into the local 
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distribution network).  But this is also where ownership contributes to the furtherance of 
knowledge. 
      Horizon doesn’t seek to educate the broader community about issues pertinent to 
electricity generation.  It simply is not part and parcel of their model.  Education is used 
primarily for marketing to advance their bottom line.  Their desire is to the minimum 
necessary to see a wind farm through to operational status. 
      The electric co-operatives have a number of incentives to cultivate the community 
to better understand electric and wind energy governance –and stewardship of the 
electrical system as well.  As noted in Chapter Two (pp. 32-34), co-operative institutional 
logic is informed by the Co-operative Principles (CP) (http://ica.coop/en/what-co-op/co-
operative-identity-values-principles).  Of relevance here is CP #4, Autonomy and 
Independence: 
Co-operatives are autonomous, self-help organisations controlled by their 
members. If they enter into agreements with other organisations, including 
governments, or raise capital from external sources, they do so on terms that 
ensure democratic control by their members and maintain their co-operative 
autonomy. 
 
The co-operatives are rooted within the community (though Basin to a much lesser 
degree).  The board is comprised of those who live within the service territory and 
consume the goods and services (as is likely of the staff as well).  Whatever the co-
operative does in the community will have an effect on those directly governing the co-
operative.  Furthermore, it’s a reflection of their concern for the community as well; it is 
highly unlikely that the co-operative would want to be seen as a destructive force. 
      The IOUs are part and parcel of a system that is enabled by the federal 
government to grow the share of wind energy generation in the U.S.  As discussed in 
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Section One, community-ownership of wind is a virtual impossibility without the active 
engagement of or pushback by community development interests.  Electric co-operatives 
serve a critical role in pushing their communities to actively engage in energy 
governance, without electric co-operatives, public energy governance would be virtually 
non-existent.  Electric co-operatives are actively involved in defining the boundaries of 
their responsibilities toward these ends. 
      The co-operatives performed a number of informative public events to educate the 
public on what to expect during the development processes.  The co-operatives certainly 
pulled from the same proverbial playbook as the IOUs with regards to appeals to 
individualism and communitarianism, but there was a stronger social responsibility 
element to how the co-operatives engaged the community. 
      First, the electric co-operatives provided in-depth educational presentations and 
materials.  Basin was extremely sensitive not only to the known oppositional issues, but 
was also very careful to acknowledge potential future dilemmas, such as the saturation of 
a localized wind regime that could limit wind energy development capacity.  Yes, this did 
help to engender deeper trust, but in presenting on such topics, Basin risked its own 
project. 
      Second, the electric co-operatives actively acknowledged that landowners should 
seek out their own third party legal representation.  Basin offered all prospective 
landowners legal-fee-stipends, to retain legal representation to review the fairness of their 
contracts.  Basin suggested the landowners pool the stipends together to enhance the legal 
representation as well.  Again, the risk Basin took was that they provided the landowners 
a venue by which they could work collectively outside of Basin’s control, and potentially 
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mobilize to demand better contractual arrangements (the co-operative provides space for 
landowners to interact, share information, and build and enhance trust). 
      Basin and VEC have well-established mechanisms to allow for longitudinal  
 
governance over the wind farm.  These mechanisms have been transmitted from amongst  
 
their cohorts in the electric co-operative sectors, and will be discussed further below. 
      [ODP #3] Wide participation in collective choice:  !
 Most individuals affected by the operation rules can participate in  
modifying the operational rules. 
 
      The IOUs’s narrowly designated boundaries, established to maintain optimal 
control, translate into a scenario where participatory collective choice mechanisms are 
essentially cut off after the development phase.  Horizon developers made it very clear 
that the executive team was hands off, expecting the development staff to produce 
optimal returns.  Horizon developers sought the path of least and desired to use monetary 
incentives to seek acquiescence.  Their timeframe was short: do just enough to get the 
turbines in the ground, and the job was essentially done.  Absentee ownership could then 
kick in.  The development staff would then pack up, and head to the next field site; in this 
manner, IOU wind farms are duplicating many of the features of absentee coal-fire power 
plants that atomized their host communities (Adamson, 2008; Freudenburg, 1984; 
Freudenburg, 2008).   
      Not so with the co-operative.  Co-operatives are not motivated by quarterly 
performance-reporting metrics; co-operatives are member-need oriented.  These co-
operatives see themselves as existing in perpetuity, benefitting future generations.  
Electric co-operatives then exhibit a much longer time horizon and planning perspective 
than their IOU counterparts.  The board and operational teams live and work within or 
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near the service territory.  What they do unto their service territory, they essentially do 
unto themselves, their friends, family, and peers.  The actions of the co-operative interact 
with the community, and the community also interacts with the co-operative.   
      Two Co-operative Principles inform how the co-operative engages the broader 
community: 
CP #1, Voluntary and Open Membership: Co-operatives are voluntary 
organisations, open to all persons able to use their services and willing to accept 
the responsibilities of membership, without gender, social, racial, political or 
religious discrimination. 
 
CP #7, Concern for Community: Co-operatives work for the sustainable 
development of their communities through policies approved by their members. 
 
These CPs push the co-operative to seek venues for broad-based participation, as well as 
to insure there is a net community benefit from its operations.  Take for example Basin 
and VEC’s actions. 
      Basin is quite cognizant of the potential for positive economic externalities reaped 
by the community hosting their wind farm.  It makes sense that they could situate any 
major investment within their service territory, and within proximity of a member-co-
operative: VEC.  VEC led the community effort to develop the wind farm, which fostered 
positive social capital from the community toward VEC.  This also enhanced Basin’s 
standing amongst actors in Ward County, as well as VEC.  Merely siting the 
infrastructure within a co-operative’s service territory is not enough to claim wide 
participation by the member-ownership in governance over the wind farm. 
      The electric co-operatives in this study are not complacent organizations.  The 
board and executive team offer a number of incentives to promote active civic 
engagement by the staff.  During the floods, staff was offered paid leave to assist in 
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mitigating the damage.  Furthermore, VEC invests a great deal of organizational 
resources in driving up turnout at their annual general member meeting, which has 
become a community fixture.  But these examples are somewhat one-way participatory 
mechanisms that certainly do transmit important information back to the organization, 
which the leaders can then absorb, analyze and assess the need to recalibrate features of 
the co-operative; these mechanisms do not necessarily empower community actors to 
govern. 
      VEC is also engaged in fostering new institutional leadership.  The “member 
advisory committee” has provided an outlet for interested co-operative member-owners 
to actively engage in governance over the electric co-operative, providing a venue for 
participatory decision-making.  This carries a risk of disruptive member-owners taking 
advantage of an open door to the organization.  But it also carries the advantage of 
information sharing, trust building, and the generation of future leaders for the co-
operative. 
      [ODP #4] Monitoring:  
 [A] Monitors are present and actively audit …resource conditions and appropriate  
behavior; [B] Monitors are accountable to or are the appropriators. 
 
      The electric industry as a whole has a relatively robust monitoring regime as it 
relates to the ongoing operation of the electric grid.  The ISOs, FERC, and NERC serve 
the role of monitoring the grid for early warning signs, as well as vetting new 
connectivity to assure perpetual operations. 
      The operational IOU wind farm does not directly report much if any information 
to its local host community.  Performance and health and safety information can largely 
be found online through the websites of governmental regulatory bodies.  Unless 
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otherwise specified in the terms of local community government or landowner lease 
contracts, the IOU wind farm need not report additional data above and beyond what is 
required by law. 
      Electric co-operatives essentially perform the same reporting as IOUs and report 
to their member-owners and apex organizations.  The electric co-operatives in this 
research see this feature as linked to CP #5: Education, Training, and Information: 
Co-operatives provide education and training for their members, elected 
representatives, managers, and employees so they can contribute effectively to the 
development of their co-operatives. They inform the general public - particularly 
young people and opinion leaders - about the nature and benefits of co-operation. 
 
Oddly, electric co-operatives take it as given that they are unregulated; they seem to only 
be unregulated by government with regards to their inner operational features as it relates 
to fiscal allocation.  The reality is that they are extremely regulated.  Electric co-
operatives report to their member-owners, at a minimum, once per year at the annual 
general membership!meeting.!!In!the!case!of!VEC,!their!member!advisory!committees!provide!another!venue!for!in0depth,!intimate!discussions!of!the!co0operative’s!robustness.!!The!co0operative!must!also!report!to!their!co0operative!support!system!lenders!on!their!fiscal!performance,!as!well!as!to!their!marketing!co0operative,!Touchstone,!on!the!integrity!and!quality!of!the!member0owner!services.!!!!!!! Electric!co0operatives!are!highly!regulated!and!monitored!entities!at!many!levels,!by!virtually!all!of!their!stakeholders.!!Not!so!with!IOU!wind!firms.!
      [ODP #5] Graduated sanctions & [ODP #6] dispute resolution mechanisms. 
ODP #5: 
Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed graduated 
sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) by other 
appropriators, officials account to these appropriators, or both. 
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ODP #6: 
 Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to  
resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials. 
 
      Both ownership models will have spelled out penalties between landowners and 
the firm, as well as local government agencies and the firm.  The IOU, however, differs 
in that the sanctions community members are able to leverage against the IOU will be 
limited (the IOU is absentee).  Plus, the IOU is more likely than the co-operative to insist 
on contractually binding third party dispute resolution mechanisms, such as arbitration.     
      Electric co-operative could certainly operate in an absentee manner (it would 
seem to be against their institutional logic), and could have their member-owners sign off 
on a waiver of judicial access and rights for disputes processes.  But in the case of Basin, 
that did not occur; the member-owners certainly could take given disputes to court should 
the need arise. 
      Co-operatives have additional sanctioning and dispute resolution mechanisms.  
Simply enough, member-owners of a community could exert collective social pressure 
upon actors within the co-operative to resolve disputes.  Member-owners can also attend 
VEC or Basin general membership and advisory meetings, where their voices are heard 
again.   And, should it come to that, the member-owners can call for a special emergency 
meeting, the board can fire staff, and the member-owners can expel members of the 
board.  The community certainly has more options for dealing with a problematic electric 
co-operative than a similarly problematic IOU. 
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      [ODP #8] Nested enterprises:  
Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and 
governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprise. 
 
      All wind energy firms are indeed embedded within a nested system.  The electric 
grid is, at its base, a system whereby actors must minimally be linked to government 
regulation and oversight, as well as maintaining connectivity to financiers on matters 
related to investment partnerships and future investing opportunities.  And if the accounts 
of developers at Horizon were accurate, wind energy developers stay connected with 
each other in order to share best practices for community organizing, as well as 
infrastructural build out.   
      Electric co-operatives nest within the same network of actors, but do so by way of 
their own polycentric, federated system.  Co-operatives are by design a nested enterprise, 
and that nesting is utilized to enhance the co-operative’s value orientation.  The 
institutional logic is again informed by the Co-operative Principles, specifically CP #6, Co0operation!among!Co0operatives:!!Co0operatives!serve!their!members!most!effectively!and!strengthen!the!co0operative!movement!by!working!together!through!local,!national,!regional!and!international!structures. 
 
      Electric co-operatives are by law and by institutional design member-owner 
governed.  They are also nested within their community.  There is a bare minimal 
recognition of participatory rights to governance and monitoring.  This means that 
electric co-operatives operate as a gateway, an access point to active participation in the 
governance of wind energy and the electric grid as a whole.  Taken on the whole, the 
electric co-operative provides a venue by which citizens may actually do democracy, 
aggregate resources to enhance the local co-operative, and foster a system that mitigates 
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the public service paradox through consumer engagement in provision and procurement 
processes. 
      The two co-operatives and the co-operative actors in the associations talked in 
terms of evolving toward a complete systems approach.  The electric co-operatives in this 
study exhibited an aggressive desire for vertical integration (from mine-mouth to meter) 
in order that they might enhance their self-governing capacities.  Vertical integration of 
the supply chain by the G&Ts is coupled with the federated structure in an attempt to 
control market volatility as much as possible to meet this end.   
      But it is not just a market orientation for the electric co-operatives.  Through 
associated with the national apex organization, NRECA, the co-operatives have created a 
wide variety of support systems for the electric co-operative sector.  The electric co-
operative system is incrementally moving toward being able to self-finance, has created a 
marketing brand (Touchstone), and is aggregating individual organizational needs into 
group purchasing negotiations in order to drive down overhead costs on services like 
health insurance and pensions.  The co-operatives are in a persistent state of network 
maintenance.  
      The IOUs prefer targeted, isolated specialization, as well as externalization of 
management of the grid infrastructure.  By design, the IOU actors act as nodes on a 
network, closed to community engagement.  IOUs may be nested within the electric 
energy system, but they are not necessarily nested within their host community. 
      In contrast, even a corrupt co-operative offers latent capacity not built in to the 
IOU firm.  The value the co-operative may offer to the member-owner is certainly 
enhanced by the nested nature of electric co-operatives; the co-operative firm “looks” a 
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lot more like its host community than the IOU.  It is left to the actors within the local 
level electric co-operative to transmit the value into something meaningful for the local 
community.  This is where adherence and commitment to democratic governance 
becomes challenging. 
      [ODP #2] Congruence with local conditions and fairness: 
Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions: [A] 
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of 
resource units are related to local conditions; [B] The benefits obtained by users 
from a …resource, as determined by appropriation rules, are proportional to the 
amount of inputs required in the form of labor, material, or money, as determined 
by provision rules. 
      Analysis of the firms failed to find evidence wherein the co-operatives or Horizon 
dramatically altered the social structure in such a manner that could be identified as 
community development.  The difference is such: Horizon sought to harness those with 
social and political capital to influence development.  IOU wind energy developers 
sought approval through local government regulatory agencies, and contractual 
agreements with landowners.  The desire was to limit overall tax burden, limit 
community enticements, and maximize the subsidies to guarantee the largest marginal 
payoff possible.  Up front, the community and wind developer may be in alignment on 
their values orientation, but as time goes on, the community has few if any options to 
renegotiate the terms of the contract.  Once the wind farm is constructed and operational, 
the community is stuck with that infrastructure for 30 to 50 years, and Horizon’s 
maintenance of its network basically shutdown. 
      The electric co-operatives come from the local community, and seek constant 
alignment with broader value-orientation of the community.  The electric co-operatives 
are helping to both contribute to maintenance of the existing social structure (which is 
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critical in an environment of rapid influx of in-migrants, that could cause a great deal of 
chaos), building individual and collective capacities.  Board members, member-owners, 
and operational staff are interacting through standard channels created and sustained by 
the co-operatives and the broader community.  The product of these interactions seems 
somewhat static from a structural change perspective; much like the IOU, the co-
operatives seem to be engaged with their local growth machine coalitions. 
      But recent developments within NRECA, the US co-operative movement, and the 
International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) could stimulate these actors to participate more 
explicitly in local co-operative development.  NRECA has created a 21st Century 
Committee in reaction to the ICA’s Year of Co-operatives to assess how co-operatives 
could get back to their core mission.  According to actors involved with the Committee’s 
work, there is a push for system-wide realignment with the Co-operative Principles (Co-
op Association Official, personal communication, September 8, 2010).  For the purpose 
of this analysis, the relevant Co-operative Principles are: 
CP #1, Voluntary and Open Membership: Co-operatives are voluntary 
organisations, open to all persons able to use their services and willing to accept 
the responsibilities of membership, without gender, social, racial, political or 
religious discrimination. 
 
CP #2, Democratic Member Control: Co-operatives are democratic 
organisations controlled by their members, who actively participate in setting 
their policies and making decisions. Men and women serving as elected 
representatives are accountable to the membership. In primary co-operatives 
members have equal voting rights (one member, one vote) and co-operatives at 
other levels are also organised in a democratic manner. 
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CP #3, Member Economic Participation: Members contribute equitably to, and 
democratically control, the capital of their co-operative. At least part of that 
capital is usually the common property of the co-operative. Members usually 
receive limited compensation, if any, on capital subscribed as a condition of 
membership. Members allocate surpluses for any or all of the following purposes: 
developing their co-operative, possibly by setting up reserves, part of which at 
least would be indivisible; benefiting members in proportion to their transactions 
with the co-operative; and supporting other activities approved by the 
membership. 
 
CP #7, Concern for Community: Co-operatives work for the sustainable 
development of their communities through policies approved by their members. 
 
ODP #3 addressed a sizable portion of CPs #1 and #7.   
      Realignment with the overall bundle of CPs could lead to significant outcomes.  
North Dakota has a rich history of co-operatives participating is economic and 
community development.  The so-called Co-operative Fever of 1991 (Patrie, 1998) had 
substantial participation by North Dakota electric co-operatives, including VEC and 
Basin.  This is yet again an emanation of co-operatives as latent community development 
capacity; all it takes is the right conditions and catalytic actors to drive the co-operative 
toward community development engagement. 
      Currently, VEC is helping to both contribute to maintenance of the existing social 
structure (which is critical in an environment of rapid influx of in-migrants, that could 
cause a great deal of chaos), while also building individual and collective capabilities for 
engagement in community governance.  The current leadership of the electric co-
operative is looking at nurturing the next generation of talent take the helm through the 
Member Advisory Committee. 
      Strong adherence to the preferences of local actors does not come without some 
pitfalls.  Co-operatives exhibit great potential to influence the larger system.  Officials at 
US DoE made it clear that NRECA and the rural electric co-ops have immense political 
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clout, that clout being used for initiative deemed worthy by key leaders in the sector.  
Electric co-operatives have not been actively pushing awareness of the need to convert 
from coal to renewables such as wind, translating into a situation whereby member-
owners are not mobilizing en masse for rapid conversion.  Electric co-operative clout is 
not used to grow the co-operative movement or community development capacity so 
much as to limit change, especially the shift from coal to renewables.  Basin, for 
example, is only looking to build its share of renewables within its portfolio, not to 
convert it completely.  Basin projects it will not need new electric generation capacity 
until 2018 (Rebenitsch, R., personal communication, August 18, 2011), meaning Basin, 
with the greatest capacity of all energy producer to develop North Dakotas wind regime, 
will be relatively idle in this area, reducing co-operative participation in renewable 
proliferation, and leaving the gate wide open for IOUs to saturate the wind regime.! 
Concluding Discussion 
      The contributions of this study are both small and large.  But what stands out to 
this researcher is this: The electric energy commons is complicated, the IOUs are 
powerful, and government policy plays a commanding role in shaping the system.  And 
yet co-operatives have demonstrated a long-term, successful track record for not only 
governing the energy commons, but maintaining their underlining institutional logical 
orientation despite the isomorphic tendencies of the system.  The implications are 
enormous.  Rural communities equipped with the proper set of institutions and leadership 
can govern over one of the most sophisticated resource systems known to humankind. 
      This dissertation was somewhat exploratory in nature, and therefore could not 
address all of the critical questions uncovered and unaddressed.  What remains to be seen 
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is how the critical consciousness of institutional actors emanates, the form it takes, how it 
is harnessed and how it is engaged.  Do these institutions and their stewards desire to be 
forces for community robustness against corrosive social forces?  Are alternative models 
to the status quo –specifically co-operatives- the optimal model for enhanced community 
development?  Do co-operatives have the capacity to attempt to become national 
policymakers merely by acting, not necessarily counting on external agents to take the 
electric energy system to the next stage?  And if so, is this a good idea? 
      What is clear is that the wind energy development phenomenon should not be 
presumed to always be a benefit or detriment to a host community.  The positive 
externalities of a wind farm depend on how it is operated, the underlying logics of the 
ownership model, who governs the firm and their underlying motivations, and within 
what framework of rules the firm functions under.  Furthermore, one cannot underscore 
the importance of intentionality; reliance on spontaneous community development 
outcomes is a naïve approach in that it presumes the mere introduction of a major 
development project would result in positive externalities, a result that can never be 
guaranteed without some level of community intervention. 
      This is a problem of passive development, of allowing “markets” to happen as 
opposed to intentionally designing or controlling for development outcomes (the invisible 
hand of the market).  Wind energy development receives government assistance with 
virtually zero strings attached, as if the consumption of public goods confers little if any 
responsibility to provide for the commons.  To place absolute trust in the community or 
public orientated virtues of the investor-owned firm is naïve; the investor-owned firm is 
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not legally or normatively expected to account for the public interest.40  As noted at the 
beginning of this dissertation, the historical pathways for energy development has had 
unintended, negative community impacts.  Government policy that extolls privileged 
status onto one type of institution should at bare minimum account for or mitigate the 
deleterious impacts that institution may externalize onto a host community. 
      There is no doubt that wind energy promises to transform rural communities via 
numerous socio-ecological mechanisms.  The studies encapsulated in this dissertation 
were conducted from an underlying assumption that the introduction of new wind energy 
infrastructure interacts with local level community structure.  Wind energy development 
very well could have a significant impact on the livelihood of millions.  Marginalized 
groups could be empowered to have a greater voice in community governance, or those 
with inordinate local influence could be further strengthened.  The subsequent questions 
of wind farm ownership become of central interest in that ownership is presumed to be a 
partial determinant as to how actors navigate systemic structural pathways at multiple 
levels, and how those actors transfuse the attributes of the resource system with the 
attributes of the community. 
      The analysis provides a lot for developers and policymakers to consider, 
particularly with considerations of the efficacy or usefulness of institutional design.  The 
two institutions have different underlying logics guiding them.  But, it is also reasonable 
to ascertain that given features of the firm should offer an additional inducement for the 
actors wishing to interact with it.  An IOU will more likely attract individuals personally 
motivated to accrue financial wealth, and co-operatives will more likely attract !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40     There are increasing incidents of investor-owned wind farms refusing to power-down their generators when requested by the 
Independent System Operators, due to the need to produce as much revenue as possible; the unfettered private profit motive is indeed 
a threat to the robustness of the energy commons.   
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individuals with a service-orientation.  Obviously this does not always neatly align, 
which is why not all institutions exhibit the same organizational culture.  At the end of 
the day, fallible human beings running the firms determine the firm’s value orientation, 
informed by -or despite of- the institutional logic. 
      Energy policy involves how and why actors use essential resources to supply the 
grid, as well as how the grid infrastructure is shared and stewarded.  A central tension sits 
at its heart.  On the one hand, following from the concept of "the commons," the electric 
system is in part stewarded to varying degrees by every citizen, and every citizen has 
some form of governance duty responsibility over that system (from paying their energy 
bill, conserving energy, to serving on an electric utility’s board).  On the other hand, in 
the American economic system significant weight has been granted to private interests 
with regards to the right to extract natural resources, process them into useable “things,” 
(goods, or services) and to profit from that process –oftentimes enhanced through 
government subsidy- so long as those private interests follow rules established by the 
political process, citizen governance (democratic administration) is diminished.  This is 
partially a result of major shifts in government policymaker orientations over the last 
couple of decades (Clinton-Gore’s “reinventing government,” neoliberalism, and the 
more recent anti-government movements).  A commonality is the misplaced rejection of 
collective or community governance regimes, stemming from the conflation of forms of 
collective action for suboptimal state or central planning.  Government policy then 
appears to confer privilege on the closed-door, for-profit, investor-owned firm out of the 
presumption that the investor-owned firm will always offer the optimal policy outcome.            
      The energy commons -and increasingly many resource systems- operate under an 
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isomorphic market logic (DiMaggio & Powell, n.d.) whereby actors within the action 
arena are taken on attributes similar to or in alignment with the investor-owned firm.  The 
provision of public goods is viewed by policymakers as optimally distributed via market 
mechanisms, resulting in policy emphasizing competition and decentralization as proxies 
for non-state control.  The replacement for “the state” with “the market” presupposes a 
false binary, limiting choice, cultivating a system that is guided by “free” market 
ideological perspectives that shapes the governance structure.  The prescribed market-
based solution evades criticism for tendencies to function much like a centralized 
autocratic state (crowding out of entrepreneurship, inefficiency, and monopolistic 
behavior).  This results in a situation in which government policy conflates means 
(markets and competition) with ends (choice, self governance, and robustness) with a 
lack of critical self-reflection.  The system is in a self-perpetuating mode, wherein the 
underlying faith in markets gets stronger and stronger despite the warning signs of 
impending tragedy (in the real of fiscal responsibility, energy security, and global climate 
change) (Bourdieu, 2001). 
      Robust public governance is about more than mere non-state, market-oriented 
institutional arrangements.  Aligica and Tarko (2011, p. 246), commenting on 
Bloomington School governance studies, remind us that: 
Ostroms’ exploration led to the conclusion that the discussion on polycentricity is 
not just a discussion about multiple decision-making centers and monopolies of 
power, but also a discussion about rules, constitutions, fundamental political 
values, and cultural adaptability in maintaining them (Aligica & Tarko, 2011, p. 
246). 
 
And yet the inherent conflicts between joint ownership, values, public participation, 
adaptability, and the exploitation of natural resources goes largely unaddressed in U.S. 
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energy policy.  Incomplete, investor-friendly government policy harms “alternative” 
institutions creating a power vacuum readily exploited by the dominant (market-logic-
oriented) institutions. 
     The point here is that this dissertation reveals that government energy policy is 
missing an opportunity to make meaningful contributions toward enhancing community 
self-help governance and development capabilities.  Energy, as an industrial sector, 
generates substantial revenues, and the sector could be further strengthened through 
citizen engagement.  What is troubling is that government energy policy may be doing 
the opposite, leaving communities wide open to exploitation through systemic erosion of 
self-governing capacities.   
      Actors learn democracy in part “by doing.”  But the emphasis of policymakers in 
the 20th century toward Weberian efficiency and Wilsonian bureaucratic administration 
paradigm means deliberate debate, dialogue and collective action has been slowly 
subsumed by expert thought-leaders.  Individuals are increasingly left to feel powerless 
due to decreasing venues for participation in the “art and science of association.”  Skills 
related to problem solving, building trust and enhancing reciprocity -and venues for being 
listened to by the powerful- are diminished.  The forms of collective action center instead 
on seemingly unending partisan conflict (youth engagement in violent gang activity, 
adults become rent-seeking, and so on). 
      The way by which a wind farm impacts its host community is found in the long-
term stewardship of the wind regimes and the resources generated by the firm; local 
ownership is one approach that seems to enhance community benefits (Kildegaard & 
Myers-Kuykindall, 2006; Tolbert, et al., 2002).  In this concern, there are two major 
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points of departure a co-operative has from an IOU that should come to the attention of 
community developers and those advocating inclusive community governance.  The first 
major departure is that an investor-owned firm has a number of legal barriers isolating 
broad-based participation, whereas a co-operative serves as a point of entry for 
participating in governance over a good or resource.  A community actually cedes a great 
deal of governance rights when an investor-owned firm is given control over local 
resources.  The investor-owned firm may be absentee-owned; meaningful interaction 
with the firm’s central decision-makers (executives, shareholders, etc.) may involve 
extensive coordination, or even outside arbiters (such as state or federal courts) to acquire 
minimal interactions for the purposes of discussing base concerns of the community. 
      Any member-owner of a co-operative has a right to certain governance 
mechanisms of the electric co-operative.  There are of course the performance reports and 
general membership meetings that are part-and-parcel of the electric co-operative model.  
But there are also direct democracy mechanisms, such as the capacity to run for the 
board, participate in public advisory events, and personal interaction with the locally 
based staff and board members. 
      This brings us to the second major departure; a member-owner has a right to 
participate in an electric co-operative.  Even a corrupt co-operative must allow some 
minimal amount of member owner participation by the community members; a fully 
operational IOU is not necessarily obligated to do so if it is not spelled out in the 
contractual details.  That also means an electric co-operative can be governed or reformed 
from a number of points. 
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      The study of Ward County, North Dakota found that the institutional logic of the 
co-operative is unlike that of the investor-owned firm.  Electric co-operatives are by 
institutional design (and legal statute) member-owner governed.  They are also nested 
within their community.  There is a bare minimal recognition of participatory rights to 
governance and monitoring.  This means that electric co-operatives operate as a gateway, 
an access point to active participation in the governance of wind energy and the electric 
grid as a whole.  Taken on the whole, the electric co-operative provides a venue by which 
citizens may actually do democracy, aggregate resources to enhance the local co-
operative, and foster a system that mitigates the public service paradox through consumer 
engagement in provision and procurement processes.  Even a stale electric co-operative 
provides additional value that an IOU would be reluctant to offer, namely that the very 
existence of an electric co-operative is at minimum latent community development. 
      The rural electric co-operative sector is rife with stories of can-do collective 
action, of people volunteering to pay for the neighbor’s member equity, of farmers 
volunteering their time and equipment to dig post holes and string wire across vast 
terrains.  Many of these early electric co-operatives went on to start telecom co-
operatives, drinking and wastewater co-operatives, and credit unions.  A few exploratory 
studies found that co-operatives “outlive” their corporate counterparts (Murray, 2011; 
Stringham & Lee, 2011), and make the community wealth rooted through local 
ownership (Alperovitz, 2011).  These are long-lived institutions that engender public 
entrepreneurship and build communitywide social capital.  
      While an electric co-operative may cover a large geographic territory (as is the 
case of Basin), a member-owner located hundreds of miles away can still access the 
!!
! 243!
central co-operative through one of Basin’s owner-co-operatives; the local distribution 
co-operative.  And through this distribution co-operative’s network, the individual 
member-owner can attempt to mobilize other distribution co-operatives under the Basin 
umbrella to influence change. 
      The power of the electric co-operative is that, by default, it incorporates more 
actors in the governance process.  If the energy generator is co-operatively-owned, the 
staff and the board stewards the firm with locality in mind.  These groups come from the 
service territory of the electric co-operative, providing a number of venues for member-
owners to engage the direct stewards.  Even then, these direct stewards can catalyze 
involvement as is being done in the case of VEC’s Member-Advisory Committee, which 
is fostering a new generation of co-operative leaders.  The electric co-operatives certainly 
make a good faith effort at educating their member-owners, as well as the general public 
(indeed there is a renewed effort by NRECA to get their co-operative member base to 
educate the individual members, and have them advocate for co-op-positive policy) 
      No institutional arrangement will result is some manner of predestined outcome.  
Recall that in the case of Ward County, the two electric co-operatives exhibited relatively 
close links with the growth machine coalition (as did the IOU in McLean County, 
Illinois).  While VEC is certainly working to build its member-owner capability to 
perform community governance, one should be concerned that the efforts of VEC to 
build a civic culture may be a wash in the end due to their strong interactions with the 
growth machine coalitions; co-operatives could also serve a powerful role in co-opting 
the local community. 
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      The way a co-operative functions has big implications as it pertains to broad-
based wealth creation and community development.  The governance mechanisms of the 
electric co-operative seem to produce an iterative approach to collective resource 
management whereby community actors may cycle through the co-operative and transmit 
new knowledge throughout the community.  This matters for relatively minor operational 
issues, such as an understanding of utility bill.  Additionally, major social dilemmas 
benefit from such engagement -global climate change and the intersection with energy 
policy in particular- in that these dilemmas will require a broadly-based movement of 
engaged citizens at a number of levels, using a number approaches, to pose new, 
innovative solutions (Ostrom, 2009).  An IOU simply does not see this as a major 
component of their operations.  
      There is certainly enhanced value offered by this co-operative-owned wind farm, 
and that does seem to stem from the co-operative ownership model.  The existence of a 
co-operative is not enough to claim community development. However, developing the 
features of a co-operative (adherence toward core principles, enhancing member-owner 
engagement in participatory governance) moves the co-operative in that direction.  In this 
way, it would seem appropriate to claim co-operatives –generally speaking- as a form of 
latent community development capacity. 
      The reluctance to claim co-operatives as institutionalized community 
development is appropriate.  It runs the risk of fostering complacency, limiting self-
reflection, and degrading praxis.  Institutional analysts would be keen to avoid making a 
value claim absent of a number of parameters. 
      A solid conclusion of this research is that there is absolutely no reason why electric 
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co-operatives should be at a structural or policy disparity from their IOU counterparts, 
whether it be wind or other elements of federal energy policy.  If energy policy is truly an 
all-of-the-above proposition, then a variety of institutions must be allowed to take 
advantage of government subsidies as well.  Policy, as it stands, privileges absentee, 
private ownership and stewardship of the grid and natural resources.  The general public 
is, by design, excluded.  Should the current trend continue, private, civic-adverse 
institutions will be the de facto models that proliferate.   
      It may seem impossible to broaden public policy to account for electric co-
operatives and their participating in deploying wind energy in an era of government 
austerity.  The capital-intensive nature of wind energy commands significant upfront 
costs.  Capital-intensive projects are going to be out of the reach of communities and non-
standard business models (due in part to state sponsorship of privilege), and instead suit 
the typical role of private investors.  But this is another problematic area wherein electric 
co-operatives offer an additional value or solution to policymakers seeking to harness 
these processes for added community development outcomes.   
      Energy policy in Denmark and Germany has carved out a role for collective or 
crowd sourced financing, leveraging community financial buy-in to advance wind energy 
development.  U.S. energy policy could go a long way toward opening the system up to 
smaller scale investing by engaging electric co-operatives as leaders in such a process.  
Electric co-operatives could harness their member-owner network to raise investment 
capital, the federal government could provide a tax advantage to encourage such 
investment, and the development of new wind energy infrastructure would be owned by 
the communities whose natural resources provide the fuel.  This seems like a reasonable, 
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low-cost for the government approach toward rapid development of wind energy. 
      Elinor Ostrom implores scholars to look at real-world examples of collective 
action successes and failures (2007 p. 9) in an effort to build healthy, robust 
communities.  There is immense potential for diverse types of institutions outside of just 
the market and state to provide solutions to critical social dilemmas facing individuals 
and their communities.  Electric co-operatives –and the co-operative sector as whole- 
provide an extraordinarily rich backdrop with which to better understand how to cope 
with collective action dilemmas.  This is in part because little attention has been given 
toward institutional models such as co-operatives, which exhibit quasi market and quasi 
government features.  And yet this institutional model has received little attention toward 
these ends.  A new, coordinated approach to understanding the co-operative model should 
provide new, innovative approaches toward addressing the major concerns awaiting 
communities at large.  It is the task of the research community to address this deficiency. 
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Appendix A: Community Survey Informed Consent 
[insert date] 
 
Keith Taylor (a PhD candidate in the Department of Human and Community Development from 
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) is researching the impacts of wind energy 
generation on communities in Illinois and North Dakota; this project is being applied to Keith’s 
dissertation completion requirement.  The research is being performed under the professional 
advisement of Professor Gale Summerfield, Director of the Women and Gender in Global 
Perspectives Program (also at the University of Illinois).  Keith is attempting to understand how 
energy generating facilities may be utilized for community and economic development.  Keith 
will be collecting data, as well as interviewing community residents and stakeholders, such as 
you. 
 
The interview will last approximately half an hour. We would like to ask you about your 
experiences with the local wind farm. You do not have to answer any question that you do not 
want to. We will keep the questionnaires confidential and not identify any participants. There are 
no right or wrong answers. Your name and any other identifying information will not be used for 
any purposes. We would like to audio record the interview but no names will be placed on the 
digital recorder, and you may request that we turn the digital recorder off at any time. 
 
There is no known risk in this study outside of the risks of daily life. If at any time you have 
questions about this research project, please feel free to contact Professor Gale Summerfield at 
217-333-1977.  As adviser of the project, she is happy to address any concerns you may have.  
You are welcome to call collect if you identify yourself as a research participant.  In addition, if 
you have any questions about your rights as a participant in research involving human subjects, 
please feel free to contact the University of Illinois Institutional Review Board (IRB) Office at 
217-333-2670 or irb@uiuc.edu.  Again, you are welcome to call collect if you identify yourself as 
a research participant.   
 
We appreciate your willingness to participate in the study and again thank you for your time.     
 
__________________________     _______________________ 
PhD Student Keith Taylor, Principal Investigator Date 
University of Illinois, Human and Community Development 
268 Bevier Hall, 905 S. Goodwin Avenue, Urbana, IL 61801 
Phone: 217-259-1145                      Fax:  217-244-7877                        Email: ktayl2@illinois.edu 
******************************************************************************
************* 
Your signature below indicates that you understand the information provided above and have 
decided to participate. 
 
__________________________  ______________ 
Signature of Participant   Date 
 
!  I agree for this interview to be audiotaped. 
!  I am at least 18 years old. 
 !
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Appendix B: Community Wind Interview Guide 
 
Community Opportunities in Alternative Energy Generating Communities 
Interview Protocol for Communities with Wind Farms 
Date and time of interview____________________________ 
Interviewer______________________ 
Location of interview________________________________ 
 
BACKGROUND: 
Keith Taylor (a PhD candidate in the Department of Human and Community Development from 
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) is studying the social impacts of wind energy 
generation on communities in Illinois and North Dakota; this project is being applied to Keith’s 
dissertation completion requirement.  Through discussions with key community stakeholders 
in Illinois and North Dakota communities, Keith hopes to identify opportunities as well 
as concerns that have appeared in the communities associated with the alternative energy 
projects.  Keith will be performing data collection, as well as interviewing community 
residents and stakeholders, such as yourself.   
 
ASSURANCES: 
Everything is completely confidential. This isn't journalism. Your name will not appear 
in any of the published materials or files except for the consent form [which will be kept 
separately from the notes] unless you state explicitly on record that you are comfortable 
with your name attached to the project. There will never be direct quotes attached to your 
name or your institution. The interview should take about15-30 minutes. 
 
QUESTIONS: 
1. What is your work (title, position) and where does your work take place? 
 
2. What community (town and county) do you live in? 
 
3. What are the critical issues facing this community? 
 
4. What assets and opportunities exist in this community that could address these critical 
issues? 
 
5 a. Are you aware of particular actions being taken to address the various 
opportunities and challenges/threats in the region?  
b. If so, can you describe them? 
 
6. We would like to understand how the town and wind farm works together. 
a. Has the wind farm changed how your day-to-day life in any way?  What about 
your business or where you work?  Please explain. 
b. Do you do any official business with the wind farm?  By that I mean do you 
have any contracts with the wind farm, or do you provide any products of services 
for them?  
i. Do any of your friends or family do any official business with the wind 
farm?  
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 c. Are there any businesses you frequently use in town? If so, please explain. 
 
7.  a. How did the wind farm come to be?   
b. Who were the founders?  [Were you involved in the start-up of the farm in any 
way?]  
c. Did any groups outside of the community participate in the process and why?  
d. Did the geographic location of the community serve as a decisive factor in 
locating the wind farm here?  
e. Were there any concerns expressed by critics?  If yes: Were these concerns 
addressed and how? 
 
8. What groups of individuals participate in the day-to-day and long-term operations of 
the wind farm?  [Clarify: “who owns the facility?  Who profits directly from it?  Do any 
outside groups have a vested interest in X?”] 
 
9. How has the wind farm benefited your community?   
 
10.  a. Do you see the wind farm as a permanent part of the community?  Why or why 
not? 
b. Has the economy had an impact on the wind farm? What impact has the 
economy had on other aspects of life in the community? 
 
11.  a. Are there any particular local organizations, such as a community development 
group, environmentalists, or energy interests, that are related to the work of the 
wind farm?  
b. Did new organizations start up for the wind farm? If so, what do they do, and 
do they still exist? 
c. Do you belong to any organization that worked with or opposed the wind farm? 
d. What are the main organizations in the town? [Church, community 
development group, growers associations?] 
 
12. What has the general community sentiment been toward the wind farm?  [Follow up] 
Why do you think the community reacted in such a way? 
 
13. What type of local development has been done in support of or as a result of the wind 
farm? 
  
14. Do you think wind energy production is good for your community? What impacts 
does wind energy productions have economically and politically? 
 
15. Accounting for the numerous assets in your community (such as the wind farm), what 
actions do you believe could be taken, utilizing those assets to further local community 
development? 
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16. [THESE TWO QUESTIONS ARE INTENDED TO DEVELOP A SOCIAL 
NETWORK DIAGRAM OF THE COMMUNITY. ADMINISTER TO 
RESPONDENTS AND COLLECT UPON COMPLETION]. 
a. If a project was before your community, please list up to five people whose 
support would be essential for the project to succeed.  Please indicate each 
individual’s name, occupation, approximate age, sex and approximate years the 
individual has resided in your community.  
 
Name Occupation Sex Age 
1.__________________________ ___________________ M   F  
2.__________________________ ___________________ M   F  
3.__________________________ ___________________ M   F  
4.__________________________ ___________________ M   F  
5.__________________________ ___________________ M   F  
 
 b. Name the three people most effective in stopping projects?  
 
Name Occupation Sex Age 
1.__________________________ ___________________ M   F  
2.__________________________ ___________________ M   F  
3.__________________________ ___________________ M   F  
 
 
 
This concludes the interview.  Thank you for your time.  Would you like a copy of the 
results?  If so, please write your name, address, and phone number below. 
 
Name __________________________________________ 
 
Address_________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Phone: _______________ 
 
 
 
 !
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Appendix C: Survey Informed Consent 
[insert date] 
 
Keith Taylor (a PhD candidate in the Department of Human and Community Development from 
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) is researching the impacts of wind energy 
generation on communities in Illinois and North Dakota; this project is being applied to Keith’s 
dissertation completion requirement.  The research is being performed under the professional 
advisement of Professor Gale Summerfield, Director of the Women and Gender in Global 
Perspectives Program (also at the University of Illinois).  Keith is attempting to understand the 
market and regulatory forces at play in wind energy development.  Keith will be collecting data, 
as well as interviewing wind energy stakeholders, such as you. 
 
The interview will last approximately half an hour. We would like to ask you about your 
experiences with wind energy. You do not have to answer any question that you do not want to. 
We will keep the questionnaires confidential and not identify any participants. There are no right 
or wrong answers. Your name and any other identifying information will not be used for any 
purposes. We would like to audio record the interview but no names will be placed on the digital 
recorder, and you may request that we turn the digital recorder off at any time. 
 
There is no known risk in this study outside of the risks of daily life. If at any time you have 
questions about this research project, please feel free to contact Professor Gale Summerfield at 
217-333-1977.  As adviser of the project, she is happy to address any concerns you may have.  
You are welcome to call collect if you identify yourself as a research participant.  In addition, if 
you have any questions about your rights as a participant in research involving human subjects, 
please feel free to contact the University of Illinois Institutional Review Board (IRB) Office at 
217-333-2670 or irb@uiuc.edu.  Again, you are welcome to call collect if you identify yourself as 
a research participant.   
 
We appreciate your willingness to participate in the study and again thank you for your time.     
 
__________________________     _______________________ 
PhD Student Keith Taylor, Principal Investigator Date 
University of Illinois, Human and Community Development 
268 Bevier Hall, 905 S. Goodwin Avenue, Urbana, IL 61801 
Phone: 217-259-1145                      Fax:  217-244-7877                        Email: ktayl2@illinois.edu 
******************************************************************************
************* 
Your signature below indicates that you understand the information provided above and have 
decided to participate. 
 
__________________________  ______________ 
Signature of Participant   Date 
 
!  I agree for this interview to be audiotaped. 
!  I am at least 18 years old. 
 
 
 !!
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Appendix D: Wind Energy Interview Guide 
 
Community Opportunities in Alternative Energy Generating Communities 
Interview Protocol for Wind Energy Stakeholders 
Date and time of interview____________________________ 
Interviewer______________________ 
Location of interview________________________________ 
 
BACKGROUND: 
Keith Taylor (a PhD candidate in the Department of Human and Community Development from 
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) is studying the social impacts of wind energy 
generation on communities in Illinois and North Dakota; this project is being applied to Keith’s 
dissertation completion requirement.  Through discussions with key stakeholders in the wind 
energy sector, Keith hopes to identify opportunities as well as concerns that have 
appeared in the communities associated with the alternative energy projects.  Keith will 
be performing data collection, as well as interviewing stakeholders, such as yourself.   
 
ASSURANCES: 
Everything is completely confidential. This isn't journalism. Your name will not appear 
in any of the published materials or files except for the consent form [which will be kept 
separately from the notes] unless you state explicitly on record that you are comfortable 
with your name attached to the project. There will never be direct quotes attached to your 
name or your institution. The interview should take about15-30 minutes. 
 
QUESTIONS: 
1. What is your work (title, position) and where does your work take place? 
 
2. What community (town and county) do you live in? 
 
3. What are the critical issues facing the wind energy sector from your perspective? 
 
4. What assets and opportunities exist that could address these critical issues? 
 
5. We would like to understand how communities and wind farms works together. 
a. How do wind farms change the local livelihoods of the community hosting the 
wind energy infrastructure? 
 
6. We would like to understand how the development process plays out in the 
communities hosting wind farms.  
 a. How does the wind energy development process typically begin? 
b. Who typically is engaged in the initial development stages of wind energy 
development?  
c. To what extent are local level community members typically engaged in the 
development process? 
d. Do the geographic location of the community serve as a decisive factor in 
locating the wind farm here?  
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i. What role does the political climate play in siting a wind farm within a 
given community? 
e. What are the general concerns expressed by critics?  Are those concerns often 
addressed, and if so, how?   
 
7. What groups of individuals participate in the day-to-day and long-term operations of 
the wind farm?  [Clarify: “who owns the facility?  Who profits directly from it?  Who 
regulates it?  Do any outside groups have a vested interest in X?”] 
 
8. How wind farms benefit local level communities?   
 
9. Do you see wind farms as a permanent part of the community?  Why or why not? 
 
10. Has the economy had an impact on wind energy development?  
 
11. What is the general community sentiment been toward the wind farm?  [Follow up] 
Why do you think communities react in such a way? 
 
12. What type of local development is done in support of or as a result of the wind farm?  
Who typically covers the expenses for such development?  Who typically benefits from 
such development? 
  
13. Do you think wind energy production is good for communities? What impacts does 
wind energy productions have economically and politically? !
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